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The hedge fund industry aggregate is approximately US$ 3.61tn assets under management (Prequin, 
2020). Despite the significance of these numbers and their potential effect on the global economic 
stability, the literature remains silent regarding domicile-strategic related aspects of performance, the 
differences in management style and performance between male and female managers, and the flow-
performance relationship based on the ethnic association of the hedge fund manager.  
This doctoral thesis focuses on three original topics concerning hedge fund performance and corporate 
governance. The first topic examines the impact of geolocation and investment strategy on the 
estimation of risk in performance persistence measurement dynamics. Secondly, we analyse gender 
differences in hedge fund performance employing risk-adjusted performance metrics and two 
performance persistence models. Lastly, the third topic examines whether the ethnic association of the 
hedge fund manager can affect the investment choice of the hedge fund investor.  
This thesis reports strong performance persistence when analysing the individual domicile or strategy 
in line with previous findings. However, as we move to consider a combination of both domicile and 
the investment strategy, we can observe diminished persistence and its loss and reversal. These cross-
comparison results indicate that the sole reliance on either domicile or the investment strategy clusters 
in isolation can be grossly misleading and lead to significant losses.  
In the sphere of gender differences, the findings indicate that both male and female hedge fund managers 
tend to produce similar risk-adjusted returns under the umbrella of lower-order statistics. However, with 
the incorporation of performance measures that account for hedge funds’ asymmetric returns 
distribution, female managers tend to produce lower returns than their male counterparts. These findings 
show that controlling for higher-order statistics is crucial in identifying gender differences in hedge 
fund performance. Further results reveal both positive and negative performance fluctuating between 
genders (with the dominance of statistically significant cases amongst male managers). Under the 
parametric approach, the performance persistence is dependent not only on managers’ gender but also 
on the adopted time horizon. More importantly, the results underline the importance of a diverse 
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approach, such as the deployment of risk-adjusted metrics and non/parametric persistence methods 
when analysing hedge funds performance. 
Lastly, the ethnic minority hedge fund managers receive significantly fewer capital inflows than their 
non-minority counterparts yet simultaneously deliver better (average) raw returns/performance. In 
addition to the regression-based approach, this part of the thesis also applies the risk-adjusted metrics 
to identify whether the investors’ choice is statistically justified. The risk-adjusted metrics results 
indicate fluctuation in the level of advantage exhibited by the two groups of hedge fund managers. The 
presented findings provide a unique contribution to the literature concerning race/ethnicity, hedge 
funds, and human behaviour.  
This doctoral thesis draws attention to the underdeveloped areas of the academic literature in the first 
place concerning hedge fund domicile and its investment strategy, managers’ gender and managers’ 
ethnicity. In all cases, it shows that the approach to the analysis requires creativity and accountability 
for statistical anomalies that are very often traditionally associated with hedge funds. Furthermore, it 
also indicates that the thorough analysis of hedge funds requires multiple approaches, often 
concentrating on the initial data formatting prior to the multi-layered main analysis. The results and the 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the thesis 
In recent years, the hedge fund industry has experienced significant growth. The assets under 
management have grown from approx. US$1.7tn in 2009 (The Hedge Fund Journal, 2010) to US$ 
3.61tn in 2020 (Prequin, 2020). To better understand the magnitude of this figure, one could compare 
it with Germany’s GDP of US$ 3.84tn reported in 2019 (World Bank, 2020). The hedge funds are 
known under many definitions, although the following description will suffice for the purpose of this 
doctoral thesis. Hedge funds are private, pooled investments with the ability to take long/short positions 
across global markets. They can trade in highly illiquid assets, utilise complex trading strategies 
containing leverage and various exotic derivatives. In most cases, these elusive investment vehicles 
enjoy a relative lack of regulation. Since their inception in the 1950s, hedge funds were always looked 
to for their astonishing performance (Bridgewater, Soros, and Citadel), which in turn has gradually 
elevated their reputation to ‘the money-making machines’ (Rittereiser and Kochard, 2010). The industry 
did not thrive without controversies, and more specifically, significant defaults, for example, Amaranth 
Advisors, LTCM, and Tiger Management.  
An accurate appraisal of hedge fund performance must recognise that the risk exposure to 
investment styles is constantly shifting as managers can change the fund’s focus. In that respect, risk 
management in hedge funds is prone to systematic biases as exposure to risk factors is changing (see 
Bollen and Whaley, 2009). The literature related to the performance persistence of hedge funds has 
grown exponentially in the last two decades. Nevertheless, despite its broad coverage of all the years 
from approximately the late 1970s until now, utilising all major databases and various methodologies, 
risk management with respect to the measurement of performance persistence remains largely 
unexplored. One of the major examples will be the data analysis focus of the previous researchers, who 
were mostly focused on either the aggregation of the global hedge fund universe under one umbrella 
and/or the strategic division. The frequent omission or underestimation of the domicile factor has not 
provided a complete risk-accountability, much needed in the hedge fund environment. The only time 
where the literature has shown consideration for the geolocation was in the case of research focused on 
the Asian and Australian, Italian, and solely Australian hedge fund environments (Koh, Koh and Teo, 
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2003; Steri, Giorginob and Vivianib, 2009; Do, Faff & Veeraraghavan, 2010). Thus, this thesis aims to 
address the unexplored differences between the domicile, strategy and the combination of both to 
provide a unique contribution to hedge fund related literature.  
Furthermore, fund performance is also largely attributed to the manager’s skill and his/her 
approach to risk. A significant part of fund-related literature focuses on gender differences and, more 
specifically, the approach towards both performance and risk. The literature shows that despite the 
increasing amount of gender research being undertaken in financial settings, the one setting almost 
never examined is hedge funds (e.g., Atkinson et al. 2003; Bollen and Posavac, 2018). The early studies 
(for example, Johnson and Powell, 1994; Powell and Ansic, 1997) prove that the gender factor matters, 
especially considering the attitude to risk. The same behaviours are confirmed in the mutual fund 
environment by Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) and/or Dwyer, Gilkeson and List (2002). 
Nonetheless, the hedge fund literature provides no answers regarding differences in risk, performance 
and/or performance persistence between genders. Therefore, this thesis provides a previously 
unexplored contrast, making a novel contribution to the literature.  
The second early dimension of self-identification, right after gender, is ethnicity/racial 
association (Epstein, 1978). The importance of ethnic/racial research is as pivotal as gender, especially 
given the prevailing differences and inequalities crystallising in almost any dimension (for example, 
Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi and Spalt, 2015; Politico, 2019). As previous researchers show (for example, 
Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel and Ramos, 2012; Röder and Walter, 2019), the 
most common relationship combination in the fund related literature is that of flows and performance. 
Interestingly, the studies concerning the ethnic/racial aspect with regards to capital flows, performance 
and risk do not exist, not in commonly examined mutual funds nor hedge funds. It is, therefore, the final 
aim of this thesis to address this issue and fill in the void in both hedge fund and corporate governance 
literature.  
In summary, this doctoral thesis aims to address the aforementioned unexplored concerns 
regarding geo-strategic performance, gender differences in performance, and the impact of ethnicity in 
capital flows, to provide an original contribution within the hedge fund related literature. 
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Chapter 3 1 of the thesis focuses on the empirical study concerning the risk in hedge fund 
performance persistence, focusing on geolocation and the investment strategy effects. The main 
findings of Chapter 3 indicate the presence of short-term performance persistence individually across 
both domicile and the investment strategy cluster. Interestingly, the fusion between the domicile and 
the investment strategy exhibits diminished persistence as well as its loss and reversal. Under the stricter 
parametric regime, yet without consideration for hedge fund specific risks, the results reveal dominant 
and statistically significant negative performance persistence in portfolios such as IRL and the USA. A 
similar occurrence takes place in the geo-strategic combinations and domiciles employing either the 
LSE or MLTI strategies. The incorporation of hedge fund specific risk changes the outcomes for several 
domiciles and the investment strategies and promotes almost all of them into the positive and 
statistically significant territory (except for IRL).  
 Chapter 4 investigates the risk-adjusted performance and performance persistence of hedge 
funds focusing on the gender of the fund manager. The main findings of Chapter 4 show that the 
performance of hedge funds managed by males and females is similar under the assumptions of metrics 
based on the lower-order statistics (for example, the Sharpe ratio). Furthermore, the incorporation of 
the third and fourth higher-order statistics reveals lower returns and higher risk amongst female hedge 
fund managers as compared with their male counterparts. Regarding the non-parametric performance 
persistence, the results indicate marginal underperformance of female managed funds. In the parametric 
(not yet adjusted for hedge fund risk) model, both genders struggle to maintain positive performance 
persistence and fluctuate between positive and negative cases depending on the time horizon. Lastly, 
the risk-adjusted performance persistence analysis results allow female managers to emerge in many 
cases into positive territory. Although, this emergence is not strong nor statistically significant enough 
to surpass male managed hedge funds. 
 Chapter 5 presents the empirical study concerning the impact of the hedge fund managers’ 
ethnicity/race on the flows of capital. One of the main findings of Chapter 5 shows that the ethnic 
 
1 This chapter has been published in Zopounidis, Benkraiem and Kalaitzoglou (2021) 
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minority hedge fund managers receive significantly lower flows of capital into their funds despite the 
generation of higher raw returns. Hence, at this point, dismissing the concept of rational statistical 
discrimination. Nonetheless, the analysis continues to examine the performance and risk of both clusters 
(minority and non-minority managers). The risk-adjusted metrics based on the lower-order statistics 
elevate hedge funds managed by the ethnic minorities. The same cannot be said about the lower partial 
moment metrics, where the non-minority managers take a marginal lead. The other metrics exhibit 
parity between both ethnic clusters, with the ones including the third and fourth higher-order statistics 
(such as Modified and Conditional Sharpe Ratio) providing a marginal advantage for the minority 
managed funds.  
 Chapter 3 provides an original contribution to the literature and is directly relevant to the 
practical investment applications. First, it presents previously unseen contrasts in the fund related 
literature (between domicile, investment strategy and the combination of both). Second, it shows that 
the sole reliance on either domicile or the investment strategy level focused clusters can be grossly 
misleading and lead to undesirable consequences. Third, the results of this chapter prove that the choice 
of the performance persistence appraisal methods is pivotal as the omission of the risk-adjusted 
approach can lead to misappraisal and losses.  
 Chapter 4 poses an original research question that has not been previously addressed in the 
hedge fund literature. More specifically, this chapter’s first contribution is to present the differences in 
risk-adjusted performance between male and female hedge fund managers. Second, it shows that 
controlling for higher-order statistics is pivotal in identifying the differences in performance between 
genders. Third, the results also draw a direct parallel to the earlier chapter and show that the choice of 
metrics and additionally various time horizons for the performance persistence analysis is of the utmost 
importance and can help the investor tailor their approach to risk and returns more accurately. 
 Chapter 5 makes an original contribution to the literature concerning not only hedge funds but, 
more importantly, ethnicity and race in the context of fund attractiveness and performance. The first 
major contribution of this chapter is the identification of flow levels, given the ethnic association of the 
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hedge fund manager. Second, it further examines hedge fund managers under the scope of risk-adjusted 
performance metrics to identify whether performance has influenced the investors' fund selection.  
Overall, this doctoral thesis raises awareness in one of the most secretive financial industries in the 
world, hedge funds. It draws attention to the need for a diverse approach in analysing these pooled 
investment vehicles. The application of methods is one area where hedge funds exhibit various 
properties while manipulating data points and their formulation is another. This thesis has shown that 
even the approaches we take for granted (such as the mere performance persistence analysis) may 
provide surprising results where domicile and the investment strategy converge. Furthermore, the reader 
can learn that gender and ethnic imbalances do exist, even in hedge funds. However, the matter may be 
slightly more complex than just simple and oft-quoted discrimination.  
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following way: Chapter 2 focuses on the 
literature review and is divided into three sub-sections, each representing an individual topic discussed 
in later chapters. Chapter 3 focuses on parametric and non-parametric performance persistence 
concerning geolocation and strategy effects. Chapter 4 provides an insight into gender differences in 
hedge fund performance using twelve risk-adjusted performance metrics and two performance 
persistence methods. Chapter 5 examines whether the racial association based on the first name of the 
hedge fund manager can affect hedge fund investors' investment choices. Lastly, conclusions are 










Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter delineates the literature review, which has been divided into three parts. Each 
part corresponds with the empirical chapters found in the later part of this PhD thesis. Thus, “On the 
underestimation of risk in hedge fund performance persistence: geolocation and investment strategy 
effects.” refers to the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3); “Gender differences in hedge fund 
performance.” is the second (Chapter 4); and “Hedge Fund Flows: Managers’ Ethnicity.” is the third 
and last empirical chapter (Chapter 5). 
2.2 On the underestimation of risk in hedge fund performance persistence: 
geolocation and investment strategy effects. 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the literature on the performance persistence of the Alternative Investment Funds 
(AIFs). In general, we show that the magnitude of performance persistence amongst AIFs exhibits a 
high degree of variation that is conditional on the country of domicile and investment strategy. We 
classify papers depending on whether the country of domicile is defined or undefined.  To provide more 
clarity on the literature around the AIFs, the data has been dissected based on the results: short and 
long-term persistence.  
2.2.2 Undefined Domiciles 
The following sub-sections aggregate all studies which do not explicitly denote the domicile of the AIFs 
they have analysed. Since the domicile focus is unknown/undefined, it is assumed that the entire 
databases (pre/post-cleaning) were collated to reflect the AIF industry.  
2.2.2.1 Short-Term Persistence 
Ever since their inception, the research into the performance persistence of the AIFs has rarely explored 
their full potential. Researchers have mostly focused on either the aggregation of the global hedge fund 
universe under one umbrella and/or the division based on the investment strategy. The frequent 
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omission or underestimation of the domicile factor has not provided a complete risk-accountability, 
much needed in the case of the AIFs. The modern performance persistence analysis of the AIFs began 
with the research of Park and Staum (1998). Their research was not only one of the first to focus on 
performance persistence but also controlled for the survivorship bias2. In their results, they have shown 
evidence of performance persistence at annual horizons (with substantial variations from year to year) 
within the aggregated universe of the AIFs pursuing the CTA strategy. In the following year, Brown et 
al. (1999) focused again, just like their predecessors, on the aggregated universe of AIFs, this time 
domiciled outside of the United States, identifying performance persistence in years 1991-1993, which 
reversed in the next two years. Their research was one of the first to depart from a commonly adopted 
aggregation of the all-in-one portfolio, focusing only on non-US funds.  
For approximately the same period but with significantly larger sample size, Edwards and Caglayan 
(2001) identified persistence with both winning and losing AIFs at both annual and bi-annual horizons, 
which differs significantly by the investment style. They have also indicated that the performance 
persistence of the AIFs can be attributed to the exploitation of market inefficiencies, which can be 
attained due to a relative lack of regulatory oversight. Other researchers also pointed towards interesting 
factors influencing performance persistence.  Thus, with Liang (1999), we can learn that the 
performance of AIFs can be enhanced by the incentivisation of the AIFMs. At the same time, Boyson 
(2003) shows that young-skilled AIFMs are the driving force behind quarterly performance persistence.   
Bares, Gibson and Gyger (2003) show that Relative Value and Specialist Credit focused AIFs exhibit 
the strongest persistence amongst all six of the analysed strategies.  
 
2 Survivorship bias refers to one of the most frequent and momentous weaknesses in statistical data analysis. The 
omission of its existence can result in erroneous investment decisions, which derive from statistically distorted 
data. It can be specifically responsible for overstating active hedge funds/mutual funds’ performance and in effect 
misleading investors. In the literature, survivorship bias is depicted in a two-dimensional spectrum: as a disparity 
in returns between live and defunct funds and/or the disparity between live & the aggregated universe (live + 




Others, such as Amenc, Bied and Martellini (2003), identify 8 out of 9 analysed investment strategies 
exhibiting performance persistence (i.e., exceeding 0.5 baselines in the Hurst Index [HI]) with Managed 
Futures being the only strategy below 0.5 in the HI (0.465), i.e. a mere 0.025 below the baseline.  
Brown and Goetzmann (2003) further show that the performance persistence of AIFs varies 
significantly across investment strategies. Another approach, which continuously focuses on the 
aggregation of the AIF universe, comes from Capocci and Hubner (2004), who identified persistence 
only for the mid-range (average return portfolio) AIFs.  
This result was further confirmed by Capocci, Corhay and Hübner (2005). Moreover, the authors show 
that Global Macro and Market Neutral were able to consistently outperform market returns. The 
supportive study comes from Harri and Brorsen (2004) and also shows that Market Neutral and FoHFs 
exhibit the strongest (short-term) persistence with Event-Driven and Global/Macro (see also Agarwal 
and Naik (2000a), Hentati-Kafell and Peretti (2015) and Gonzalez, Papageorgiou and Skinner (2016)). 
Kosowski, Naik and Teo (2007) and Joenvaara, Kosowski and Tolonen (2012) further show that some 
investment strategies exhibit stronger persistence (on the annual horizon); Long-Short Equity, 
Directional Traders, Relative Value and FoHFs. Their cluster-size focused analysis shows that the small 
AIFs exhibited strong annual persistence, whereas large AIFs persistence is much weaker. Moreover, 
they have identified that persistence amongst AIFs is sensitive to fund-specific limitations, e.g., share 
restrictions or the AuM. 
2.2.2.2 Long-Term Persistence 
In relation to long-term performance persistence, Kouwenberg (2003) has identified persistence on a 
three-year horizon, noting that the selection of persistently performing AIFs has been suppressed by a 
large number of funds disappearing from the market (see also Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov 
(2010)). While Sun, Wang and Zheng (2012) demonstrated that AIFs exhibit strong persistence within 
five years of their inception. The other factors influencing the performance persistence were identified 
by Bae and Yi (2012), who have shown that AIFs with inflow/outflow restrictions exhibit superior 
(winning) performance over the other funds. Finally, Ammann, Huber and Schmid (2013) showed that 
AIFs’ characteristics (AuM and leverage ratio) impact their long-term performance persistence. Their 
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findings reaffirmed Kouwenberg’s (2003) results, indicating (Alpha) performance persistence on the 
horizons of up to 36 months with statistically significant over six months and substantial (yet 
insignificant) during 24 months for all three analysed strategies: Equity Market Neutral, Global Macro 
and Emerging Markets. 
2.2.3 Defined Domiciles 
The following sub-section aggregate all studies, which denote the domicile of the AIFs they have 
analysed. It is worth noting that there are no studies with defined domiciles that investigate the long-
term performance persistence of AIFs.  
Agarwal and Naik (2000a) were one of the first proponents to analyse AIFs based on domicile. In their 
research, they have identified significant quarterly performance across all ten investment strategies, 
which successively diminished at bi-annual and annual levels. Their other research identified quarterly 
persistence attributable to continuously losing rather than winning AIFs (Agarwal and Naik, 2000b). 
Interestingly, they have underlined that analysing performance persistence amongst AIFs is far more 
critical than that of mutual funds due to its impact on their longevity (i.e. default rates). Chen and 
Passow (2003) continued to rely on the US-based AIFs market, showing that the AIFs with lower 
exposure to the factors identified by Agarwal and Naik (2000b) exhibited superior performance during 
both adverse and advantageous market conditions. Further work by Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek 
(2005) also built on Agarwal and Naik’s (2000b) research and found that performance analysis can be 
hampered by significant attritions in databases (mainly due to a fund's liquidations or the lack of 
continuous reporting to the database). 
In the Asian and Australian AIFs universe, Koh et al. (2003) employed single and multi-period 
persistence analysis, identifying performance persistence at monthly and quarterly intervals.  
The same result has been achieved by Henn and Meier (2004), who also identified significant 
persistence on the monthly and quarterly bases, which diminished towards the annual horizon. It is 
important to notice that despite describing and providing statistical descriptions of specific investment 
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strategies, their non-parametric (contingency table) persistence analysis focused solely on the 
aggregated universe.   
Steri et al. (2009) have also analysed the European environment, focusing on their analysis of the Italian 
AIFs, confirming monthly persistence but demonstrating that this persistence differs on quarterly and 
semi-annual horizons. On an important note, the peculiarity of the Italian AIFs industry is that 95% of 
AIFs are FoHFs. Further results also indicate that the Italian FoHFs exhibited lower performance when 
contrasted with traditional asset classes, i.e. stocks/bonds/commodities. 
Another study (this time solely focused on the Australian market) by Do et al. (2010), has shown that 
the Australian AIFs exhibit short-term monthly persistence. 
Overall, the review of the literature uncovers significant limitations in terms of geolocation focus. The 
majority of the aforementioned research focuses on either a globally aggregated approach, i.e., all AIFs 
under one umbrella usually divided based on the investment strategy, or the data clusters based on the 












2.3 Gender differences in hedge fund performance. 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The following section discussing the literature has been divided into two parts. The first part concerns 
gender related-aspects in the investment fund environment. At the same time, the second part focuses 
on the risk-adjusted metrics and the performance persistence application in HFs.  
2.3.1.1 The Gender Environment 
There exists a significant body of literature concerning gender differences and, more 
specifically, the approach towards performance and risk. A closer look at the literature reveals that 
despite the increasing number of gender research being undertaken in either mutual and/or retirement 
funds or the simulated (university) settings, one type of completely overlooked fund is hedge funds. 
One reason for this significant literature gap may stem from the fact that the number of females within 
the hedge fund universe (as well as the other types of funds) is significantly low. For example, according 
to Pavlenko-Lutton and Davis (2015), the number of female mutual fund (MF) managers account for 
approx. 9.4% - including mixed-gender teams. Whereas the percentage of the MFs managed solely by 
a female stands at merely 2.0%. In contrast, within the hedge funds universe, mixed teams account for 
approx. 4.6%, with sole female fund leadership at 2.6% (Aggarwal and Boyson, 2016).  
The review of the pre-1980s literature by Johnson and Powell (1994) indicates that women encounter 
‘glass ceilings’ within the organisations due to the perception that they are too risk-averse. Thus, being 
considered potentially less likely to make risky decisions necessary for the survival and/or success of 
the organisation. Subsequent studies from Powell and Ansic (1997) provide further evidence, 
supporting the view that the gender factor affects the attitudes towards financial risk, which in turn may 
arise from either a difference in strategic approach or individual motivation. In a similar vein, Dwyer 
et al. (2002) analyse 2000 mutual fund investors, generally confirming the findings of their predecessors 
(for example, Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998) that women as investors are more risk-averse than men. 
Nevertheless, the research employs another complementary control, the ‘investment knowledge’ of both 
male and female investors. The results imply a highly statistically significant difference between both 
sexes, with males exhibiting a higher degree of investment expertise. Therefore, implying that the 
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difference cannot be solely attributed to the ‘risk preference’ but instead to the specific ‘investment 
knowledge’. Similarly, to test financial literacy, Bucher-Koenen, Lusardi, Alessie, and Van Rooij 
(2017) employ a sample of 5700 households across the US, Germany, and Netherlands. Their findings 
show that females are less likely than males to provide correct answers, while they are more likely to 
admit they do not know what the answer is, which leads to the theory of overconfidence amongst males. 
Odean (1998) finds that overconfident individuals are prone to trade more than rational investors, which 
in turn impacts their expected utility. Barber and Odean (2001) further explore the idea through the 
acquisition of the data for 35 000 stock exchange investors over six years (1991-1997) and catalogue 
their activities by gender. Their analysis indicates that males trade 45% more often than females and 
reduce their annual net returns by 2.65 percentage points (pp), whereas females by a mere 1.72 pp. 
Interestingly, the study by Choi, Laibson, and Metrick (2002) into the trading behaviour of young male 
investors in two large 401(k) corporate plans leads to a similar conclusion. A further study into 401(k) 
by Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén (2003), resonates with Barber and Odean (2001) and confirms that 
men indeed invest not only more than women but also with higher frequency. Their findings show that 
males trade 55% more often than female investors and also confirm the results of Choi et al. (2002), 
showing that males invest a higher portion of their portfolios in equities. Moving across the ocean, the 
German environment has been proven to exhibit the same qualities (Dorn and Huberman, 2005). The 
gender profiles of the investors correlate with the aforementioned studies (focusing on the US market), 
i.e., young male investors trade more aggressively and with higher frequency than females. In a peculiar 
turn of events, the literature shows that the same pattern does not apply to China, where the trading 
volumes revolve around the same level for both genders (Feng and Seasholes, 2008).  
A more recent study from Bollen and Posavac (2017) combines the two aforementioned themes 
and analyses the impact of gender on the asset allocation between graduate business students and 
professional portfolio managers. As a result, they identify that non-professional (students) males select 
riskier portfolios than females. Also, Schmidt and Traub (2002), in their analysis (at the University of 
Kiel), find that the female students exhibit a more frequent and greater degree of risk aversion than their 
male counterparts. At the same time, the professional wealth managers of both genders select the same 
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portfolios. The examination of the performance and risk appetite in mutual funds pursuing a fixed-
income strategy shows that there are no significant differences when controlling for managers’ gender 
(Atkinson et al. 2003)3. The only substantial difference crystalises at the fund flow level. Furthermore, 
as the authors notice, the net flows of capital into the funds are particularly low for the females in their 
first year of management, regardless of whether they have been managing it since its inception or taken 
over from someone else. In a similar vein, the study by Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) finds that 
despite the adaptation of more reliable investment strategies and generation of the same returns as their 
male counterparts, female managers attract substantially diminished capital inflows. Interestingly, the 
results do not support rational statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972) but instead imply the ‘irrational’ 
prejudice towards female fund managers (Becker, 1971).  
The analysis of the European (equity only) mutual funds also confirms the results of the other studies 
indicating insignificant differences in performance and approach to risk between males and females 
(despite female managed funds often being larger and charging lower management fees) (Babalos, 
Caporale, Philippas, 2015). Nevertheless, the female managed funds were found to be dominated by 
perverse market timing, specifically with regards to Europe’s Mid-Cap and Large-Cap Value 
investment approaches. The study of Babalos et al. (2015) also identifies that female managers prefer 
growth strategies (versus male managers’ focus on Small-Cap stocks), yet they are unable to predict the 
movements of the growth factor. Even earlier studies (Brachinger, Schubert, Brown and Gysler, 1999), 
focusing on the attitudes of the Swiss undergraduate students’, show that when male and female students 
are presented with investment or insurance scenarios, the decisions are identical (no gender differences 
in attitude to risk).  
Drawing a direct parallel with the earlier research, one should expect higher risk aversion amongst 
female fund managers while excessive risk-taking amongst males. The same would apply to profit 
generation, where in some cases, males would be expected to generate lower returns due to excessive 
trading (for example, Barber and Odean, 2001). Interestingly, most of the research into the fund’s 
 
3 The number of the managers in the sample stands at 269 of which 25 or 9.3% are females. Thus, reaffirming 
earlier estimation of approx. 9.4% by Pavlenko-Lutton and Davis (2015). 
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performance with relation to the manager’s gender proves that there are no differences (or at most very 
little difference) between the two genders.  
We find that the modern fund (excluding hedge funds) related literature provides an extensive 
examination of gender differences in mutual fund’s management (with a specific focus on the 
performance and risk appetite). In contrast, the same literature related to hedge funds is almost non-
existent. The only publication concerning gender-specific differences between the hedge fund managers 
reveals that, on average, the SR and standard deviation of the funds managed by females are marginally 
better than that of their male counterparts (Aggarwal and Boyson, 2016). However, due to this 
insignificant disparity in performance and risk, the authors’ overall conclusion indicates that the 
differences between genders are either minimal or non-existent. 
2.3.1.2 Risk-Adjusted Metrics and the Performance Persistence 
The academic and organisational publications offer a wealth of assessment methods with regard to the 
performance and risk of various investment vehicles. As we have learnt from the publications 
mentioned in the previous section, the most common risk-adjusted metric used in the appraisal of 
investments rarely goes beyond the basic SR (Sharpe, 1966). The SR is an appropriate measure for the 
funds exhibiting a normal distribution (Chamberlain, 1983), which may be the case with mutual funds 
but is rarely the case with HFs (Fung and Hsieh, 1999; Gregoriou, Sedzro and Zhu, 2005). In 
consequence, the SR does not allow for the accountability of the effects of higher-order moments. 
Furthermore, the SR does not take into account a correlation between the fund and market index, where 
other measures such as Jensen Alpha would be more appropriate (Jensen, 1968, Dowd, 2000; Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus, 2005). The inherently asymmetrical distribution of HFs has also led other researchers 
to the development of new risk and performance metrics (Favre and Galeano, 2002; Gregoriou and 
Gueyie, 2003). Nevertheless, according to Pfingsten, Wagner and Wolferink (2004) and their analysis 
of lower partial moments and value at risk, the choice of a particular metric does not have a significant 
impact on the ranking of the investment. While Pfingsten, Wagner and Wolferink (2004) employ the 
bank’s trading book data in their analysis, Pedersen and  Rudholm-Alfvin (2003) used the alternative 
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investment market data in their risk-adjusted metrics correlation testing (noting the correlations above 
60% between various metrics).  
The most comprehensive study examining twelve risk-adjusted ratios4 came from Eling and 
Schuhmacher (2006). Interestingly, the authors have used HF indices in their analysis, proving that 
since all risk-adjusted metrics (including the ones accounting for the higher-order moments) are highly 
correlated (more than 90% in every case), the SR is perfectly capable of describing the tradeoff between 
performance and risk in HFs. To further explore this avenue, only one year later Eling and Schuhmacher 
(2007) released a more granular study, this time focusing on individual HFs as opposed to the indices. 
The findings yet again indicated high correlations between the analysed metrics supporting their theory. 
Thus, reinforcing their initial statement that the choice of the risk-adjusted ratios does not matter even 
in the event of asymmetrical distributions.  
The risk-adjusted ratios provide an interesting and diversified (metric-wise) insight into the risk 
and performance of the investment funds. However, the majority of the extant HF performance-related 
literature is devoted to persistence studies. The concept of performance persistence studies is to examine 
whether the funds will continue to generate (either positive or negative) consistent returns in the 
foreseeable future. A significant number of publications focuses exclusively on two approaches: the 
first refers to the examination of HFs in the collective context by aggregating them in portfolios based 
on the investment strategy, while the second, which is infrequent, diverts towards the country of 
domicile and/or the investment strategy. Moreover, the persistence analysis usually addresses one or 
two time horizons5 at a time. The span of the extant HF persistence related literature began in the late 
1990s with the research of Park and Staum (1998). This was also the first study to focus exclusively on 
a particular investment strategy as well as the long-term (annual) only approach to performance 
persistence. On the contrary, the first known research to examine the performance persistence in HFs 
from the geographically limited perspective came from Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999). The 
angle they adopted in their data analysis was to focus on the offshore US HFs. Similar to Park and 
 
4 Sharpe, Omega, Sortino, Kappa 3, Upside potential, Calmar, Sterling, Burke, Excess return on VaR, Conditional 
Sharpe and Modified Sharpe. 
5 Time horizon refers to the monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, etc. approach to the organisation of HF returns 
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Staum (1998), they have also focused on the annual persistence analysis. In parallel, the other authors 
introduced diversity into the time horizon of performance persistence. Thus, with the research of 
Edwards and Caglayan (2001), we learn that HFs exhibit persistence on both fronts (winning and losing) 
during the annual and bi-annual horizons. Moreover, they have found that performance persistence 
significantly depends on the investment style. Another piece of research that considers more than two 
horizons comes from Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek (2005) and identifies positive performance 
persistence on a quarterly and annual basis, while the opposite is true for the bi-annual horizon. It is 
worth mentioning that persistence is statistically significant only on the annual horizon. Naturally, the 
increase in the time horizon perspective allows for more insightful analysis and thus a more educated 
decision on the investor’s part. For example, Ammann, Huber and Schmid’s (2013) enrichment of the 
approach provides an insight into four-time horizons (6, 12, 24 and 36 months). Interestingly, the 
authors decide to focus on the long-term horizons and omit periods shorter than six months due to the 
existence of redemption periods. The findings reveal that the performance persistence crystalises in all 
periods up to 36 months. However, the statistically significant persistence occurs only on a six-monthly 
basis. Similarly, Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (2010) also focus solely on the long-term 
persistence within a 36-month timeframe. While their approach builds upon Getmansky et al’s model 
(2004), the result indicates the persistence is supported on the 36-month horizon if alphas from the 
analysed timeframe can explain alphas from the predicted timeframe. To a lesser extent, geolocation 
has also been investigated under various periodical constraints. Do, Faff and Veeraraghavan (2010) 
examined the persistence of HFs domiciled in Australia. While their analysis employs both non-
parametric and parametric methods, it focuses only on the short-term, monthly persistence. The authors 
find weak short-term persistence amongst Australian HFs, which mostly intensifies in funds of HFs. In 
the European realm, Steri, Giorgino and Viviani (2009) focused on the Italian funds of HFs, confirming 
persistence across all analysed periods. Although, the statistically significant persistence was only 
observed in monthly and quarterly horizons – excluding six-monthly periods. Interestingly, as the 
authors point out, the Italian HF industry is 95% comprised of funds of HFs. Last but not least, in a 
more geo-focused attempt, Koh, Koh and Teo (2003) confirmed the persistence on a monthly and 
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quarterly basis in HFs domiciled in Asia and Australia. They have also found that the persistence 
weakens beyond the quarterly horizon (in line with the findings of Brown et al. (1999).  
2.3.2 Summary 
In summary, we find that the modern fund (excluding HFs) related literature provides an extensive 
examination of gender differences, particularly focusing on performance and risk. At the same time, the 
same literature related to hedge funds is almost non-existent. Furthermore, as shown previously, the 
analysis of the risk-adjusted metrics in HFs indicates significant correlations with SR. This in turn 
implies that the SR perfectly describes the risk and performance of HFs. Nevertheless, this notion has 
been questioned in the mainstream HF-related research, which the incorporation of the higher-order 
moments. The risk-adjusted ratios provide diversified (metric-wise) insight into the risk and 
performance of the investment funds. Nevertheless, the majority of the HF performance related 
literature focus on the persistence of returns. While the persistence literature seems to be saturated, only 
a few studies are focusing on more than one or two time horizons (short, medium and long-term). 
Instead, the research is usually divided into clusters focusing on the aggregate of all HFs, investment 
strategies, specific domiciles, or a combination of all of these, neither of which considers the gender of 
the HF manager. Lastly, the persistence environment utilises various methods, where the most common 









2.4 Hedge Fund Flows: Managers’ Ethnicity. 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The following literature review consists of three parts. In the first instance, we provide the reader with 
an insight into the socio-psychological literature concerning race and ethnicity. This part serves as a 
fundament of the entire chapter, allowing the reader to ascertain the intricacies of human behaviour. In 
particular, we draw attention to the formulation and perception of the ethnic/racial identity and the 
association to a particular group (demographic bias). Further, in the second part, we discuss the general 
fund environment and in the third part, we focus on stereotypical investor behaviours related to the fund 
manager’s foreign name, gender and other factors.  
2.4.1.1 Socio-Psychological (including demographic biases) 
Does the race or the ethnicity of a fund manager matter to the investor? Similar questions have been 
asked directly and indirectly several times in the extant literature (for example, in relation to gender or 
the foreignness of a manager's name) (Kumar et al., 2015). However, before we discuss these studies, 
let us first try and understand the greater environment concerning human behaviour beyond mere fund 
management. Many would agree with Kumar et al.  (2015), that whether we like it or not, upon hearing 
the individual’s name (whether it is a conscious or a subconscious process), we assign them a multitude 
of attributes, which are derived from their potential association to a particular country, ethnicity, 
religion and so forth. The predicted performance and individual quality are systematically associated 
with the first name's stereotypical perception, as a study of teachers’ expectations shows (Harari and 
McDavid, 1973). Similarly, the educational and professional aspirations amongst adolescents 
significantly vary across ethnic and racial lines Kao (2000). Furthermore, these aspirations are defined 
based on the stereotypical images attached to particular ethnic groups and extend beyond into often 
segregated extracurricular activities. As Kunda (1999) identifies, the name stereotyping ‘may’ occur in 
a spontaneous, almost unconscious way. However, interestingly, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find 
that despite equal qualifications, there is discrimination in the labour market. The individuals with 
“white-sounding” names receive fifty per cent more interest from potential employers. Similarly, King, 
Mendoza, Madera, Hebl and Knight (2006) uncover the significant effects of occupational stereotyping, 
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which go as far as “discrimination”, specifically towards Black and Hispanic individuals. Their findings 
were also reported to be consistent with Shih's earlier work (2002), which has identified employers 
common ethnic and racial stereotyping (again most pronounced against Black and Hispanic 
individuals).  
An objective observer may notice a continuous pattern of repetitive behaviour, which according to 
evolutionary psychologists, may occur due to humans being tribal species (Van Vugt and Park, 2009). 
For that, we need to acknowledge humans make impulsive in/out-group categorisations and have the 
tendency to favour ‘in’ rather than ‘out’ group associates (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). This type of social 
categorisation (or mere perception of association to a particular group) is sufficient to provoke 
intergroup competitiveness, bias and in the extreme forms discrimination as it has been proven in many 
studies; Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, Larsen and Ostell (1972) show that when the competitive 
interaction between groups is anticipated, the level of discrimination is stronger; Hatch and Schultz 
(2004) further show that the out-group perceptions are generally negative, while Zizzo (2011) finds that 
sharing a common fate with the in-group but not the out-group members' influences how the economic 
agents approach economic transactions (independent of strategic incentives).  
As Jenkins (2014) argues, the primary human identification is his/her race and/or ethnicity. There is an 
ongoing debate as to whether the ethnicity is primordial (and therefore unchanging) or situational (and 
therefore floating) (Jenkins, 2008). Nevertheless, ethnic (including racial) identification is often 
considered an early dimension of self-identification, although not as early as gender. The learning 
process during which the individuals ascertain frameworks for classifying their (and others) racial and 
ethnic association usually occurs during childhood. If associated with emotion and affect, such 
classification may become significantly embedded in selfhood (Epstein, 1978). That in turn, leads adult 
individuals to readily identify themselves (regardless of the group size and the composition, which may 
often include unfamiliar subjects) with a particular in-group and to display their loyalty and association, 
often at a high personal cost (Zdaniuk and Levine, 2001; Van Vugt and Hart, 2004). These findings 
support and confirm the hypothesis posed by Charness, Rigotti and Rustichini (2007), which states that 
the individuals, by default, consider stipulations of the group membership as a guide in the social 
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environment. Moreover, according to Hewstone, Rubin and Willis (2002), people tend to adopt 
favourable opinions about their in-group members while remaining indifferent or even disparaging in 
their perception towards the out-group. It is worth noting, as explained by Fehr and Gachter (2002), that 
in the in-group scenario, the individual member's selfishness and disloyalty, as well as defection, is 
severely punished. Thus, making it difficult for in-group members to change their perceptions and 
behaviour towards the out-group.  
2.4.1.2 Fund Flows 
There have been numerous studies investigating the determinants of fund flows. In most cases, the 
subjects of these publications are mutual funds, while the most common relationship is that between 
performance and capital flows. We see an example of this in the research of Sirri and Tufano (1998), 
who find that US mutual fund investors are mostly concerned with previous (yet most recent) highest 
returns (which in turn drives flows). A similar analysis is performed by Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel and 
Ramos (2012) regarding flows and past performance in mutual funds across 28 countries. Their findings 
reveal that due to the sophistication of the investors in more developed countries, their reactions to the 
top (bottom) performers are more restrained (pro-active) than in less developed countries. Further, the 
funds with higher flow-performance relationships take on more risk as the increased risk-taking may 
increase the likelihood of winning. As Berk and Green (2004) indicate, the relation between flows and 
past performance has implications for future fund performance persistence. Other researchers such as 
Ippolito (1992) or Gruber (1996), also confirm this kind of asymmetric performance-flow relationship 
where the high (low) performing funds receive large (small) inflows (outflows) of capital. As Röder 
and Walter (2019) find, the dependence between investment flows and past performance is also similar 
in the socially traded portfolios issued as structured products. Despite the common use of the 
performance-flow relationship, the literature also employs other classical fund characteristics such as 
age, volatility (Huang, Wei and Yan, 2007), fees (Greene, Hodges and Rakowski 2007), advertising 
and media mentions (Jain and Wu 2000; Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura 2014), or even the association 
of the fund with large umbrella funds (Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2004). Interestingly, mutual fund 
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name changes reflecting their investment style generate abnormal flows despite there being no changes 
in the fund’s performance (Cooper, Gulen, and Rau, 2005)  
In a more specified, sociocultural setting this time, Kumar et al.  (2015) examines the stereotypes 
associated with the manager’s name and whether or not it exhibits influence over the investor's 
perception. As the authors’ note, the mutual fund setting with its widely available performance measures 
is a perfect environment for the identification and examination of social biases. Therefore, it should not 
come as a surprise (given our earlier socio-psychological literature insight) that the managers with a 
foreign-sounding name experience 10% per cent less annual capital inflows despite their overall funds' 
performance being on par with other funds, where the name of the fund manager is typically American 
(Kumar et al., 2015). Similar investor behaviour, which often lacks rational explanation, is more 
profoundly documented in gender studies concerning fund management. For instance, the analysis of 
performance and risk appetite in fixed-income funds show similarities between both genders (Atkinson, 
Baird and Frye, 2003). Nevertheless, the difference, as it was in the case of Kumar et al.  (2015), also 
occurs at the fund flow level. The authors note that the net flows of capital into female managed funds 
are particularly low in the first year of their management - that is, regardless of whether the female 
becomes a manager at the inception of the fund or simply takes over from someone else. Interestingly, 
the case investigated by Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) is even more profound as it finds female 
managers attract substantially lower capital inflows despite the adaptation of more reliable strategies 
and generation of the same returns as their male counterparts (Schmidt and Traub, 2002). Once again, 
the results do not support rational statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972), but instead demonstrate an 
irrational prejudice towards female mutual fund managers (Becker, 1971). In both cases, the minorities, 
be it a mutual fund manager with a foreign-sounding name or a female manager, suffer from a direct 





2.4.1.3 Socio-Psychological Fund Environment 
Previously mentioned authors (e.g., Kunda 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) claim that 
prejudicial behaviour may occur in a spontaneous, almost unconscious way. However, that would 
contradict another of Kumar et al’s.  (2015) findings, which shows that before changes in the law 
governing the disclosure of individual names of fund managers, the fund management companies were 
more likely to allocate a manager with a foreign-sounding name to the team. The practice, combined 
with the favourable law, prevented the investors from knowing that the managers with foreign-sounding 
names were effectively managing their capital. Furthermore, speaking of teams, Patel and Sarkissian 
(2017) find that ‘team (collective) management’ has a positive (55 bps per year higher) impact on funds’ 
performance as juxtaposed against single managed mutual funds. Thus, indirectly indicating that the 
presence of a manager with a potentially foreign-sounding name amongst other team members certainly 
is not detrimental to the fund's performance. In a combined context of ethnicity and gender (outside of 
fund management), both Honara (2002) and Swanson, Cunningham and Spencer (2003) acknowledge 
that males representing the ethnic minority are subject to more negative treatment as compared to 
females of the same ethnicity. This, in turn, suggests, like Jung, Kumar, Lim and Yoo (2019) note, that 
having an ‘unfavourable’ surname may be more damaging to male analysts. Their research concerning 
surname favourability also finds that the investors’ judgement is biased as they constantly seek 
consistency between the analyst’s surname perception and the quality of their forecast. This behaviour 
construct, where the individual (in their case the investor) endorses a favourable conclusion, is known 
in the cognitive science literature as motivated reasoning. Interestingly, Jung et al. (2019) note that the 
combination of the surname favourability and the foreignness (mentioned in Kumar’s et al.  (2015) 
work) elevates the market’s response to forecast revisions. Thus, suggesting the in-group bias against 
the foreign-sounding name is very closely associated with the surname favourability.6  
Focusing further on fund management, we learn that the investors are not only sensitive to a manager’s 
name or gender but also, as Kostovetsky (2015) shows, to the general changes in fund management 
 
6 This brief socio-psychological review, regardless of the conclusions we may reach, should serve as a good 
indication of human behaviour (regarding collective associations and the perception of race/ethnicity) as it is not 
always driven by the individual but more than likely a collective in-group perception. 
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and/or ownership. Importantly, he also finds that the change in either ownership or management has no 
detrimental effect on the fund’s performance. Nevertheless, the portion of investors (particularly those 
with a high expense ratio) seem to value the trust they have in the old management and thus are more 
likely to withdraw their capital. This behaviour has been already observed in other types of investments, 
such as retirement funds (Cohen, 2009). Once again, the authors observe the same in-group association 
or favouritism, which we have already seen in ethnic, racial, and gender-related studies. In a slight yet 
still relevant deviation from the personified (name/surname/gender) approach of the previous authors, 
Xing, Anderson and Hu (2016) have found that a ticker symbol also influences the investors. This 
‘name’ likeability has been found to influence stock acquisitions significantly.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Summarising, this literature review has highlighted several gaps, which in turn inform the subsequent 
chapters. In the first instance, we learn that the granularity of studies concerning performance 
persistence of hedge funds rarely go beyond an examination of the collective database (all hedge funds 
in one portfolio and/or divided based on the investment strategy, or any other type of cluster). Only less 
than a handful of studies have focused on a domicile, be it the USA, Asia and/or Australia. The literature 
has never provided a direct contrast between the persistence crystallising in various domiciles, 
investment strategies and the combination of both. Thus, these findings become the primary motivators 
in the third chapter of this thesis: “On the underestimation of risk in hedge fund performance 
persistence: geolocation and investment strategy effects.” The second part of the literature investigated 
the gender aspect, exclusively within the fund related environment. The general literature concerning 
gender is very rich, although one will almost immediately notice that when looking at funds in this 
context, there are only a handful of publications. Most of them focus on mutual funds with only one 
in/directly related publication in hedge funds. The hedge fund literature remains silent regarding 
performance persistence and performance (with accountability for the effects of the higher-order 
moments). Thus, being the main motivator for the development of the fourth chapter: “Gender 
differences in hedge fund performance.” Lastly, the final part of the literature review has focused on a 
cross-disciplinary approach investigating socio-psychological connection to demographics and 
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separately reviewing fund flow-related studies. This investigation indicated no studies are examining 
the perception of the ethnic/racial association of the hedge fund manager by the investor and whether it 


















Chapter 3. On the underestimation of risk in hedge fund 
performance persistence: geolocation and investment strategy 
effects. 
3.1 Introduction 
The last three decades have seen a gradual but significant increase in interest in the AIFs. The extreme 
expansion of the industry has seen its value increase from approximately US$118.2bn in 1997 to 
US$3.55tn in November 2017 (Prequin, 2018). This chapter investigates the impact of geolocation and 
investment strategy effects on the estimation of risk in performance persistence measurement 
dynamics.7 
An accurate appraisal of AIF performance must recognise that AIFs’ risk exposure to investment styles 
is constantly shifting as managers are able to change the fund’s focus. In that respect, risk management 
in AIFs is prone to systematic biases as exposure to risk factors is changing (see Bollen and Whaley, 
2009). Further, AIFs’ strategies expose investors to high correlation risk (see Buraschi et al., 2014). 
Since their inception in the 1950s, AIFs were always looked to for their astonishing performance 
(Bridgewater, Soros, and Citadel)8 , which in turn has gradually elevated their reputation to ‘the money-
making machines’ (Rittereiser and Kochard, 2010). The industry did not thrive without controversies, 
and more specifically, significant exposure to left-tail risk (see Agarwal and Naik, 2004) and defaults 
(Amaranth Advisors, LTCM, and Tiger Management)9. 
The literature related to the performance persistence of AIFs has grown exponentially in the last two 
decades. Nevertheless, despite its wide coverage of all the years from approximately the late 1977s until 
2018, utilisation of all major databases and variety of methodologies, risk management with respect to 
the measurement of performance persistence remains largely unexplored. One of the areas where AIF 
 
7 This chapter has been published in Zopounidis, Benkraiem and Kalaitzoglou (2021) 
8 Bridgewater: (net gains) approx. $50bn since 75’, Soros: approx. $42 (73’), Citadel: approx. $25bn (90’) 
9  Amaranth Advisors losses = approx. $6.5bn, LTCM = approx. $4.6bn, Tiger Management = approx. $2bn 
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risk management is crucial is geolocation, as the majority of academic research focuses on one (or a 
combination of) of the following approaches in data analysis: The globally aggregated approach (all 
AIFs in one portfolio), the investment strategies (all AIFs aggregated in portfolios based on their 
primary investment strategy), or the data clusters (some of which are based on the fund-specific 
properties, e.g., low, medium or high return portfolios). The only studies that we have come across that 
disrupted the aforementioned pattern focused on the Asian and Australian (Koh, Koh and Teo, 2003), 
Italian (Steri, Giorginob and Vivianib, 2009) and solely Australian (Do, Faff & Veeraraghavan, 2010) 
AIF universes.  
Therefore, in this chapter, we are going to assess the performance persistence of AIFs in the sphere of 
geolocation and identify whether the country of domicile and the investment strategy impact their risk 
dynamics. In particular, this chapter will answer the following questions. What is the performance 
persistence of hedge funds located in the world’s most saturated domiciles, employing the most popular 
investment strategies, and whether the combination of domicile and the investment strategy changes the 
attractiveness of hedge funds? The focus on geolocation should not come as surprise, given different 
tax regimes and legal requirements in the most popular hedge fund havens. Moreover, we also focus on 
the importance of the most often employed investment strategies and their varying risk profiles. The 
additional side objective of this investigation is to contribute to the scarce literature concerning the 
previously noted non-US AIFs domiciles (Koh et al., 2003; Steri et al., 2009; Do et al., 2010).  
To provide an adequate perspective for the analysis of performance persistence, we have employed both 
non-parametric contingency tables and parametric regressions. The analysed sample of AIFs in this 
study comes from the EurekaHedge database. The sample data aggregates 5619 AIFs (post-processing) 
and spans January 1995 to October 2016. Interestingly, the period covered in our analysis consists of 
two major economic events (the Russian financial crisis of 1998 (combined with the LTCM’s collapse) 
and the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007), which may be of interest, particularly to the potential AIF 
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investors. In our analysis, we have focused on the world’s four most saturated domiciles (USA, CAYI, 
LUX and IRL) and the four most commonly employed strategies (LSE, CTA, FIX and MLTI).10 
We have several findings to report. We show that metrics based on the individual domiciles and 
(separately) the investment strategies indicate the existence of short-term performance persistence. 
However, as we move to consider a combination of both domicile and the investment strategy, we can 
observe diminished persistence as well as its loss and reversal. Interestingly, one can draw a parallel 
between the geo-strategic combinations exhibiting high risk and the positive level of persistence. To 
provide greater depth into our analysis, we have further employed a two-step parametric regression 
method. In the first instance, we have computed the performance persistence on raw data without 
consideration for risks crystallising in the AIFs. The results reveal dominant and statistically significant 
negative performance persistence in portfolios such as IRL and the USA (a result previously unseen 
under the non-parametric approach). The same goes for the geo-strategic combinations and domiciles 
employing either the LSE or MLTI strategies. In the second instance, we have enhanced our parametric 
method to account for the risks materialising in the AIFs. The accountability for risk has completely 
changed the outcomes for some of the individual domiciles and the investment strategies, as they have 
all moved into a positive and statistically sig. territory (except for IRL). As to the cross combinations, 
we no longer observe any negative performance persistence across domiciles practising the LSE 
approach. A similar reversal and, in effect, a dominance of the positive 𝛽𝑝 coefficients occur at the 
MLTI level.  
The results of our analysis for both the non-parametric and parametric approaches uncovered 
differences in performance persistence between the general overview of the domicile, investment 
strategy and a combination of two. Furthermore, we prove that the sole reliance on either the general 
domicile or on the investment strategy level focused clusters can be grossly misleading and lead to 
undesirable consequences.  
 
10 Table 3.1 provides a list of abbreviations.  
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The definition of risk propagated by the participants in the AIFs industry very often varies. Therefore, 
the results of this study are specifically relevant to AIF investors. Primarily, the performance persistence 
of the AIFs is far more important than in mutual funds, as it has a bigger impact on the fund's survival 
(Agarwal and Naik, 2000a). Secondarily, the results of our study allow potential investors for more 
educated investment decisions. We clearly show that the sole reliance on either the general domicile or 
on the investment strategy level focused clusters can be grossly misleading and lead to undesirable 
consequences.  
The rest of the chapter is organised in the following way: Section 3.2 analyses the database and provides 
descriptive statistics; Section 3.3 discusses the methodology, and Section 3.4 provides the 
interpretations of the results; Section 3.5 concludes. Lastly, the literature review has been explored in 
Chapter 2 (sub-section 2.1). 
 















The AIF data used in this research comes from the EurekaHedge11 database. EurekaHedge is the world’s 
largest alternative investment data provider and consists of more than 28500 investment vehicles (as of 
January 2017), according to Capocci (2013). Additionally, EurekaHedge provides a much more 
comprehensive reflection of the contemporaneously reporting hedge funds universe than (for example) 
Lipper, HFR or MorningStar, as noted by Joenvaara et al. (2012). Currently, the largest AIFs data 
providers on the market are EurekaHedge, Lipper, HFR, Morningstar, Barclays Hedge, and CISDM 
(see Table 3.2). Thus, from the perspective of a single data source, this research utilises the dataset with 
the highest saturation of contemporaneously reporting AIFs in the world. 
 
***Insert Table 3.2*** 
 
The research timeframe covers the period from January 1995 to October 2016. In order to minimise 
their tax liabilities, hedge funds have a tendency to domicile themselves in tax havens. Due to this, the 
majority of the hedge funds in the database are located in a few specific domiciles. After the 
examination of the database, we have determined that the only domiciles and strategies with the 
meaningful number of hedge funds are the United States, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg and Ireland.  
We have further limited our dataset by selecting the four most prominent investment strategies within 
each domicile: Long-Short-Equity (LSE), Fixed-Income (FIX), Commodity-Trading-Advisors (CTA), 
and Multi-Strategy (MLTI). This way, we have reduced the initial dataset from 16678 AIFs to 1119712. 
Further reductions occurred due to missing/not-disclosed observations in sections such as management 
and performance fees, assets under management (AuM) and lockup and redemption periods.  
 
11 For more detailed description, please visit www.eurekahedge.com 
12 The null hypothesis of the unit root is uniformly rejected. The results are available upon request. 
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Another important aspect of the data cleaning process is the potential existence of duplicate 
funds, previously identified by Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) and Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011), 
whose analysis eliminated duplicate fund classes and all other funds of which correlation was either 
equal to or exceeded 0.99. Therefore, we investigated our database and removed all duplicate classes 
and all AIFs where the correlation was either equal to or greater than 0.99. For the robustness check, 
we have also analysed the data where the correlation threshold has been set at 0.95 and subsequently at 
0.90. This operation (0.99), as well as the removal of all funds with a lifespan equal to or shorter than 
six months, limited our collective data set to 5619 AIFs across four domiciles (USA (United States of 
America) 2302, CAYI (Cayman Islands) 2034, LUX (Luxembourg) 853, IRL (Ireland) 430) or four 
investment strategies (CTA 1212, FIX 912, LSE 2928, MLTI 567) (Figure 1).  
 
***Insert Figure 1*** 
 
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we are looking at the descriptive statistics of the aforementioned domiciles and their 
associated investment strategies. Table 3.3 comprises the USA (Panel A) and CAYI (Panel B), LUX 
(Panel C) and IRL (Panel D). Furthermore, each domicile has been divided into four most commonly 
employed strategies (within the EurekaHedge database). The data gathered in this table aggregates 5619 
AIFs. A significant proportion of the AIFs domiciled in the USA and CAYI can be classed as defunct 
as they did not report any returns in October 2016. The case of the other two domiciles is much less 
severe, nevertheless in almost all cases across IRL (except CTA) and LUX, more than 50% of the AIFs 
are classed as defunct. Furthermore, the negative skew of the returns dominates all domiciles and 
strategies apart from the CTA (all domiciles) and LSE (USA, CAYI and IRL) strategies. In addition, 
the kurtosis has exhibited non-normal properties across all domiciles and strategies. With regards to the 
average returns, the USA and its strategies dominate all other cases, with LUX and IRL generating the 

























In order to maximise the reach and the ability to provide in/direct contrast to previous literature 
concerning performance persistence, we rely on a dual-layered (non-risk and risk-adjusted) regression 
(parametric) approach as well as the “industry standard” contingency tables (non-parametric). The 
determination to employ these methods stems from their frequent use in hedge fund literature and thus 
the ability to in/directly compare the results of this chapter with the results presented by other authors. 
We undertook all our tests at monthly intervals for the timeframe between January 1995 and October 
2016.  
The parametric approach employs the XR (3.1) (Excess Returns) to identify performance persistence. 
Unlike Do et al. (2010), our XR calculation measures the XR of an individual AIF in contrast to the 
median (and not the average) return of all AIFs within the same domicile and strategy. The reason for 
this change lies within the predominantly skewed return distributions of the analysed AIFs (see Table 
3.3). The XR approach is then further enhanced into AXR (3.2) to account for the risks associated with 
the AIFs investments. The AXR (Adjusted Excess Returns) measures the XR of an individual AIF in 
contrast to the median (and not the average) return of all AIFs within the same domicile and strategy. 
It is further divided by the residual standard deviation from a linear regression of the AIF’s return on 
median returns from AIFs within the same domicile and strategy. 
 
𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑛𝐷𝑛 + 𝑎𝑝𝐷𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝐷𝑛𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑝𝐷𝑝𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3.1) 
𝐷𝑛 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑝 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0 
 
𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑛𝐷𝑛 + 𝑎𝑝𝐷𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝐷𝑛𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑝𝐷𝑝𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3.2) 




With regards to the dummies of 𝐷𝑛 and 𝐷𝑝, they stand for negative (lose) and positive (win) 
returns. While the 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 and 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 identify the level of return autocorrelation of the AIFs amongst the 
negative and positive cases, respectively.13  
The non-parametric method consists of widely utilised contingency tables (see Brown and Goetzmann 
1995; Agarwal and Naik 2000a; Eling 2009, Do et al. 2010). The anchor value which serves as a 
performance benchmark is the median return of all funds across all four domiciles and specific 
investment strategies. Thus, the fund which exceeds (is below) the median return is considered a winner 
(loser) and denoted as WW (LL). Whereas the winner (in the first period) transforms into a loser (in the 
second period) as WL or LW if the opposite is true. This non-parametric measure uses three different 
metrics: cross-product ratio (CPR), Z-statistic (Z) and Chi-square (X2). The CPR defines the odds ratio 
of the funds, which exhibit performance persistence as opposed to those that do not. Its fundamental 
null hypothesis is 𝐶𝑃𝑅 = 1, implying no persistence (when WW=25%, LL=25%, WL=25%, 
LW=25%). Carpenter and Lynch (1999) conclude that the X2 test based on the number of winners and 
losers is well specified, powerful and more robust to the presence of biases compared to other non-





         (3.3) 
 
The statistical significance of the CPR has been measured through the application of the standard error 
of the natural logarithm (𝛼ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅)) what results in a Z-statistic, which is the ratio of 𝛼ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅) to the 
standard error of the ln 𝑥 ≡ 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒 𝑥. Thus, in parallel to Z ~ N (0,1
2) → Z, whenever the value of 1.96 
or 2.58 (for 5% and 1% confidence interval respectively) is exceeded, significant performance 
persistence occurs. The Z-statistic (3.4) can be denoted as:  
 
13 E.g., the 𝛽𝑖,𝑛with a significant positive figure implies the existence of the autocorrelation or persistence of the 






















       (3.4) 
 
The chi-square (X2) compares the observed frequency distribution of all four denominations 
with the expected frequency distribution. Thus, if the value of X2 for one d.f. exceeds 3.84 or 6.64 (for 
5% and 1% confidence interval respectively), we can observe a significant performance persistence. 











































       (3.6) 
Lastly, we also provide additional numbers concerning the winner (loser) gone WG (LG), which 
refers to the HFs, that are no longer reporting to the database (not necessarily defunct) (see Table 3.4). 
To complete the picture, the reverse is also provided. Thus, the new entrant winner (loser) is denoted 
as NEW (NEL) and refers to the fund, which has generated a higher (lower) return as contrasted with 
the median return of all funds in the same category in the first reported period.  
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3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Parametric Methods 
3.4.1.1 Non-Risk Adjusted  
3.4.1.2 The Domicile and Investment Strategies 
In this section, we analyse the results of a non-risk-adjusted parametric performance persistence test for 
the individual domiciles (Panel A) and investment strategies (Panel B) presented in Table 3.4. Panel A 
shows that the majority of the AIFs across LUX and CAYI dominate with positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 and statistically 
sig. (at 5%) cases over the number of 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 coefficients. The exception to this is the USA and IRL, where 
the number of positive and statistically sig. 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 cases dominate 𝛽𝑖,𝑝. Despite no signs in our non-
parametric analysis, in this case, the USA and IRL exhibit negative performance persistence. In terms 
of the investment strategies (Panel B), the only approach where the 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 cases dominate is MLTI – the 
difference between the significant cases is minimal and stands at 316/315 cases.  
 
***Insert Table 3.4*** 
 
3.4.1.3 Domicile Combined with Investment Strategy 
Continuing with our more in-depth perspective, we turn to Table 3.5, which aggregates the combination 
of domiciles and the investment strategies. Table 3.5, Panel A (LSE) shows that the number of funds 
exhibiting positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 amongst those domiciled in the USA, stands at 792 out of 1159 with 654 sig. at 
5% level, while for CAYI, it stands at 937 out of 1275 with 783 statistically sig. Concerning the other 
two domiciles, LUX exhibits positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 at 197/276 with 178 sig. at 5% and IRL at 137/218 with 118 
sig. at 5%. The contrarian, negative 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 coefficient implies that 579 (USA), 730 (CAYI), 130 (LUX), 
and 120 (IRL) AIFs exhibit significant (at 5%) losing performance persistence. Again, the exception is 
the IRL domicile, which, when combined with the LSE strategy, continues to minimally exhibit 
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dominant losing properties. Overall, the XR performance persistence method's application indicates 
some short-term persistence, specifically of a positive magnitude (except IRL).  
Table 3.5, Panel B represents the second most populated investment strategy in our analysis, 
namely the CTA with 1212 total AIFs: USA (787), CAYI (262), LUX (106) and IRL (57). In this case, 
Panel B shows that the number of positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 coefficients (sig. at 5%) dominates over the negative 
ones in all cases, which correlates with the results from Table 3.4 (Panel B). Furthermore, Panel C 
aggregates 912 AIFs employing the FIX strategy: USA (187), CAYI (230), LUX (371) and IRL (124). 
Panel C shows that the number of funds exhibiting positive (at 5%) 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 (𝛽𝑖,𝑛) in the USA stands at 94 
(88), LUX at 228 (189), while on the contrary, negative cases (losers) dominance can be seen in CAYI 
at 117 (129) and IRL at 61 (73).  
Lastly, in Table 3.5, Panel D gathers the lowest number of the AIFs in our dataset, pursuing the 
MLTI strategy with the total number of 567 funds: USA (169), CAYI (267), LUX (100) and IRL (31). 
Focusing on panel D, we can observe that the number of positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 (𝛽𝑖,𝑛) (at 5%) coefficients for the 
USA stands at 89 (97), IRL at 15 (17), while LUX at 64 (60) and CAYI 147 (142). Simultaneously, 
making CAYI the only domicile, which is capable of delivering positive performance persistence while 
employing the MLTI investment strategy.  
 
***Insert Table 3.5*** 
 
3.4.2.1 Risk-Adjusted  
3.4.2.1 The Domicile and Investment Strategies 
Further to the previous non-risk-adjusted parametric approach, we provide here risk-adjusted analysis 
(AXR). In the domicile only scenario (Panel A of Table 3.6), the IRL is no longer dominated by the 
negative values and instead regains its positive dominance with 230 cases for 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 (sig. at 5%) versus 
197 for 𝛽𝑖,𝑛. This reversal implies that the AIFs located in IRL regain their positive performance 
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persistence after being adjusted for risk. Another peculiar case refers to the LUX domicile, which in 
this environment begins to underperform and generates 427 negative versus 417 positive cases.  
In the realm of investment strategies only (Panel B of Table 3.6), there is no more dominance of negative 
persistence as was the case in the XR analysis (MLTI strategy). Despite the positive performance 
persistence, the number of statistically significant cases that exhibit persistence is much lower than in 
the non-risk-adjusted analysis (e.g., CTA down from 706 to 578, LUX 1733 to 1464, LSE 500 to 470 
and MLTI 315 to 283).   
 
***Insert Table 3.6*** 
 
3.4.2.2 Domicile Combined with Investment Strategy 
In this sub-section, we provide the risk-adjusted (AXR) analysis of domiciles combined with the 
investment strategies. Table 3.7, Panel A indicates that all domiciles employing the LSE strategy exhibit 
performance persistence. In Table 3.7, Panel B (CTA), we can observe that the CTA strategy's 
persistence trend in LUX and CAYI reverses in the post-risk-adjustment case. Thus, the LUX is 
dominated by negative values in 56 (𝛽𝑖,𝑝) to 41 (𝛽𝑖,𝑛) and CAYI 123 to 129. The FIX strategy (Panel 
C) exhibits trend reversal in performance persistence when comparing non-risk-adjusted and risk-
adjusted approaches. The domiciles CAYI and IRL where positive performance persists in XR reverses 
into negative territory in AXR. While the same reversal occurs in the USA and LUX, which no longer 
generate positive persistence in the post-risk-adjusted scenario. Lastly, Panel D shows that the MLTI 
strategy for LUX domiciled funds has been dominated by the AIFs exhibiting losing performance 
persistence.  
 




 In summary, from the autoregressive perspective, we have found performance persistence 
amongst all strategies. Furthermore, in certain instances, we have observed trend reversals between the 
XR and AXR parametric approaches. Our results vary and cannot unilaterally confirm Do et al. (2010) 
nor Agarwal and Naik’s (2000b) outcomes, which held that the majority of the persistence is on the 
negative side. Lastly, the applicability of the risk-adjusted testing proves that the simple approach 
(excluding risk) of the XR can be misleading in assessing the performance persistence of the AIFs. 
3.4.3 Non-Parametric Methods 
The following sub-sections outline the results of the two approaches. The first individually examines 
domiciles and investment strategies, while the second deals with the combination of both. The results 
unequivocally confirm the existence of short-term performance persistence across all of the examined 
universes, regardless of whether it is the individual domicile/strategy or a combination. However, when 
we increase granularity and begin to focus on smaller clusters, we observe the equal number of 
persistent cases (WW versus LL) in the USA (CTA & FIX), CAYI_FIX and IRL (LSE & FIX) 
registered funds, as well as the loss and reversal of persistence in places such as LUX (all strategies) 
and IRL_MLTI.  
3.4.3.1 Domiciles and Investment Strategies 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 present results of the non-parametric method with regards to the mean and total 
number of the AIFs exhibiting winning (WW) and losing (LL) cases of persistence (section 4.0). Tables 
3.8 and 3.9 each consists of two panels that reflect the domicile (Panel A) and separately the strategy 
(Panel B) of the analysed AIFs. On the contrary, Tables 3.10 and 3.11 consist of 4 different panels (A: 
USA, B: CAYI, C: LUX and D: IRL) reflecting the domiciles combined with the investment strategies, 
which are directly associated with Tables 3.8 and 3.9 and provide the statistics for the non-parametric 
test. The timeframe for this data is January 1995 through to October 2016 (262 months) and aggregates 
5619 AIFs.  
 




The initial examination of Table 3.8 shows us that in all cases, regardless of whether we are considering 
the domicile or the investment strategy alone, the number of funds denoted as WW dominates all other 
instances (i.e., LL, WL or LW). Such an outcome implies positive performance persistence at the very 
start of our analysis; as such, we examine further the statistical results of the CPR, X2, Z-statistics and 
the PRW.  
The domicile focused analysis (Table 3.8, Panel A) indicates that the CPR and X2 show statistical 
significance at 5% (1%) in 126 (112) and 181 (159) out of 262 months for the USA domiciled AIFs. 
The PRW is greater than 50% in 165 out of 262 cases (or 63%). The average (total) CPR of all USA 
based AIFs is 1.79 (1.30), rejecting the null hypothesis of no persistence in 196/262 cases. At the same 
time, the total (average) X2 for the entire sample is 26.96 (1.64), which reaffirms that the AIFs domiciled 
in the USA exhibit short-term (monthly) performance persistence.  
Similarly, the funds domiciled in the CAYI exhibit the CPR and X2 in 123 (102) and 160 (135) out of 
262 months, respectively. Their mean and total CPR stands at 1.95 and 1.49, implying performance 
persistence in 196 out of 262 months. The mean and total X2 exceed the value of 1.96 for the sig. at 5%, 
further demonstrating persistence. The PRW, in this case, is much higher (than in the USA) and is equal 
to 195 (or 74%).  
The number of months where LUX based AIFs exhibit significance at 5% (1%) for CPR and 
X2 stands at 79 (66) and 127 (99). The mean (2.68) and total (1.27) CPR differ from the value of 1 and, 
as it can be seen with Z-stat (13.91), exhibit persistence.  
Lastly, the CPR and X2 of the IRL domiciled funds show statistical significance at 5% (1%) in 63 (39) 
and 109 (64) out of 262 months. With the mean (total) CPR of 3.27 (1.20) and the Z-stat of 7.59, they 
do exhibit performance but to a lesser magnitude than the other domiciles.  
In Table 3.8, Panel B, we can observe the same number of AIFs (5619). However, this time they have 
been dissected based on their investment approach: LSE, CTA, FIX and MIRL. All strategies defy the 
null hypothesis of the CPR and report more than 190 out of 262 months (in every case), representing 
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the existence of performance persistence. The total Z-stats is significant in all cases. Furthermore, as 
was the case with domiciles, every single type of strategy generates PRW >50%.  
 
***Insert Table 3.9*** 
 
3.4.3.2 Domiciles Combined with Investment Strategy 
The combination of domiciles and investment strategies allowed us to provide significantly greater 
granularity. The initial assessment of Table 3.10 already reveals that all LUX strategies and IRL_MLTI 
are dominated by losing (LL) cases of performance persistence. The panels A-D of Table 3.11 
correspond to the following domiciles, each with four specific strategies (LSE, CTA, FIX and MLTI): 
the USA, CAYI, LUX and IRL. The total X2 and Z-stats of all strategies in the USA (Panel A) is highly 
significant at 5%. Moreover, the percentage of repeating winners above 50% dominates across all 
strategies. The trends in CAYI (Panel B) are similar to the USA across all strategies except CTA. The 
CTA’s total CPR stands at 1.07, which confirms the default null hypothesis of no persistence. While 
the total Z-stats stands at 2.31, which is approximately ten times lower than the other strategies (such 
as FIX and LSE) within this domicile. The Z-stat at 5% shows only 44 out of 262 months of persistence. 
Therefore, this particular strategy (CTA in CAYI) exhibits weak performance persistence.  
 
***Insert Table 3.10*** 
 
In contrast to previously described domiciles, the results for the European ones, LUX (Panel C of Table 
3.11) and IRL (Panel D), differ significantly. Immediately apparent are the LUX_CTA and IRL_CTA, 
which generate the total CPR that is in line with the null hypothesis of no persistence. Neither LUX nor 
IRL CTA strategy exhibits significance at 5% for either the Z-stat or the X2. Therefore, they do not 
exhibit significant performance persistence. Moreover, the PRW in LUX is below the 50% threshold 
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for both LSE and CTA strategies. Similarly, the IRL’s CTA and FIX strategies are at PRW 40 and 42, 
respectively, with the remaining two at 53 (LSE) and 55 (MLTI) per cent.  
 
***Insert Table 3.11*** 
 
We have evaluated performance persistence through the idea of comparing ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ 
alternative investment funds returns in each period over 262 months. Moreover, this comparison has 
been enhanced with statistical measures of the CPR, X2 and Z-statistic at both 1 and 5 per cent 
significance. We have seen that the analysis based individually on either the domicile or the investment 
strategy of the AIFs does not provide a full overview of the risks lurking for potential investors. After 
expanding the scope of the analysis, we have shown that the individual strategies combined within 













The value of the AIF industry has increased from approximately US$118.2bn in 1997 to US$3.55tn in 
November 2017. Equally, there is a large increase in the number of studies focusing on the 
performance persistence of AIFs. However, to our knowledge, the area of risk management 
concerning the measurement of performance persistence remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we 
have analysed four of the world’s most saturated AIFs domiciles and four of the most commonly 
employed investment strategies for the period between January 1995 and October 2016. We employ 
parametric and non-parametric analysis. Our objective was to investigate the impact of geolocation 
and investment strategy effects on the estimation of risk in performance persistence measurement 
dynamics. More specifically, we have posed to answer what is the performance persistence of hedge 
funds located in the world’s most saturated domiciles such as the USA (USA), Cayman Islands 
(CAYI), Luxembourg (LUX) and Ireland (IRL), employing the most popular investment strategies 
such as Long-Short-Equity (LSE), Fixed-Income (FIX), Commodity-Trading-Advisors (CTA), and 
Multi-Strategy (MLTI). Furthermore, we have also focused on whether the combination of domicile 
and the investment strategy changes the attractiveness of hedge funds. Our focus on geolocation 
underlines the importance of different tax regimes and legal requirements guarding the most popular 
hedge fund havens. Furthermore, we also explored the risk and returns of the most popular investment 
strategies and their varying risk profiles.  
The results of the non-parametric approach unequivocally confirm the existence of short-term 
performance persistence across all the examined combinations. However, despite most of them 
representing potentially attractive investments, we show that some domicile/strategy combinations are 
quite the opposite. For instance, the number of winner/loser cases is equal across USA_CTA,  
USA_FIX, CAYI_FIX, IRL_LSE and IRL_FIX. Interestingly, we find negative performance 
persistence across all strategies in the LUX domicile and MLTI in IRL.  
The results of the non-risk-adjusted parametric performance persistence test for the individual 
domiciles shows that the majority of funds domiciled in LUX and CAYI dominate with positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 
and statistically significant cases. On the contrary, the USA and IRL are dominated with statistically 
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sig yet (negative) 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 cases - this result has not been discovered by the industry-standard contingency 
tables analysis. Regarding the investment strategies, the only approach where the 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 cases dominate 
is the MLTI – although the difference between the significant cases is minimal and stands at 316/315 
cases.  
The contrasts between domiciles, investment strategies and the combination of both undertaken in this 
chapter have not been addressed previously in the hedge fund related literature. Thus, providing a new 
and more insightful view into one of the most secretive financial vehicles known to man. 
Furthermore, we show that the results between non-parametric, parametric (risk and non-risk 
adjusted) metrics can lead to erroneous investment decisions and the potential loss of the investment 
capital. Moreover, the same happens when we look at domicile or/and the investment strategies in 
isolation. The results of this study are primarily relevant to hedge fund investors and researchers. We 
clearly show that the sole reliance on either the general domicile or on the investment strategy level 
















Table 3.1 Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Explanation 
AIF/s Alternative Investment Fund/s 
AIFM/s Alternative Investment Fund Manager/s 
AuM Assets under Management 
CTA Commodity Trading Advisors are primarily AIFs trading futures contracts 
FIX Fixed-Income 
FOHFs Funds of Hedge Funds 























Table 3.2 World’s primary AIFs databases 
Database # of live AIFs # of defunct AIFs 
EurekaHedge 9 722 12 138 
Lipper 7 500 11 000 
HFR 7 200 16 000 
MorningStar 7 000 12 000 
Barclays Hedge 6 366 17 965 
CISDM 5 000 11 000 





Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A 
United States CTA [Obs.787] FIX [Obs.187] LSE [Obs.1159] MLTI [Obs.169] 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
 
S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dead/Alive 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Negative Skew % 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Skewness 0.18 1.23 -5.86 5.63 -0.14 1.76 -7.98 6.26 0.06 0.98 -4.40 6.42 -0.26 1.39 -6.35 5.28 
Kurtosis 3.30 5.32 -1.64 48.70 5.92 9.00 -0.97 69.61 2.69 4.54 -1.52 72.08 4.79 6.62 -1.15 52.90 
Std. Dev. of r 5.33 4.71 0.29 73.90 1.98 1.57 0.07 12.06 4.39 4.18 0.36 107.54 3.37 2.69 0.31 19.67 
AVG r 0.77 1.29 -3.47 15.01 0.73 0.60 -1.26 5.62 0.74 1.58 -46.22 5.17 0.70 0.66 -2.69 3.38 
Age [yrs] 7.02 5.23 1.10 21.90 6.35 4.30 1.20 21.90 7.34 5.01 1.10 21.90 7.74 5.31 1.30 21.90 
AVG AuM 35.86 132.65 0.10 2203.50 338.78 2208.07 0.10 29776.90 75.54 355.35 0.10 9437.80 212.81 561.79 0.20 5843.00 
MED AuM 29.52 114.50 0.00 1788.00 336.81 2218.79 0.00 29903.00 64.36 285.23 0.00 7710.00 190.22 506.22 0.00 5262.00 
 
Panel B 
Cayman Islands CTA [Obs.262] FIX [Obs.230] LSE [Obs.1275] MLTI [Obs.267] 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dead/Alive 0.73 0.45 0 1 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.76 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Negative Skew % 0.41 0.50 0 1 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Skewness 0.13 1.00 -5.90 4.753 -0.44 2.00 -8.15 6.93 -0.01 0.94 -3.50 6.73 -0.08 1.51 -7.27 6.81 
Kurtosis 2.14 4.25 -1.40 37.557 7.73 11.98 -0.93 86.99 2.47 4.19 -1.20 70.36 4.63 8.19 -1.20 72.80 
Std. Dev. of r 4.45 3.09 0.67 22.3 2.84 5.26 0.04 73.32 4.02 2.84 0.40 36.09 3.94 4.09 0.44 47.95 
AVG r 0.44 1.22 -3.99 9.319 0.62 1.24 -3.97 14.71 0.53 0.83 -9.35 7.15 0.48 0.93 -3.54 5.60 
Age [yrs] 6.54 4.67 1.2 21.9 5.95 3.87 1.20 19.40 6.35 4.08 1.20 21.90 6.43 4.12 1.20 19.70 
AVG AuM 113 553.46 0.5 7734.4 165.91 252.11 0.30 1821.20 95.40 178.58 0.10 2127.50 204.32 456.28 0.30 3870.60 
MED AuM 102.1 521.35 0 7659 159.28 260.76 0.00 1863.00 84.31 166.83 0.00 2024.00 176.78 400.11 0.00 3471.00 
 
Panel C 
Luxembourg CTA [Obs.106] FIX [Obs.371] LSE [Obs.276] MLTI [Obs.100] 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dead/Alive 0.58 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Negative Skew % 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Skewness 0.01 0.68 -1.57 4.82 -0.44 0.99 -4.39 3.42 -0.20 0.92 -8.97 3.96 -0.35 0.88 -4.64 2.81 
Kurtosis 1.09 3.92 -0.92 37.90 2.77 4.28 -0.90 35.15 1.86 6.22 -1.08 92.48 1.82 4.49 -1.14 29.62 
Std. Dev. 3.83 2.37 0.56 11.94 1.30 0.83 0.03 5.66 2.79 1.87 0.62 11.45 1.67 1.49 0.26 11.66 
AVG r -0.08 0.62 -2.84 1.62 0.15 0.35 -0.66 3.40 0.26 0.54 -1.91 2.55 0.12 0.26 -0.85 1.02 
Age [yrs] 5.54 4.14 1.10 21.90 5.91 3.85 1.20 22.70 4.75 2.88 1.10 16.30 4.68 2.41 1.10 16.80 
AVG AuM 104.83 201.97 1.00 1454.70 1138.01 2000.87 1.00 8770.60 201.14 292.38 1.00 1696.80 1006.92 2686.33 1.00 16200.90 
MED AuM 93.91 172.58 0.00 1414.00 1137.01 1999.38 1.00 8806.50 168.17 246.94 1.00 2048.50 987.94 2660.18 1.00 16018.00 
 
Panel D 
Ireland CTA [Obs.57] FIX [Obs.124] LSE [Obs.218] MLTI [Obs.31] 
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max 
Dead/Alive 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.52 0.51 0.00 1.00 
Negative Skew % 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Skewness 0.20 0.99 -2.28 4.02 -0.29 0.77 -2.67 2.97 -0.17 0.93 -3.61 6.57 -0.31 0.69 -2.06 1.32 
Kurtosis 1.67 3.86 -1.09 21.54 2.13 3.84 -0.65 27.19 2.00 5.00 -1.11 58.17 1.18 1.76 -0.83 7.36 
Std. Dev. of r 3.24 1.51 0.74 6.45 1.54 0.91 0.03 4.70 3.17 2.09 0.44 17.66 2.02 1.82 0.30 8.64 
AVG r 0.24 0.54 -1.23 1.68 0.28 0.34 -0.80 2.57 0.29 0.52 -2.12 1.49 0.01 0.49 -1.64 1.05 
Age [yrs] 5.22 4.61 1.10 20.60 4.95 2.55 1.20 13.50 5.23 3.75 1.10 21.90 3.40 2.79 1.20 13.10 
AVG AuM 90.81 141.88 1.00 832.46 455.24 675.74 1.00 3122.68 152.77 315.38 1.00 3728.08 166.26 290.07 1.00 1587.41 
MED AuM 75.92 127.69 0.00 826.00 446.48 662.16 0.00 3340.00 145.50 314.94 0.00 3623.00 154.90 282.49 0.00 1563.00 
 
Note: The Dead/Alive: denotes the percentage of AIFs, which have not reported any results in Oct 2016. The Negative Skew %: percentage of AIFs with negative skewness. Skewness and Kurtosis: the average skew/kurt value for a given strategy. Std. 





Table 3.4. Parametric Performance Persistence [non-risk-adjusted [XR]]: Domicile/Investment Strategy 
Panel A 
XRDomicile 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -2.228 -1.616 -1.923 -1.823 3.520 1.500 2.978 2.090 0.079 0.273 0.191 0.250 0.176 0.299 0.223 0.153 0.474 0.439 0.401 0.413 
Sigma 2.637 1.659 2.121 1.572 3.335 1.508 2.646 1.587 1.297 0.961 0.455 0.653 0.444 0.588 0.454 0.673 0.155 0.163 0.200 0.215 
Max 29.432 5.794 4.385 3.131 59.368 9.708 47.553 8.358 3.695 11.786 6.634 4.827 3.806 2.612 4.313 5.391 0.996 0.996 0.985 0.962 
Min -27.820 -10.925 -18.056 -11.405 -17.032 -2.404 -5.586 -2.927 -50.693 -9.922 -2.078 -5.449 -8.119 -2.704 -3.232 -2.763 -0.502 -1.097 -0.719 -0.776 
Positive 168 51 190 18 2280 811 2015 405 1378 563 1387 294 1599 619 1484 268 
 
Sig @ 0.05  1183 440 1156 240 1284 537 1204 229 
Negative 2134 802 1844 412 22 42 19 25 924 290 647 136 703 234 550 162 
Sig @ 0.05  858 269 603 124 681 225 534 156 
 
Panel B 
XRInvStra 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA LSE FIX MLTI 
Mean -2.702 -2.134 -0.895 -1.523 3.902 3.074 1.312 2.492 0.118 0.145 0.271 0.169 0.201 0.185 0.312 0.193 0.471 0.430 0.445 0.418 
Sigma 2.925 2.014 1.746 1.844 3.849 2.237 2.158 3.018 1.521 0.460 1.344 0.608 0.480 0.444 0.624 0.514 0.163 0.204 0.161 0.189 
Max 28.085 4.385 29.432 5.794 59.368 26.817 47.553 39.250 3.695 6.634 11.786 2.750 3.796 5.391 4.554 3.063 0.992 0.996 0.959 0.961 
Min -27.820 -22.413 -16.007 -14.149 -17.032 -5.586 -2.927 -2.109 -50.693 -9.922 -30.356 -6.445 -8.119 -3.088 -2.704 -3.232 -0.324 -0.336 -0.776 -1.097 
Positive 47 172 142 66 1198 2901 864 548 780 1840 630 372 853 2063 663 391 
 
Sig @ 0.05  665 1559 479 316 706 1733 500 315 
Negative 1165 2756 770 501 14 27 48 19 432 1088 282 195 359 865 249 176 
Sig @ 0.05  402 1019 256 177 342 840 242 172 
 
Note: This table provides the parametric (XR) test results for a collective sample of 5619 AIFs from January 1995 to October 2016 [monthly intervals]. The first two columns refer to the dummy variables which 
separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) implies the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the fourth column (Beta n) implies 








Table 3.5: Parametric Performance Persistence [non-risk-adjusted [XR]]: Domicile Combined with the Investment Strategy 
Panel A 
XRLSE 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -2.230 -2.237 -1.993 -2.317 3.412 2.153 3.032 2.683 0.101 0.052 0.196 0.200 0.141 0.226 0.229 0.112 0.4663 0.4243 0.4547 0.4451 
Sigma 2.106 1.722 2.030 1.678 2.380 1.636 2.246 1.536 0.352 0.755 0.439 0.537 0.385 0.395 0.461 0.623 0.1459 0.1497 0.1989 0.2217 
Max 3.830 0.175 4.385 0.461 25.387 9.708 26.817 8.358 3.003 1.867 6.634 4.827 3.806 1.568 4.313 5.391 0.9592 0.9207 0.9159 0.9135 
Min -22.413 -9.583 -18.056 -11.405 -2.584 -0.988 -5.586 -0.135 -1.763 -9.922 -1.359 -0.974 -3.088 -0.846 -2.191 -2.763 -0.5019 -0.3477 -0.7193 -0.7762 
Positive 60 3 103 6 1152 273 1260 216 675 149 870 146 792 197 937 137 
 
Sig @ 0.05  579 130 730 120 654 178 783 118 
Negative 1099 273 1172 212 7 3 15 2 484 127 405 72 367 79 338 81 
Sig @ 0.05  450 115 387 67 358 77 329 76 
 
Panel B 
XRCTA 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -2.824 -2.556 -2.589 -1.805 4.353 2.563 3.474 2.122 0.055 0.328 0.204 0.201 0.171 0.357 0.206 0.296 0.4885 0.4616 0.4051 0.3998 
Sigma 3.205 2.267 2.448 1.364 4.359 2.107 2.635 1.512 1.856 0.535 0.377 0.517 0.499 0.572 0.372 0.399 0.1497 0.1613 0.2040 0.1979 
Max 28.085 0.385 4.368 0.251 59.368 9.692 15.960 5.425 3.695 1.780 1.642 1.848 3.796 2.523 1.687 1.140 0.992 0.9741 0.8993 0.9616 
Min -27.820 -10.925 -17.694 -6.836 -17.032 -2.404 0.040 -2.281 -50.693 -1.511 -0.858 -1.208 -8.119 -0.694 -0.980 -0.536 -0.3235 -0.1266 -0.2523 -0.1783 
Positive 25 7 11 4 780 102 262 54 485 81 178 36 542 80 187 44 
 
Sig @ 0.05  419 61 155 30 447 67 157 35 
Negative 762 99 251 53 7 4 0 3 302 25 84 21 245 26 75 13 
Sig @ 0.05  279 24 80 19 233 25 71 13 
 
Panel C 
XRFIX 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -0.485 -0.983 -1.006 -1.042 1.390 0.829 2.073 1.228 0.007 0.438 0.217 0.269 0.379 0.345 0.275 0.181 0.5036 0.4940 0.3718 0.3767 
Sigma 2.539 1.050 2.107 0.916 1.540 0.737 3.734 1.178 2.296 1.118 0.613 0.837 0.482 0.688 0.470 0.813 0.2130 0.1917 0.1927 0.1696 
Max 29.432 3.720 1.397 3.131 13.919 4.268 47.553 6.311 2.248 11.786 4.381 2.077 2.282 2.612 1.962 4.554 0.9964 0.9961 0.9845 0.816 
Min -9.374 -5.487 -16.007 -3.962 -0.906 -0.701 -1.053 -2.927 -30.356 -3.965 -1.390 -5.449 -1.081 -2.704 -1.728 -2.168 0.0364 0.0281 -0.3359 -0.2714 
Positive 56 37 44 5 183 343 227 111 111 266 166 87 151 272 170 70 
 
Sig @ 0.05  88 189 129 73 94 228 117 61 
Negative 131 334 186 119 4 28 3 13 76 105 64 37 36 99 60 54 
Sig @ 0.05  71 99 53 33 36 93 60 53 
 
Panel D 
XRMTLI 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -1.371 -1.253 -1.722 -1.508 2.731 1.063 3.013 1.314 0.120 0.212 0.132 0.618 0.215 0.265 0.166 0.072 0.4885 0.4616 0.4051 0.3998 
Sigma 1.895 1.459 1.916 1.859 3.545 1.030 3.077 1.599 0.405 1.054 0.435 0.651 0.445 0.621 0.471 0.743 0.1497 0.1613 0.2040 0.1979 
Max 1.966 5.794 0.723 0.897 39.250 5.000 33.105 7.424 2.117 2.750 2.232 1.834 3.063 1.749 2.284 2.952 0.939 0.9223 0.8825 0.9612 
Min -14.149 -7.224 -11.945 -8.067 -2.109 -1.960 -0.178 -1.112 -1.382 -6.445 -2.078 -0.626 -1.166 -2.686 -3.232 -1.227 0.0762 -1.0972 -0.2233 -0.2513 
Positive 27 4 32 3 165 93 266 24 107 67 173 25 114 70 190 17 
 
Sig @ 0.05  97 60 142 17 89 64 147 15 
Negative 142 96 235 28 4 7 1 7 62 33 94 6 55 30 77 14 
Sig @ 0.05  58 31 83 5 54 30 74 14 
 
Note: This table provides the parametric (XR) test results for a collective sample of 5619 AIFs from January 1995 to October 2016 [monthly intervals]. The first two columns refer to the dummy variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and 
positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) implies the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the fourth column (Beta n) implies the auto-correlation or persistence amongst positive (winning) 




Table 3.6: Parametric Performance Persistence [risk-adjusted [AXR]]: Domicile/Investment Strategy 
Panel A 
 
AXRDomicile 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -2.328 -1.654 -1.916 -1.819 3.691 3.027 3.097 2.252 0.006 0.015 0.007 0.037 0.008 8.532 -0.006 0.056 0.456 0.415 0.365 0.387 
Sigma 2.478 1.577 2.319 1.539 4.266 45.113 2.658 2.175 0.451 0.321 0.405 0.929 0.829 249.296 0.369 0.606 0.169 0.178 0.218 0.226 
Max 7.325 3.184 35.118 1.617 132.712 1317.945 51.408 30.967 7.586 4.587 13.641 18.300 27.972 7285.249 3.173 9.722 0.995 0.999 0.981 0.884 
Min -32.997 -9.999 -28.547 -9.176 -6.409 -48.429 -4.704 -5.236 -8.467 -3.180 -3.004 -2.741 -22.605 -4.105 -9.992 -1.638 -1.139 -0.910 -1.032 -0.934 
Positive 191 60 205 26 2295 832 2018 413 1172 450 1034 205 1217 441 1060 238 
 
Sig @ 0.05  1114 427 980 197 1145 417 1003 230 
Negative 2111 793 1829 404 7 21 16 17 1130 403 1000 225 1085 412 974 192 
Sig @ 0.05  1084 378 969 210 1029 395 922 183 
Panel B 
AXRInvStra 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA FIX LSE MLTI CTA LSE FIX MLTI 
Mean -2.820 -2.149 -0.929 -1.572 4.111 3.187 1.408 4.845 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.017 -0.024 0.014 -0.007 12.879 0.454 0.386 0.425 0.394 
Sigma 2.675 2.167 1.516 1.897 5.418 2.297 2.899 55.255 0.709 0.406 0.376 0.272 0.783 0.349 0.241 305.683 0.176 0.220 0.179 0.190 
Max 1.296 35.118 7.325 2.022 132.712 30.967 51.408 1317.945 18.300 13.641 4.587 3.197 3.254 9.722 2.542 7285.249 0.979 0.999 0.989 0.942 
Min -32.997 -23.006 -28.547 -15.357 -1.856 -5.236 -48.429 -6.409 -5.316 -4.511 -8.467 -2.741 -22.605 -2.968 -4.105 -9.992 -0.856 -0.480 -1.139 -1.032 
Positive 46 186 174 76 1200 2905 897 556 597 1496 480 288 619 1543 495 299 
 
Sig @ 0.05  568 1419 456 275 578 1464 470 283 
Negative 1166 2742 738 491 12 23 15 11 615 1432 432 279 593 1385 417 268 
Sig @ 0.05  593 1378 402 268 555 1326 399 249 
 
Note: This table provides the parametric (AXR) test results for a collective sample of 5619 AIFs from January 1995 to October 2016 [monthly intervals]. The first two columns refer to the dummy 
variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) implies the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the 









Table 3.7: Parametric Performance Persistence [risk-adjusted [AXR]]: Domicile Combined with the Investment Strategy 
Panel A 
AXRLSE 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL 
Mean -2.289 -2.251 -1.979 -2.270 3.517 2.233 3.150 2.859 0.013 0.021 0.008 -0.015 0.010 -0.004 0.000 0.131 0.4480 0.4009 0.4329 0.4361 
Sigma 2.184 1.724 2.307 1.595 2.345 1.672 2.244 2.606 0.339 0.332 0.482 0.319 0.246 0.300 0.295 0.819 0.1648 0.1720 0.2100 0.2262 
Max 2.480 3.184 35.118 0.599 24.691 9.893 28.275 30.967 4.585 1.377 13.641 2.052 2.152 2.814 3.173 9.722 0.9757 0.9893 0.8102 0.8476 
Min -23.006 -9.811 -14.825 -9.176 -0.492 -0.163 -4.704 -5.236 -4.511 -3.026 -3.004 -2.240 -2.968 -2.595 -2.418 -1.385 -1.1393 -0.9098 -0.67 -0.9338 
Positive 71 3 105 7 1156 275 1262 212 606 138 653 99 610 154 660 119 
 
Sig @ 0.05  576 132 615 96 582 148 622 112 
Negative 1088 273 1170 211 3 1 13 6 553 138 622 119 549 122 615 99 
Sig @ 0.05  530 130 606 112 528 115 586 97 
 
Panel B 
AXRCTA 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA CAYI LUX IRL 
Mean -3.004 -2.514 -2.596 -1.878 4.642 2.627 3.483 2.420 -0.003 -0.037 -0.015 0.344 -0.031 -0.027 -0.013 0.021 0.4778 0.433 0.3762 0.3588 
Sigma 2.871 2.166 2.358 1.522 6.435 2.107 2.523 1.498 0.544 0.409 0.280 2.408 0.955 0.231 0.243 0.289 0.1598 0.1824 0.2015 0.2200 
Max 1.296 0.739 1.015 0.249 132.712 9.926 17.438 6.104 7.586 0.543 1.913 18.300 3.254 0.671 0.930 0.837 0.979 0.9099 0.8594 0.7965 
Min -32.997 -9.999 -19.167 -8.246 -1.856 -0.925 -0.380 -0.178 -5.316 -3.180 -1.675 -0.819 -22.605 -1.052 -1.911 -1.638 -0.856 -0.3238 -0.3438 -0.4089 
Positive 24 6 12 4 784 99 261 56 373 60 131 33 411 45 129 34 
 
Sig @ 0.05  350 56 129 33 381 41 123 33 
Negative 763 100 250 53 3 7 1 1 414 46 131 24 376 61 133 23 
Sig @ 0.05  400 42 127 24 344 60 130 21 
 
Panel C 
AXRFIX 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL 
Mean -0.525 -1.041 -0.999 -1.076 1.731 0.696 2.343 1.318 -0.033 0.027 0.019 0.009 0.006 -0.013 0.005 -0.028 0.4629 0.4608 0.3210 0.3282 
Sigma 1.254 0.943 2.410 0.887 1.565 2.894 3.940 0.983 0.670 0.314 0.146 0.154 0.092 0.314 0.227 0.144 0.2267 0.2042 0.2093 0.1854 
Max 7.325 1.717 0.860 0.246 15.336 6.969 51.408 5.604 2.866 4.587 0.989 0.630 0.469 2.542 0.677 0.451 0.9945 0.9986 0.9809 0.8626 
Min -5.234 -5.591 -28.547 -4.123 0.170 -48.429 0.244 -0.903 -8.467 -1.113 -0.477 -0.878 -0.361 -4.105 -2.740 -0.988 -0.1544 -0.0015 -0.4795 -0.3878 
Positive 64 45 53 12 187 358 230 122 107 199 114 60 102 189 132 72 
 
Sig @ 0.05  105 187 108 56 95 177 126 72 
Negative 123 326 177 112 0 13 0 2 80 172 116 64 85 182 98 52 
Sig @ 0.05  74 162 109 57 83 176 90 50 
 
Panel D 
AXRMLTI 𝜶𝒏 𝜶𝒑 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒑 𝑨𝒅𝒋 𝑹
𝟐 
USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL USA LUX CAYI IRL 
Mean -1.446 -1.367 -1.735 -1.507 2.625 14.290 3.110 1.416 0.043 0.008 0.012 -0.051 0.171 72.868 -0.042 -0.075 0.3996 0.4243 0.3278 0.3214 
Sigma 2.078 1.226 1.963 1.949 2.206 131.025 3.082 1.739 0.324 0.164 0.211 0.545 2.155 724.872 0.720 0.242 0.1508 0.1689 0.2347 0.2953 
Max 2.022 0.230 0.604 1.617 18.490 1317.945 30.573 7.901 3.197 0.541 2.065 0.907 27.972 7285.249 2.165 0.213 0.9395 0.942 0.7758 0.8841 
Min -15.048 -7.140 -15.357 -8.425 -6.409 0.030 -0.328 -0.402 -1.137 -0.803 -0.570 -2.741 -1.249 -0.415 -9.992 -1.255 -0.2138 -0.4795 -1.0316 -0.3697 
Positive 32 6 35 3 168 100 265 23 86 53 136 13 94 53 139 13 
 
Sig @ 0.05  83 52 128 12 87 51 132 13 
Negative 137 94 232 28 1 0 2 8 83 47 131 18 75 47 128 18 
Sig @ 0.05  80 44 127 17 74 44 116 15 
 
Note: This table provides the parametric (AXR) test results for a collective sample of 5619 AIFs from January 1995 to October 2016 [monthly intervals]. The first two columns refer to the dummy variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the 




















Table 3.8: Non-Parametric Performance Persistence 
Panel A 
Domicile WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
USA Mean 171.43 170.07 149.92 149.23 4.22 6.16 4.41 4.03 
Total 44572 44218 38979 38801 586 875 975 878 
CAYI Mean 155.62 152.53 126.65 126.19 4.01 6.14 4.23 4.74 
Total 40462 39657 32928 32810 557 970 934 1009 
LUX Mean 57.09 56.77 50.66 50.62 2.75 2.86 3.01 3.72 
Total 14216 13852 12411 12452 151 206 352 499 
IRL Mean 25.85 24.89 23.07 23.18 1.55 1.68 1.63 2.18 





WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
LSE Mean 147.12 143.96 123.45 123.16 3.72 5.71 4.29 4.84 
Total 38250 37429 32097 32021 514 890 919 1026 
CTA Mean 94.34 92.85 88.99 88.70 3.07 3.85 3.07 3.08 
Total 24528 24142 23138 23062 362 500 577 569 
FIX Mean 72.02 70.84 49.67 49.89 2.35 2.60 2.42 3.38 
Total 18652 18206 12764 12822 167 268 336 571 
MLTI Mean 45.20 44.10 36.07 36.01 2.18 2.31 1.82 2.09 
Total 11753 11465 9379 9362 172 238 264 287 
 
Note: This table presents the mean and total number of winning [WW] and losing [LL] periods over  
the 262 months between Jan 1995 and Oct 2016. Furthermore, it also provides the number of winners-gone  






















USA 1.79/1.30 196 1.64/26.96 126 [112] 24.99/727.68 181 [159] 165 [0.63] 
CAYI 1.95/1.49 190 2.16/37.58 123 [102] 22.96/1417.1
5 
160 [135] 195 [0.74] 
LUX 2.68/1.27 213 0.90/13.91 79 [66] 12.05/193.78 127 [99] 159 [0.61] 




















LSE 2.00/1.39 194 1.78/30.87 115 [102] 23.39/955.35 167 [143] 173 [0.66] 
CTA 1.68/1.11 190 0.48/8.01 97 [77] 14.97/64.23 159 [130] 138 [0.53] 
FIX 3.19/2.07 224 2.5/44.85 136 [115] 20.22/2033.8
3 
160 [134] 198 [0.76] 
MLTI 2.54/1.53 200 1.31/21.81 100 [78] 8.54/477.32 126 [96] 179 [0.68] 
 
Note: This table provides the non-parametric test results for a collective sample of 5619 AIFs from January 1995 to October 2016 [monthly 
intervals]. The first column shows the average  
and total CPR; the second column shows the number of months different from CPR’s null hypothesis; the third column shows the average 
and total Z-stat; the fourth column counts the number  
of months where Z-stat is sig. at 5 and 1%, the following column shows the average and total X2 figures, and the sixth column counts the 
number of significant cases. Lastly, PRW shows the number  


















Table 3.10. Non-parametric Performance Persistence: Domicile Combined with the Investment Strategy 
Panel A 
United States WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
USA_LSE Mean 103.40 101.70 89.18 88.67 2.77 4.18 3.13 2.60 
Total 26883 26442 23187 23054 338 552 589 507 
USA_CTA Mean 64.34 63.63 60.35 60.10 2.31 2.92 2.38 2.22 
Total 16728 16543 15690 15625 236 333 391 344 
USA_FIX Mean 16.31 15.69 11.08 11.04 1.45 1.55 1.24 1.40 
Total 4224 4016 2815 2804 45 87 82 101 
USA_MLTI Mean 16.70 16.08 13.09 13.07 1.54 1.21 1.23 1.17 
Total 4342 4180 3404 3397 60 70 74 82 
 
Panel B 
Cayman Islands WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
CAYI_LSE Mean 100.30 98.23 82.60 82.30 2.88 4.14 3.15 3.44 
Total 26078 25539 21477 21398 374 637 623 637 
CAYI_CTA Mean 20.02 19.19 18.95 18.91 1.44 1.53 1.43 1.41 
Total 5204 4969 4928 4916 82 112 130 121 
CAYI_FIX Mean 20.33 19.55 13.60 13.55 1.22 1.77 1.23 1.54 
Total 4941 4654 3182 3184 44 113 87 143 
CAYI_MLTI Mean 21.97 21.18 17.80 17.63 1.53 1.64 1.38 1.50 
Total 5668 5444 4467 4442 81 131 138 126 
 
Panel C 
Luxembourg WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
LUX_LSE Mean 19.99 21.85 20.72 20.55 1.57 1.91 1.98 1.88 
Total 4098 3911 3585 3576 47 86 131 145 
LUX_CTA Mean 7.15 7.64 7.50 7.49 1.36 1.30 1.41 1.36 
Total 1794 1613 1709 1707 30 35 48 57 
LUX_FIX Mean 28.67 31.18 25.18 24.91 1.81 1.91 2.32 2.38 
Total 7282 6922 5641 5680 47 61 137 233 
LUX_MLTI Mean 7.01 10.55 10.53 10.64 1.93 1.38 1.63 1.55 
Total 1479 1319 1306 1309 29 22 49 51 
 
Panel D 
Ireland WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
IRL_LSE Mean 14.27 14.16 12.54 12.52 1.31 1.40 1.38 1.64 
Total 3583 3369 3136 3143 38 67 90 126 
IRL_CTA Mean 3.58 3.17 3.52 3.49 1.00 1.33 1.09 1.15 
Total 917 767 883 877 18 16 25 30 
IRL_FIX Mean 11.16 10.85 10.66 11.00 1.25 1.21 1.37 1.66 
Total 1942 1790 1673 1694 15 23 41 83 
IRL_MLTI Mean 1.82 2.02 2.08 2.06 1.25 1.09 1.25 1.31 
Total 4098 3911 3585 3576 47 86 131 145 
 
Note: This table presents the mean and total number of winning [WW] and losing [LL] periods over the 262 months between Jan 1995 
and Oct 2016. Furthermore, it also provides the number of winners-gone [WG] and losers-gone [LG] as well as the new-entrant-winner 









Table 3.11: Non-parametric Performance Persistence: Domicile Combined with the Investment Strategy 
Panel A 
USA Mean/Total CPR CPR Mean/Total Z-s Z@5% [1%] Mean/Total X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] PRW % 
USA_LSE 2.02/1.33 200 1.36/22.43 116 [105] 18.7/503.79 171 [147] 171 0.65 
USA_CTA 1.61/1.13 191 0.45/7.69 82 [65] 9.26/59.21 134 [99] 146 0.56 
USA_FIX 3.93/2.15 224 1.30/22.11 79 [45] 4.57/494.73 101 [55] 204 0.78 




Cayman Island Mean/Total CPR CPR Mean/Total Z-s Z@5% [1%] Mean/Total X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] PRW % 
CAYI_LSE 2.29/1.45 194 1.61/28.39 114 [94] 16.23/808.27 151 [122] 174 0.66 
CAYI _CTA 1.70/1.07 212 0.15/2.31 44 [26] 4.15/5.32 86 [52] 138 0.53 
CAYI _FIX 3.73/2.27 221 1.58/25.35 93 [58] 5.81/651.58 105 [67] 200 0.76 
CAYI_MLTI 2.53/1.56 202 .91/15.52 72 [45] 4.5/241.92 93 [55] 171 0.65 
Panel C 
Luxemburg Mean/Total CPR CPR Mean/Total Z-s Z@5% [1%] Mean/Total X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] PRW % 
LUX_LSE 2.57/1.25 216 0.49/6.864 30 [20] 4.15/47.16 45 [31] 129 0.49 
LUX_CTA 3.36/0.99 233 0.05/-.167 26 [18] 3.75/0.03 72 [39] 128 0.49 
LUX_FIX 3.35/1.57 229 1.14/17.98 72 [59] 11.02/324.63 113 [91] 177 0.68 
LUX_MLTI 3.03/1.14 238 0.1/2.42 23 [13] 4.91/5.88 54 [31] 149 0.57 
 
Panel D 
Ireland Mean/Total CPR CPR Mean/Total Z-s Z@5% [1%] Mean/Total X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] PRW % 
IRL_LSE 3.25/1.22 213 0.43/5.82 46 [27] 4.19/33.9 80 [55] 139 0.53 
IRL_CTA 2.57/0.91 217 -0.06/-1.41 6 [1] 1.85/1.98 40 [10] 104 0.40 
IRL_FIX 3.97/1.23 232 0.36/4.294 25 [14] 4.82/18.46 58 [37] 110 0.42 
IRL_MLTI 2.42/1.30 241 0.09/2.21 1 [0] 1.82/4.9 16 [1] 143 0.55 
 
Note: This table provides the non-parametric test results for a collective sample of 5619 AIFs from January 1995 to October 2016 [monthly intervals]. The first column shows the 
average and total CPR; the second column shows the number of months different from CPR’s null hypothesis; the third column shows the average and total Z-stat; the fourth column 
counts the number of months where Z-stat is sig. at 5 and 1%, the following column shows the average and total X2 figures, and the sixth column counts the number of significant cases. 









Figure 1. The Number of Domicile/Strategy Hedge Funds (1995-2016) 
 
Note: This figure shows the number of hedge funds in each domicile, which is further divided based 
on the investment strategy. The data has been extracted from the Eureka Hedge database. 
Abbreviations: USA - United States, CAYI - Cayman Islands, LUX - Luxembourg, IRL - Ireland, 
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Chapter 4. Gender differences in hedge fund performance. 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent decades the debate concerning gender differences in the financial investment industry 
has been the subject of significant attention. However, the analysis of the performance within the hedge 
fund industry from the gender perspective has been largely unexplored. According to Prequin (2020), 
hedge funds aggregate US$ 3.61tn assets under management, which is almost the equivalent of 
Germany’s 2019 GDP of US$ 3.84tn (World Bank, 2020). Given the value of the assets under 
management in the global hedge fund industry, the significance of risk these investment vehicles pose 
for the global economy is evident. Despite the relatively low profile and secrecy, the hedge fund 
industry has come to international prominence not only due to exorbitant profits generation but more 
so due to spectacular defaults and government bailouts (Jorion 2000; King and Maier 2009).  
Previous research shows that male investors invest in riskier assets than their female counterparts 
(Barber and Odean, 2001; Marinelli, Mazzoli and Palmucci, 2017). Similarly, female mutual fund 
investors are more risk-averse than their male counterparts (Dwyer, Gilkeson and List, 2002; Powell 
and Ansic, 1997). By contrast, research on mutual funds finds that few differences exist in the 
performance and investment behaviour between male and female managers (Atkinson, Baird and Frye, 
2003; Bollen and Posavac, 2018). Given the relatively explored mutual fund environment and 
completely non-existent (similar) research in hedge funds, we explore the following research questions. 
Are there any differences between the performance of male and female hedge fund managers? Taking 
into consideration multi-period performance persistence, what is the performance of the male and 
female hedge fund managers?  
The Sharpe ratio (SR) is the most popular risk-adjusted performance measure used. However, the use 
of the SR not only implies that investors invest in just one fund but also that HF returns follow a normal 
distribution (see Eling and Schuhmacher, 2007). To our knowledge, the only study on risk-adjusted HF 
performance (Aggarwal and Boyson, 2016) relies on the estimation of the Sharpe ratio (SR) as the only 
risk-adjusted performance measure. However, these assumptions are unrealistic in this context, given 
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the asymmetric return distributions of HFs (see Bernard, Vanduffel and Ye, 2019; Fung and Hsieh, 
1999). Thus, the analysis of HFs requires a sophisticated approach (Getmansky, Lo and Makarov 2004; 
Malkiel and Saha 2005; Eling 2006), which extends beyond standardised appraisal methods of the first 
two moments and metrics such as the SR. Although Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) show that the choice 
of risk-adjusted measure does not affect the ranking of HF performance, they contend that SR is 
inadequate in the cases of asymmetrical distribution.  
Our study extends the investigation of HF performance beyond the first two moments of the returns’ 
(mean and standard deviation) and incorporates the third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis). Furthermore, 
our analysis includes not only a series of risk-adjusted metrics but also the analysis of performance 
persistence (both parametric and non-parametric).  
Although extant literature exists examining male and female fund managers' performance, this is 
restricted to mutual and retirement funds (e.g., Atkinson et al. 2003; Aggarwal and Boyson, 2016; 
Bollen and Posavac, 2018). Very little research focuses on performance between genders in the male-
dominated hedge funds industry and when it does as is the case with the research conducted by 
Aggarwal and Boyson (2016), the potential deviations of the higher-order statistics are not examined. 
The uniqueness of hedge funds lies in their elusive behaviour and the investment opportunities they 
explore (usually unavailable to other investment entities). These, in turn, cause the asymmetrical 
distribution, i.e., the deviations of higher-order moments (skewness and kurtosis) and fat tails, leading 
to a higher number of extreme events than one would normally anticipate (Fung and Hsieh, 1999). Thus, 
one of the major contributions of this chapter is to incorporate these crucial properties into the 
examination of male/female hedge fund manager performance to provide a more accurate assessment. 
Furthermore, the performance persistence aspects were also never considered in the examination of 
gender differences in any fund environment, let alone hedge funds. 
Our analysis uncovers several interesting findings. We show that when using the SR as a measure of 
investment performance, male and female HF managers produce similar results, in line with previous 
literature (Aggarwal and Boyson, 2016). However, when considering higher-order statistics, our tests 
reveal that female HF managers tend to produce lower returns and higher risk than their male 
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counterparts. Returns of HFs managed by female managers are, on average, negatively skewed, and 
performance measures that capture the negative deviations of returns only penalize negatively skewed 
funds relative to those managed by males, which are positively skewed. This finding not only confirms 
the previous studies with regards to the higher-order statistic properties crystallising in HFs but also 
shows their importance in identifying gender differences in HF performance. Further, correlation 
matrices of risk-adjusted ratios reveal the high average correlation of all metrics against Sharpe ratio 
for the female Equity managers and their male counterparts (although noticeably lower than females). 
Concerning the Universe of HFs, both genders exhibit similar correlations. Nevertheless, in either case, 
our correlations with the Sharpe ratio are significantly below what has been reported by Eling and 
Schuhmacher (2007). This result further suggests that other risk-adjusted ratios do matter in assessing 
HF performance, at least in the case of male managers where correlations with regards to Sharpe ratio 
are lower than in female managed HFs. 
Lastly, we analyse the performance persistence based on multiple periods: short-term (monthly and bi-
monthly), medium-term (quarterly) and long-term (six-monthly and annual). In the non-parametric 
approach, we observe performance persistence crystallising across all analysed time horizons and 
genders. The results indicate the most pronounced average performance persistence occurs in female 
managed HFs (in both clusters). Nevertheless, despite that, the number of months under which the null 
hypothesis of no persistence is violated is marginally higher for male managers. The non-risk-adjusted 
parametric method results indicate a solid positive and statistically significant persistence across both 
portfolios and genders under the monthly time horizon. However, as soon as we move towards the bi-
monthly period, both genders in the Equity cluster experience performance reversal (into negative). 
Contrary, in the Universe portfolio, both genders continue to exhibit positive and statistically significant 
persistence. The results of the quarterly analysis, on the other hand, are broadly similar to our initial 
investigation of the monthly persistence - once again, in all cases, we observe positive persistence. 
Further, the six-monthly analysis indicates the dominance of negative cases for both portfolios and 
genders except the male managed Universe cluster, which exhibits strong positive persistence. Lastly, 
under the annual horizon, the female managers continue to exhibit negative persistence in both 
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portfolios, while the opposite is true for the male managers. Under the risk-adjusted parametric analysis, 
male HF managers exhibit positive performance persistence throughout all time horizons (except Equity 
annual) in both clusters. In an interesting turn for the female HF managers, the incorporation of risk 
into the parametric analysis has elevated their funds into mostly positive territory (with some at parity 
between the number of positive and negative cases). The only time where we have seen weak although 
negative performance persistence with the female managers was at the monthly horizon in both Equity 
and the Universe. The general finding of the performance persistence crystalising across all analysed 
periods (gender aspect aside) is consistent with the earlier work of, for example,  Do, Faff and 
Veeraraghavan (2010) or Ammann, Huber and Schmid (2013). We, like many others, believe that 
gender differences are an important issue for future research. Even more so, given the almost non-
existent coverage of the topic in one of the world's most secretive investment industries, the hedge 
funds. Furthermore, our study brings further attention to a highly underrepresented group (females) in 
the financial industry and especially hedge funds (where sole female management stands at approx. 
4.5% - see 4.2). 
The remaining chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 describes the data; Section 4.3 outlines the 
methods; while Section 3.3 describes the results, and Section 4.5 concludes findings. Lastly, the 











Our initial sample comprises all 4,327 funds recorded in Morningstar’s (MSD) Global Hedge Fund 
Universe for the period October 1978 - December 2018. From these, we exclude duplicates14 and funds 
with a missing manager or the investment strategy details. We also exclude funds that have less than 12 
months of returns. Our final sample consists of 1,321 funds, which are then subjected to the 
winsorization process with the bounds set to 0.05 due to the presence of a very small number of outliers 
(affecting the male sample and exponentially elevating (positive direction) their performance). We 
allocate funds into six strategy groups based on the Morningstar Category Classifications (Morningstar, 
2016) and the HFRI formulaic methodology (HFRI, 2019), namely: Equity; Arbitrage; Event; Debt; 
Global; and Multi (Table 4.1). The strategy pools were organised based on the Morningstar Category 
Classifications (Morningstar, 2016) and the HFRI formulaic methodology (HFRI, 2019). Table 4.1 
tabulates the number of hedge funds based on each of the size strategy groups along with those managed 
by male and female managers. In the analysis, we focus on the Equity strategy (as well as the entire HF 
Universe for comparison purposes), which is the most saturated investment strategy by both male and 
female managers and accounts for 25.3% ($914bn) of the HF market (Preqin, 2018). The hedge funds 
are heavily male-dominated, with 1,261 being managed by male managers and the remaining 6015 by 
female managers. Nevertheless, despite the low number of female hedge fund managers, the 60 hedge 
funds cover the entire examined timeframe between October 1978 and December 2018. The 
Morningstar database identifies only a fraction of hedge fund manager genders. Thus, due to a relatively 
small sample of 1321 hedge funds, we check the gender of each manager manually (through a search 
on Bloomberg and the individual hedge fund websites). Our research focuses only on the most recent, 
lead hedge fund manager (as extracted from the database). 
 
 
14 Duplicates exist because of multiple listings in various currencies and/or share classes e.g. Aggarwal and 
Jorion (2010), and Bali, Brown and Caglayan (2011). 
15 The only limitation of this study is the number of female hedge fund managers. The hedge fund industry is 
heavily male dominate, hence the small number of female managers. The suggestion for future research that 
could potentially alleviate this issue would be to acquire all known hedge fund databases, remove duplicate 
funds and then analyse the performance/performance persistence. 
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***Insert Table 4.1*** 
 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In the first instance, we analyse the risk and return employing standard metrics such as the mean return 











/√12         (4.2) 
However, given the previous literature (Getmansky et al. 2004; Malkiel and Saha 2005; Eling 2006), 
we know that under Markowitz’s (Markowitz, 1952) Modern Portfolio Theory (i.e. mean-variance 
analysis [the first two moments]), we cannot account for the existence of the autocorrelation, 
survivorship and selection biases as well as the higher moments of the return distribution. Thus, we test 
for the autocorrelation (4.3) at lag 1. The autocorrelation in hedge funds is a by-product of erroneous 
investment valuations. The errors in valuation arise due to the illiquidity of specific investment 
instruments, for example, sub-prime (distressed) RMBS’s (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities) 








       (4.3) 
The significance of the autocorrelation is tested with Ljung-Box (4.4) (Ljung and Box, 1978) statistic:  





𝑗=1         (4.4) 
Subsequently, we assess the higher moments of the return distribution, such as skewness (4.5) and 
kurtosis (4.6). The asymmetrical distribution of hedge funds is their widely known property, resulting 
from the difficulties in the valuation of illiquid securities (within their holdings) and investments in 
derivatives (Favre and Signer, 2002; Kat, 2002; Eling, 2006). Furthermore, it is often said that the 
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assumption of normality is inappropriate for hedge funds (unlike with stocks and bonds) (Geman and 














)4𝑁𝑖=1          (4.6) 
To test the significance of the S and K, we employ the Jarque-Bera (4.7) distribution test for both 0.05 







)         (4.7) 
 
***Insert Table 4.2*** 
 
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the returns of Equity HFs (Panel A) and the Universe of 
HFs (Panel B). The average return in the Equity cluster indicates female managers superiority (at 0.83 
versus 0.71 for the males). Similarly, the female managed HFs also dominate (although minimally by 
0.05 of a per cent) in the Universe cluster. This observation is consistent with the previous literature 
concerning gender-related investor behaviour (Barber and Odean, 2001; Choi et al., 2002). 
Concerning the higher-order statistics, despite minimally lower average returns, male managed funds 
exhibit more attractive levels of skewness. Concerning the higher-order statistics, despite minimally 
lower average returns, male managed funds exhibit more attractive (positive) levels of skewness. The 
positive skewness and positive excess kurtosis are highly attractive for the risk-averse investors (Kat, 
2003; Eling, 2006) as they magnify the probability of substantial gains. The investors prefer to 
decrease the extreme negative events and prefer positive (as opposed to negative) skewness (what 
indicates that the left tail is fatter than the right one), as the underlying motivation for HFs is their 
ability to generate positive returns in stagnated or bearish markets. Moreover, in most cases, HFs 
advertise extreme risk which naturally results in negative skewness and positive kurtosis (similar to a 
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short put option) (Agarwal and Naik, 2000). Importantly, HF returns have fat tails, which lead to a 
higher number of extreme events than one would normally anticipate (Fung and Hsieh, 1999). The 
omission of the existence of negative skewness combined with positive kurtosis has crystalised at the 
collapse of the Long-Term-Capital-Management ( LTCM) in 1998 and as Bali, Gokcan and Liang 
(2007) and Bali and Gokcan (2004) states initiated the industry to start accounting for the higher-order 
moments beyond the mere mean-variance assessment of performance. Thus, the fusion of the positive 
skewness and kurtosis, although not completely unique is a desirable departure from the standard 
expectation of negative skew and positive kurtosis crystallising specifically in hedge funds.  
The Ljung-Box test for the autocorrelation of returns rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, 
while the Jarque-Bera test for the higher-order statistics rejects the null hypothesis of a normal return 
distribution for both male and female HF managers’ returns. It is important to note that the data has 













To examine the gender differences in hedge fund performance, we consider several techniques. Firstly, 
we measure risk-adjusted performance employing classical risk-adjusted metrics such as the Sharpe 
ratio and Jensen Alpha. Second, we adopt metrics based on the lower partial moments such as Omega, 
Sortino, Kappa 3 and the Upside Potential. We further use Calmar, Sterling, and Burke - drawdown-
based metrics. Lastly, we employ Excess return on Value at Risk, Conditional Sharpe and Modified 
Sharpe. In addition, we follow Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) and examine the correlation of all the 
risk-adjusted metrics and construct a Spearman rank correlation matrix.  
Finally, we complement the analysis by conducting performance persistence testing by examining 
multiple time horizons. Specifically, we perform both non-parametric testing presenting a contingency 
table of the winners and losers and parametric testing using regressions. In both cases, we focus on 
multiple periods: short (monthly and bi-monthly), medium (quarterly) and long (six-monthly and 
annual).  
 
4.3.1 Risk-Adjusted Ratios 
Risk-adjusted ratios such as the Sharpe ratio and Jensen Alpha are direct derivatives of Markowitz’s 
portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). Their general utility makes them the most widely used metric in 
prior literature (Sharpe, 1966; Dhrymes, 2017).  
4.3.1.1 Classic Ratios 
Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio (4.8) measures the excess return per unit of total risk (Sharpe, 1966). The metric is 
also referred to as the reward to variability ratio and in principle, assumes that the returns of the analysed 











The Jensen Alpha (4.9) measures the excess return above the return predicted by the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. The metric reports in a percentage format, which indicates the over/underperformance 
as contrasted with the market.  
𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛 = (𝑟𝑖
𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓) − (𝑟𝑟𝑝
𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓)𝛽      (4.9) 
4.3.1.2 Lower Partial Moment Ratios (LPM) 
The lower partial moments (LPM) measure the risk through negative deviations of the HFs returns with 
regards to a minimum acceptable return (MAR) (Fishburn, 1977). Since the LPM considers only the 
negative deviations of the analysed time series, it seems to be a more appropriate measure of risk than 
standard deviation – as σ considers both negative and positive deviations. Thus, in this section, we 
examine the following ratios: Omega, Kappa 3 and Upside Potential.  
Omega 
The Omega ratio (4.10) refers to the excess return over the minimum acceptable return and the lower 
partial moment of the first order (LPM1). Furthermore, as can be seen, Omega is similar to the Sharpe 





+ 1         (4.10) 
Sortino 
The Sortino ratio (4.11) refers to the excess return over the minimum target return and the LPM. Its 
physiology is similar to Shape’s ratio, in which σ is replaced with downside deviation. While, the order 
of the LPM (seen previously in Omega) is increased to 2, which reflects a concave utility function 










The Kappa 3 ratio (4.12) refers to the excess return over the minimum acceptable return and the lower 
partial moment of the first order (LPM3). Same as the Omega and Sortino, this metric does not assume 





3         (4.12) 
Upside Potential 
The Upside Potential ratio (4.13) is one of the metrics combining both lower (LPM) and higher (HPM) 
partial moments (Sortino, van der Meer, and Plantinga, 1999). The ratio measures the attractiveness of 





2          (4.13) 
4.3.1.3 Drawdown Ratios 
The drawdown-based metrics represent a special class in the realm of alternative risk versus reward 
ratios. Their uniqueness relies on the ease of their interpretation and simultaneous difficulty in analysing 
their operational properties (Schuhmacher and Eling, 2011). This section examines the following ratios: 
Calmar, Sterling, Burke.  
Calmar 
The Calmar ratio (4.14) measures the fund’s performance through the return versus drawdown risk 
(Young, 1991). The Calmar ratio is, in essence, smoothed version of the Sterling ratio as it employs 











The Sterling ratio (4.15) (unlike Sharpe with its σ) measures risks through the application of the average 
drawdown (Lhabitant, 2004, p.84). Furthermore, due to the employment of the smallest drawdowns 









        (4.15) 
Burke 
The Burke ratio (4.16) is another metric similar to the Sharpe ratio, which also measures the adjusted 
risk. Unlike the Sharpe ratio, Burke’s denominator consists of a square root of the sum of squares of 







        (4.16) 
 
4.3.1.4 Ratios Based on the Value at Risk (VaR) 
This part discusses the methods based on the VaR, which measures the worst expected loss over the 
analysed period at a predefined confidence interval (Jorion, 2001). The metrics based on the VaR are 
simply based on the quantile 𝑍𝑎 of the distribution of the time-series returns. The VaR approach 
concentrates on the return properties of analysed HFs. As previously identified (Getmansky et al. 2004; 
Malkiel and Saha 2005; Eling 2006), the analysis of hedge funds requires a sophisticated approach, 
which extends beyond standardised appraisal methods of the first two lower-order moments. Thus, this 
part focuses on the Sharpe ratio (SR) and Value at Risk (VaR) and their modifications incorporating the 






Excess Return on Value at Risk 
The Excess Return on value at Risk (4.17) measures the excess risk over the Value at Risk (VaR) 





         (4.17) 
Conditional Sharpe Ratio 
Conditional SR (4.18) measures the expected loss only considering the values, which exceed VaR 





          (4.18)   
Modified Sharpe Ratio 
To get a better insight into the risk approach of both male and female hedge fund managers, we have to 
first calculate standard VaR (4.19), where 𝑍𝑎 = −2.33 (0.99 𝐶𝐼) and 𝑤 = 𝑈𝑆$1. Jorion (2001, p. xxii) 
describes VaR in the following way: “VaR measures the worst expected loss over a given horizon under 
normal market conditions at a given level of confidence.” 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 = −(𝑍𝑎𝜎𝐴𝑚 + 𝑟𝑖
𝑝
)𝑤        (4.19) 
To integrate the deviations of higher moments of return distributions (S and K), we apply Favre and 
Galeano’s (2002) Modified VaR (MVaR) (4.20), in which the alpha value of the standard VaR has been 
replaced with Cornish-Fisher expansion (4.21). 
𝑀𝑉𝑎𝑅 = −(𝑍𝐶𝐹𝜎𝐴𝑚 + 𝑟𝑖
𝑑)𝑤        (4.20) 













2   (4.21) 
To complement the change in MVaR, we use the modification employed by Eling and Schuhmacher 
(2007) and replace the 𝜎𝐴𝑚 in the SR formula with the MVaR. Thus, our new metric, the Modified SR 
(MSR) (4.22), incorporates the effects of the S and K. The Modified SR measures the excess return over 
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          (4.22) 
4.3.2 Performance Persistence 
The following section describes the two most common performance persistence measures. The first 
measure pertains to widely applied non-parametric contingency tables, while the second one, 
parametric, focuses entirely on the regressions. 
Given the differences in approach towards the risk between male and female managers, as described in 
the literature review, we provide additional insight into the performance persistence. We compare the 
HFs based on gender and categorise them in either Equity strategy-based funds or the Universe (which 
includes multiple strategies). The analysis concerns the period between October 1978 - December 2018. 
We are using four performance benchmark medians; each of them corresponds with the number of 
analysed HFs and their strategic focus/gender of the manager. The fund exceeding (receding) the 
median return equals a winner (loser) and is denoted as WW (LL). While the winner (in the initial 
period) transforming into a loser (secondary period) as WL and vice versa LW. The contingency tables 
approach is structured in the following way: cross-product ratio (CPR), Z-statistic (Z) and Chi-square 
(X2).  
The cross-product ratio indicates whether or not the HF exhibits performance persistence. The null 




         (4.23) 
The statistical significance of the CPR results is measured with Z-statistic (4.24). Thus, if the Z-stat 


















        (4.24) 
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The chi-square (4.25) compares the observed frequency distribution with the expected frequency 
distribution. Therefore, if the X2 exceeds 3.84 (5%) or 6.64 (1%), we can further confirm the existence 


































         (4.25) 




       (4.26) 
 
In terms of the parametric approach, we use two types of regressions, the XR (4.27) and AXR (4.28). 
Both regressions are similar to Do et al. (2010)with one notable difference, our benchmark variables 
are medians and not average returns of the aggregated HF groups. Furthermore, we consider a vast 
number of time horizons in our work as well as previously unexplored gender aspects. The XR 
regression measures the HF returns with respect to the median return of all HFs in a particular group 
(i.e., Equity and the Universe). Whereas the AXR approach accounts for the risks associated with HFs. 
Thus, the AXR regression works in the same way as the XR, although the results are further divided by 
the residual standard deviation of the XR. 
 
𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑛𝐷𝑛 + 𝑎𝑝𝐷𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝐷𝑛𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑝𝐷𝑝𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4.27) 
𝐷𝑛 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑝 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0 
 
𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑛𝐷𝑛 + 𝑎𝑝𝐷𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑛𝐷𝑛𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑝𝐷𝑝𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (4.28) 
𝐷𝑛 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑝 = 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 > 0 
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The dummy variables 𝐷𝑛 and 𝐷𝑝 refer to the negative (losing) and positive (winning) returns. Similarly, 
the 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 and 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 refer to the negative and positive levels of returns’ autocorrelation. The significant 
positive 𝛽𝑖,𝑛 indicates the presence of the autocorrelation and negative (losing) HFs, while the 𝛽𝑖,𝑝 





















4.4 Empirical Results  
The following two sections present the results of two approaches undertaken in this chapter. First, we 
discuss the results of the twelve risk-adjusted ratios (divided into classic, lower partial moment, 
drawdown, and based on VaR). Second, we report the results of the performance persistence 
approaches: the non-parametric (contingency tables) and parametric (regressions) models.  
4.4.1 Risk-Adjusted Ratios 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the gender-based risk-adjusted-ratio analysis for both the Equity-only 
and the entire HF Universe. The average Sharpe ratio stands at 0.14 for both male and female HF 
managers. Equally, both male and female HF managers outperform the market, on average, by one basis 
point.  
Classic ratios consider risk as negative and positive deviations of returns from expected returns. In 
contrast, LPM ratios consider only negative deviations of returns from a minimum acceptable return. 
Whilst these measures produce similar results when the return distributions are normal, they produce 
different results when return distributions are lognormal (Price et al., 1982). Table 4.3, Panel B presents 
the results for the Omega, Sortino, Kappa 3 and Upside Potential Ratios. All four LPM ratios show that 
male HF managers outperform female HF managers when accounting for negative deviations from the 
minimum acceptable return. Given the differences in skewness between male and female HF managers 
(Table 4.2), the above results are not surprising: Female (male) HF returns tend to exhibit more 
significant negative (positive) skewness, and LPM ratios penalize negatively skewed returns relative to 
positively skewed returns. The departure from normality in hedge funds in addition to the fat tails issue 
also includes the asymmetry and the short option behaviour, where the intermittent significant losses 
appear scattered among frequent low returns (Dennis and Mayhew, 2002; Perez, 2004). Thus, in many 
instances rendering the low yet positive returns insignificant. It is important to notice that these 
properties are mostly prevalent in hedge funds. As much as long investors stray away from the negative 
skewness (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1976; Harvey and Siddique, 2000), there are some hedge funds 
capable of generating returns through the sale of negative skewness. Similarly, the hedge funds 
exhibiting negative kurtosis can also generate returns (due to the kurtosis premium being negative) 
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(Agarwal, Bakshi and Huij, 2009). Furthermore, the negative skewness of hedge funds can be also offset 
by placing them in a portfolio of stocks and bonds due to their low correlation with each other (Eling, 
2006). 
Table 4.3, Panel C, presents the results for the Drawdown-based performance measures: Calmar, 
Sterling and Burke ratios. In contrast to Classic and LPM ratios, Drawdown-based measures use the 
maximum possible loss over some time as a measure of risk. Two of the three Drawdown-based 
measures show almost no differences between male and female HF managers. The Calmar ratio shows 
that male HF managers tend to over-perform female HF managers when accounting for drawdown risk.  
Table 4.3, Panel D, reports risk-adjusted performance metrics based on VaR.  We estimate the Excess 
return on value at risk (ErVaR), Conditional SR and Modified SR measures. VaR performance-based 
measures utilise the maximum possible loss of an investment with a given probability over a given 
period and are therefore similar to the LPM-based measures. Two of three measures show that HFs 
managed by male managers produce better risk-adjusted returns than their female colleagues when 
accounting for the expected VaR.  This result is consistent with the LPM-based measures' findings and 
reflects the highly negative skewness of HFs managed by females (see Table 4.3: Panel B). 
 
***Insert Table 4.3*** 
 
Similar to Eling and Schuhmacher (2007), we also provide a complimentary overview of the rank 
correlation of the risk-adjusted metrics. Table 4.4 presents the results of this analysis focusing solely on 
Equity focused HFs (Table 4.4) and Table 4.5 on the universe of HFs.  In both cases, the data has been 
separated based on the gender of the HF manager. Our matrices do not exhibit a high correlation of 
magnitude of 0.92-0.99 in all cases. Instead, for the male managed Equity HFs (Panel A), the correlation 
coefficient for the Sharpe ratio at its lowest is 0.50 (Calmar ratio) and the highest at 0.88 (MSR). In 
Panel B (female managed HFs), the lowest correlation with the Sharpe ratio is 0.38 (Calmar ratio), with 
the highest 0.99 (MSR). The average of the ratios based on the VaR (0.87) and the LPM (0.76) has the 
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highest correlation with the Sharpe ratio in Panel A, while the same is true for the ratios based on VaR 
(0.99) and LPM (0.92) in Panel B. Overall, the number of coefficients exceeding 0.60 correlation 
(excluding diagonal 1.00 values) for males is 46 out of 66, while for females 53/66. This result is 
comparable with the findings of Pedersen and Rudholm-Alfvin (2003) concerning the HF universe.  
 
***Insert Table 4.4*** 
 
The aggregated HF universe (Table 4.5) paints a slightly different picture. Panel A shows that the lowest 
correlation coefficient value with regards to the Sharpe ratio is 0.54 (Calmar ratio), with the highest 
being 0.83 (Kappa 3). Similar values can be found in Panel B, where the minimum correlation 
coefficient is 0.54 (Calmar ratio), and the maximum is 0.91 (MSR). The average of the ratios based on 
the LPM (0.76) has the highest correlation with Sharpe ratio in Panel A, while the same is true for the 
ratios based on VaR (0.76) in Panel B. Overall, the number of coefficients exceeding 0.60 correlation 
(excluding diagonal 1.00 values) for males is 39 out of 66, while for females 54/66. As was the case 
with Table 4.4 (Panel B), the risk-adjusted metrics in female managed HFs (Table 4.5) also exhibit a 
much higher correlation with the Sharpe ratio than those of their male counterparts. This finding aligns 
with the results in Eling and Schuhmacher (2007), implying that in our case, the Sharp ratio is a 
sufficient metric for the female managed HFs, regardless of whether we are focusing on Equity-only or 
the aggregated universe portfolios.  
 




4.4.2 Performance Persistence 
4.4.2.1 Non-Parametric 
The following section examines non-parametric performance persistence based on the gender of the HF 
manager. As mentioned earlier, the analysis focuses on the Equity HFs. Nonetheless, we also provide 
the figures for the aggregated HF Universe for comparison. Furthermore, to increase the granularity of 
our analysis, we have calculated performance persistence for short-term (monthly and bi-monthly), 
medium-term (quarterly and six-monthly) and long-term (annually).  
Tables 4.6 (4.7) and 4.8 (4.10) present the results of the non-parametric analysis for female and male 
equity HFs managers, respectively - aggregating 815 HFs (see Table 4.1). Notably, the percentage 
difference between the number of WW’s and LL’s is more significant amongst female managers. In 
almost all periods, the female managed HFs are dominated with negative performance persistence, 
while the male managed funds achieve parity between the wins and losses in 6-monthly and annual 
periods. For the female managers, the dynamics change towards monthly and bi-monthly periods where 
the gap between the WW and LL cases narrows. The lowest average CPR for male managers stands at 
1.72 (annual), with the highest at 2.51 (six-monthly). Simultaneously, the lowest average CPR for 
female managers stands at 2.32 (quarterly) and the highest at 3.0816 (6-monthly). The null hypothesis 
of no persistence (i.e., CPR= 1) is violated in all periods for both genders. The Z-statistic further shows 
that of the 220/375 (208/375) months (CPR≠ 1) in male (female) managed HFs, the 25 (11) are 
significant @1% and 91 (4) @5%. Lastly, despite the average PRW being higher for female managers 
across all periods, the number of months where the PRW is greater than 50% is much higher amongst 
male managed funds. 
 
***Insert Table 4.6*** 






Turning our attention to the aggregated HF Universe, we examine the results in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. The 
aggregated HF Universe represents six major HF strategies with a collective number of 1321 HFs (see 
Table 4.1). In this scenario, we observe a significant increase in the number of LL cases in the female 
managed HFs as compared to the previous assessment of the Equity Universe (the Equity HFs constitute 
62% of the entire HF Universe). On the contrary, the percentage differences between the winners and 
losers in male managed HFs substantially decrease to the point of parity and even a performance 
persistence reversal under the annual horizon. In this particular case, male HF managers achieve 
positive performance persistence with 2.2% (WW= 114.03 versus LL= 111.57). Moreover, the changes 
in CPR are also noticeable, with the lowest (highest) for the male managers at 1.89 (2.28) and the female 
at 2.27 (3.91). Nevertheless, the CPR levels across the male managed portfolios are broadly similar 
(Tables 4.6 and 4.9). The exception to this is the monthly horizon in female managed HFs, where the 
CPR increases by 30.4% (from the equity-only to the universe portfolio). Regardless of the portfolios' 
CPR value differences, the changes in the number of time intervals exhibiting performance persistence 
(CPR≠ 1) are minuscule. The average PRW figures are still dominating amongst female HF managers, 
while the number of cases where the PRW is greater than 50% in most cases belongs to male managers.  
 
***Insert Table 4.8*** 
***Insert Table 4.9*** 
 
The results of the analysis (for both genders) undoubtedly confirm the existence of performance 
persistence across all analysed periods. According to CPR, the most pronounced performance 
persistence occurs in a short-term (monthly) period for the female Equity managers (CPR= 3.91). 
However, it is worth mentioning that under the assumption of the CPR’s statistical sig., female Equity 
managers exhibit performance persistence in 199/375 months. Whereas the highest number of 
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statistically significant months in a short-term (monthly) persistence analysis occurs under the male 
managed HF Universe (225/375 with a CPR= 2.28). 
4.4.2.2 Parametric 
In this part, we turn our attention to the parametric analysis, although at this point, non-risk adjusted, 
which is less commonly used in prior literature.  
Table 4.10 and Table 4.11 presents the results of the gender-based (MAL/FEM) non-risk adjusted 
analysis for both the Equity-only (EQU) and the entire HF Universe (ALL). As we observe in Table 
4.10 (Panel A), the percentage of statistically significant cases versus the number of Beta coefficients 
is higher for male managed Equity HFs and stands at 18.9% versus 17.4% for the female managed 
funds. Interestingly, the percentage differences reverse when comparing against the aggregated 
portfolio (Table 4.11: Panel A). 
Slightly decreasing granularity, we are moving onto the bi-monthly intervals as shown in Panel B (Table 
4.10/4.11). Consequently, we are observing a minimal downward shift in the number of statistically 
significant cases in all portfolios. The male managed HFs continue to exhibit marginal positive 
dominance in the aggregated portfolio. Interestingly, the same cannot be said about the Equity HFs, 
which are minimally dominated (66 to 63) by the negative and statistically significant cases. Thus, 
indicating the negative persistence. On the contrary, the female managed HFs maintain the parity 
between the number of negative and positive cases in the Equity cluster while exhibiting positive 
persistence in the aggregated universe.   
The quarterly (medium-term) results in Panel C (Table 4.10/4.11) show that the female managed funds 
in both portfolios continue to exhibit similar properties. On the other hand, the male managed HFs 
return to profitability, as the number of cases indicating positive performance increases drastically 
relative to the previously analysed time horizon. Despite using different HF databases, the other authors 
have also confirmed the existence of quarterly persistence in both HFs (Agarwal and Naik, 2000) and 
funds of HFs (Steri et al., 2009). 
78 
 
Moving towards the long-term analysis, we discover that the number of negative cases dominates the 
Equity portfolio for both genders under a six-monthly time interval. What’s even more interesting is 
that the HFs across all portfolios manifest the ability to switch from losers to winners and vice versa 
(depending on the time horizon). Nonetheless, the HFs under the six-monthly time horizon, regardless 
of gender, exhibit losing (or near) performance persistence. The only exception we can call out is the 
male managed Universe, where the number of statistically significant and positive cases stands at 143 
versus 141 negatives.  
A similar situation occurs at the annual level for the female managers, where the HFs in both clusters 
are dominated with negative cases. The situation for the male managed equity HFs overturns and begins 
to exhibit minor domination in the positive territory. While the aggregated universe shows continuous 
and highly significant (at the annual horizon) positive performance persistence. Interestingly, we note 
that our risk-adjusted R2 is significantly higher in comparison to Do et al. (2010) for both genders across 
all time horizons.  
 
***Insert Table 4.10*** 
***Insert Table 4.11*** 
 
The complementary risk-adjusted-performance persistence analysis has been aggregated in Table 4.12 
and Table 4.13. Panel A concerning male HF managers in both clusters shows similar magnitude results 
to our earlier non-risk adjusted analysis. Thus, winning and statistically significant performance 
persistence dominates. On the contrary, and despite the increase in the number of female managed HFs, 
both clusters reverse into the statistically significant negative Betas. In general, we find a weak short-
term (monthly) negative performance persistence crystallising under female management.  
The bi-monthly risk-adjusted results for the Equity cluster are significantly different from what we have 
seen in the non-risk-adjusted analysis (Table 4.10/4.11: Panel B). The male managed funds are no 
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longer dominated by losing performance persistence and instead flourish with a significant positive 
lead. While the Universe cluster continues to exhibit positive persistence. In terms of the female 
managed HFs, they exhibit positive persistence across the board, unlike in the non-risk-adjusted and 
losing Equity cluster. 
In the quarterly data (Panel C), we observe a similar number of significant cases as in the non-risk-
adjusted analysis. However, this time, female managed portfolios exhibit parity between the number of 
statistically significant positive and negative cases, while male HFs notably exhibit positive 
performance persistence.  
As we have seen earlier (Table 4.10: Panel D), under long-term six-monthly analysis, both male and 
female managed Equity HFs exhibited negative performance persistence. This time, however, the 
accountability for risk (Table 4.12: Panel D) has caused a performance reversal (into positive) under 
male management and parity under female management. In the Universe cluster, male managers 
continued to maintain positive persistence, although with a smaller lead than before the risk adjustment. 
Also, the female Universe moves away from the solid negative persistence into a parity between the 
number of negative and positive Betas. Lastly, the annual (Table 4.12: Panel E) results indicate 
performance reversal for male (into negative) and female Equity managers (into parity). The Universe 
cluster, on the contrary, allows male managers to maintain a positive, although very weak, persistence 
(as opposed to the strong persistence seen in Table 4.11: Panel E). Furthermore, female managed funds 
are promoted into the positive territory after performance reversal. Thus, exhibiting a positive long-
term persistence. Similarly, as it was in the case of the non-risk adjusted analysis, the R2 values are 
significantly higher than those reported by Do et al. (2010) - across all time horizons.  
 
***Insert Table 4.12*** 





Despite the surge in academic studies that investigate the role of gender in risk-taking and investment 
performance, the literature, in general, is silent about the risk-adjusted performance of female fund 
managers and their male counterparts. Furthermore, the avenue of performance persistence concerning 
gender also remains unexplored. Thus, the main contribution of this study is to account for the higher-
order moments and their implications in the assessment of the performance of the male and female 
hedge fund managers previously unseen in the literature. Another significant contribution, also for the 
first time in the known literature, considers multi-period performance persistence (both non-parametric 
and parametric) of the male and female managers. In this chapter, we use 12 performance measurement 
ratios to compare the risk-adjusted performance of male and female HF managers, as well as the 
non/parametric methods of performance persistence.  
We show that when using the SR as a measure of investment performance, male and female HF 
managers produce similar results, in line with prior literature. However, the assumptions of SRs are 
unrealistic in this setting. We show that, when accounting for higher-order statistics, female HF 
managers tend to produce lower returns and take higher risks than their male counterparts. Importantly, 
as we have seen earlier in the chapter, the implications of the higher-order moments in hedge funds are 
of the utmost importance. While the basic reliance on the lower-order moments (mean and variance) 
provides distorted results, in most cases underestimating variance and overestimating SR.  Returns of 
HFs managed by female managers are, on average, negatively skewed, and performance measures that 
capture the negative deviations of returns only penalize negatively skewed funds relative to those 
managed by males, which are positively skewed. Our findings clearly show that controlling for higher-
order statistics is crucial in identifying gender differences in HF performance. Moreover, the correlation 
between the Sharp ratio and the other risk-adjusted metrics in Equity HFs managed by females (male) 
is the highest of all clusters and, on average, stands at 0.83 (0.76). This is followed by the Universe HFs 
managed by female (male) managers with 0.71 (0.70). Given the findings in the literature (e.g., Eling 
and Schuhmacher, 2007), these results imply that other metrics do matter as they are providing 
disparate, uncorrelated results when juxtaposed against the Sharpe ratio.  
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The non-parametric approach undoubtedly confirms the existence of performance persistence across all 
analysed periods and genders. The results indicate that the most pronounced average performance 
persistence occurs in female managed HFs (in both clusters). Nevertheless, despite that, the number of 
months under which the null hypothesis of no persistence is violated is marginally higher for male 
managers.  
The examination of the non-risk adjusted parametric method results reveals an interesting pattern, as 
we observe a positive and significant performance persistence in both portfolios for the monthly (short) 
time horizon. The moment we start decreasing granularity and move towards bi-monthly (short) periods 
in the Equity cluster, both male and female managed HFs experience weak performance persistence 
reversal (into negative). On the contrary, under the Universe portfolio, both genders continue to exhibit 
positive and statistically significant performance persistence. The quarterly (medium-term) analysis, on 
the other hand, is broadly similar to our initial investigation of the short-term monthly persistence. In 
all cases and regardless of gender, the portfolios exhibit positive performance persistence. Moving on 
towards the long-term view (six-monthly), we observe the dominance of negative cases except for the 
male managed Universe HFs, where the values strongly establish positive persistence. Lastly, the annual 
horizon of the performance persistence is also overrun by the statistically significant coefficients 
crystallising in the negative (positive) territory for females (males) in both portfolios.  
When it comes to the risk-adjusted performance persistence analysis, we observe continuous positive 
performance persistence amongst male managers throughout all time horizons (except Equity annual) 
in both clusters. Interestingly, the accountability for additional risk amongst female managed funds has, 
in most cases, elevated them into either positive persistence territory or parity. The only occasions where 
female managed HFs exhibit weak negative persistence occur under the monthly horizon in both 
clusters17. 
 
17 This study employs methods exceeding the basic mean-variance approach in the performance assessment of 
male/female hedge fund managers. Thus, we are unable to compare these results in/directly with the likes of 
Aggarwal and Boyson (2016) or even Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) concerning the mutual funds. 
Furthermore, since the literature concerning male/female performance persistence does not exist, we are unable 

























Table 4.1: Number of Hedge Funds  
Investment strategy Universe Male Female % Female 
Equity 815 779 36 4.40% 
Arbitrage 31 27 4 12.90% 
Event 48 47 1 2.10% 
Debt 130 122 8 6.20% 
Global 125 118 7 5.60% 
Multi 172 168 4 2.30% 
Total 1321 1261 60 4.50% 
Note: This table presents the total number of hedge funds considered  








rp σm S K(ex) rp σm S K(ex) 
Average 0.71 4.20 0.01 0.21 0.83 4.28 -0.17 0.10 
Min -5.44 0.09 -2.54 -1.41 -0.34 0.74 -1.33 -0.81 
Max 7.21 20.76 4.73 22.88 1.75 11.64 0.93 3.25 
Median 0.69 3.89 -0.04 -0.19 0.826 4.03 -0.14 -0.22 
Jarque-Bera (J-B) 7.26*** 6.59*** 
Ljung-Box (L-B) 3.22*** 3.56*** 




rp σm S K(ex) rp σm S K(ex) 
Average 0.69 3.54 0.03 0.31 0.74 3.37 -0.12 0.34 
Min -5.44 0.02 -2.54 -1.41 -0.35 0.10 -2.15 -0.81 
Max 7.21 21.60 4.73 40.38 1.75 11.64 1.62 5.54 
Median 0.66 3.10 -0.04 -0.16 0.68 3.14 -0.14 -0.18 
Jarque-Bera (J-B) 8.81*** 8.51*** 
Ljung-Box (L-B) 5.91*** 6.69*** 
# of obs. 1261 60 
Note: This table contains the descriptive statistics dissected based on the manager’s gender.  
The columns (from left) in each section consist of the mean return, standard deviation, skewness  
and kurtosis. The significance at 0.01 is denoted with ***, while for the 0.05 with **. The monthly  
the risk-free rate of 0.209 has been computed from 10-year US Treasury Bonds,  

















Table 4.3 Results: Risk-Adjusted Metrics 
  Male EQ Female EQ Male UV Female UV 
Panel A: Classic Ratios 
Sharpe Ratio  0.14 0.14 0.25 0.25 
Jensen Alpha 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 
Panel B: Lower Partial Moment Ratios 
Omega Ratio  0.66 0.55 1.31 0.99 
Sortino Ratio  0.30 0.26 0.49 0.43 
Kappa 3 Ratio  0.22 0.19 0.34 0.31 
Upside Potential Ratio  0.94 0.87 1.24 1.07 
Panel C: Drawdown Ratios 
Calmar Ratio  0.016 0.007 0.064 0.068 
Sterling Ratio  0.39 0.41 0.49 0.48 
Burke Ratio  0.34 0.35 0.54 0.40 
Panel D: Ratios Based on the Value at Risk 
ErVaR 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.12 
CSR 0.11 0.09 0.83 0.13 
MSR 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 
Note: This table provides the results of four types of risk-adjusted 
performance measures (Panel A: Classic Ratios, Panel B: Lower 
Partial Moment Ratios, Panel C: Drawdown Ratios, Panel D: Ratios 
















Table 4.4 Rank Correlation of the Risk-Adjusted Metrics for Equity HFs 
Panel A 






























































































Sharpe Ratio 1.00                       
Jensen 0.76 1.00                     
Omega Ratio 0.76 0.46 1.00                   
Sortino Ratio 0.83 0.55 0.98 1.00                 
Kappa 3 Ratio 0.85 0.57 0.97 1.00 1.00               
Upside Potential Ratio 0.60 0.43 0.65 0.71 0.71 1.00             
Calmar Ratio 0.50 0.35 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.11 1.00           
Sterling Ratio 0.75 0.83 0.67 0.72 0.73 0.55 0.41 1.00         
Burke Ratio 0.75 0.83 0.67 0.72 0.72 0.55 0.41 1.00 1.00       
Excess Var 0.87 0.59 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.69 0.57 0.73 0.72 1.00     
Conditional Sharpe Ratio 0.86 0.57 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.72 0.54 0.73 0.72 1.00 1.00   
MSR 0.88 0.57 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.41 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.92 0.91 1.00 
Average 0.78 0.61 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.57 0.60 0.82 0.78 0.97 0.95 1.00 
Median 0.80 0.57 0.92 0.90 0.82 0.55 0.56 0.73 0.72 1.00 0.95 1.00 
Panel B 






























































































Sharpe Ratio 1.00                       
Jensen 0.67 1.00                     
Omega Ratio 0.93 0.65 1.00                   
Sortino Ratio 0.97 0.67 0.99 1.00                 
Kappa 3 Ratio 0.98 0.67 0.98 1.00 1.00               
Upside Potential Ratio 0.79 0.46 0.92 0.91 0.89 1.00             
Calmar Ratio 0.38 0.45 0.24 0.28 0.29 0.10 1.00           
Sterling Ratio 0.72 0.88 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.60 0.43 1.00         
Burke Ratio 0.72 0.88 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.59 0.43 1.00 1.00       
Excess Var 0.98 0.65 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.87 0.32 0.73 0.72 1.00     
Conditional Sharpe Ratio 0.98 0.67 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.87 0.31 0.74 0.73 1.00 1.00   
MSR 0.99 0.67 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.86 0.33 0.74 0.73 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Average 0.84 0.70 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.70 0.47 0.84 0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Median 0.95 0.67 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.86 0.38 0.74 0.73 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: This table provides the correlation matrix of the risk-adjusted metrics for the Equity HF portfolios 









Table 4.5 Rank Correlation of the Risk-Adjusted Metrics for All HFs 
Panel A 





















































































Sharpe Ratio 1.00                       
Jensen 0.61 1.00                     
Omega Ratio 0.72 0.27 1.00                   
Sortino Ratio 0.81 0.36 0.98 1.00                 
Kappa 3 Ratio 0.83 0.38 0.96 1.00 1.00               
Upside Potential Ratio 0.67 0.26 0.90 0.91 0.91 1.00             
Calmar Ratio 0.54 0.15 0.78 0.78 0.77 0.71 1.00           
Sterling Ratio 0.61 0.59 0.48 0.55 0.56 0.45 0.33 1.00         
Burke Ratio 0.65 0.64 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.48 0.35 0.99 1.00       
Excess Var 0.65 0.30 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.67 0.57 0.42 0.46 1.00     
Conditional Sharpe Ratio 0.80 0.36 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.89 0.75 0.53 0.57 0.87 1.00   
MSR 0.75 0.33 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.70 0.61 0.44 0.47 0.62 0.79 1.00 
Average 0.72 0.42 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.70 0.60 0.68 0.62 0.83 0.90 1.00 
Median 0.70 0.36 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.70 0.59 0.53 0.52 0.87 0.90 1.00 
Panel B 





















































































Sharpe Ratio 1.00                       
Jensen 0.60 1.00                     
Omega Ratio 0.70 0.25 1.00                   
Sortino Ratio 0.71 0.28 1.00 1.00                 
Kappa 3 Ratio 0.70 0.28 0.99 1.00 1.00               
Upside Potential Ratio 0.64 0.19 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00             
Calmar Ratio 0.54 0.12 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.89 1.00           
Sterling Ratio 0.81 0.78 0.67 0.69 0.68 0.62 0.52 1.00         
Burke Ratio 0.82 0.78 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.64 0.53 0.99 1.00       
Excess Var 0.67 0.26 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.87 0.67 0.69 1.00     
Conditional Sharpe Ratio 0.69 0.27 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.87 0.67 0.70 1.00 1.00   
MSR 0.91 0.45 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.78 0.80 0.81 0.89 0.91 1.00 
Average 0.73 0.42 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.86 0.76 0.83 0.80 0.96 0.95 1.00 
Median 0.70 0.28 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.80 0.75 1.00 0.95 1.00 
Note: This table provides the correlation matrix of the risk-adjusted metrics for the aggregated HF portfolios  






Table 4.6 Non-Parametric Performance Persistence for the Equity HFs 
Panel A Monthly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 66.40 69.79 61.31 62.00 2.23 2.07 11.88 8.74 
STD 67.43 67.83 61.97 61.98 1.61 1.59 56.08 46.87 
Female 
AVG 4.78 4.89 4.43 4.43 1.05 1.18 4.75 5.67 
STD 2.92 2.79 2.73 2.73 0.21 0.39 6.50 6.60 
Panel B Bi-Monthly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 67.36 69.64 60.36 61.41 3.28 3.26 15.52 14.04 
STD 68.62 68.79 61.84 61.75 2.53 3.09 63.00 59.51 
Female 
AVG 4.77 4.81 4.55 4.49 1.06 1.13 4.75 5.67 
STD 2.91 2.81 2.78 2.78 0.23 0.34 6.50 6.60 
Panel C Quarterly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 68.66 70.88 58.38 58.47 4.39 4.44 20.05 19.05 
STD 68.50 67.85 60.83 60.62 3.50 4.07 74.25 70.69 
Female 
AVG 4.68 4.87 4.50 4.47 1.24 1.15 4.75 8.50 
STD 2.91 2.76 2.71 2.73 0.55 0.36 6.50 7.50 
Panel D  6-Monthly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 70.05 71.28 56.26 56.33 7.60 7.79 35.18 32.75 
STD 69.87 69.03 58.24 57.40 7.44 7.42 94.88 91.24 
Female 
AVG 4.96 5.19 4.16 4.17 1.35 1.18 4.00 16.00 
STD 2.87 2.84 2.58 2.53 0.68 0.39 6.00 0.00 
 Panel E Annually WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 69.39 69.78 56.07 54.60 12.89 14.86 55.29 49.13 
STD 66.32 63.12 57.68 58.10 10.77 16.28 114.35 108.24 
Female 
AVG 4.95 5.25 4.20 4.33 1.21 1.58 4.00 16.00 
STD 2.93 2.96 2.20 2.30 0.41 0.86 6.00 0.00 
Note: This table presents the mean [AVG] and standard deviation [STD] number of winning [WW] and  
losing [LL] periods for the Equity HFs. Furthermore, it also provides the number of winners-gone [WG]  







Table 4.7 Non-Parametric Performance Persistence for the Equity HFs 
Panel A 
Monthly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 2.39/3.21 218 1.12/3.1 25 [91] 10.71/19.98 131 [36] 241 [.58] 
Female 2.72/3.7 183 .28/1.21 11 [4] 1.74/2.02 10 [17] 171 [.6] 
Panel B 
Bi-Monthly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 1.92/1.6 109 1.01/3.37 10 [43] 12.21/24.03 64 [18] 114 [.56] 
Female 3.06/7.07 91 .25/1.25 1 [4] 2.02/2.73 7 [13] 86 [.6] 
Panel C 
Quarterly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 2.12/1.8 79 1.16/3.31 7 [32] 12.04/21.3 44 [16] 80 [.56] 
Female 2.32/2.5 56 .24/1.17 4 [1] 1.67/2. 4 [9] 54 [.59] 
Panel D 
 6-Monthly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 2.51/2.57 41 1.7/2.98 7 [18] 13./22.28 28 [7] 42 [.59] 
Female 3.08/3.48 29 .53/1.08 4 [0] 1.79/1.89 2 [5] 29 [.61] 
Panel E 
Annually AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 1.72/.93 19 1.32/2.37 2 [8] 12.12/10.41 17 [5] 21 [.57] 
Female 2.99/5.4 14 .3/1.14 2 [0] 2.07/1.87 1 [2] 13 [.6] 
Note: This table presents the results for the Cross-Product Ratio (CPR), Z-statistic (Z-s), Chi-square (X2) calculation and  
the percentage of repeating winners (PRW) for the Equity HFs. Furthermore, each panel representing a time horizon  
consists of data for both male and female HF managers. Additional abbreviations: AVG - mean, STD - standard deviation.  
Please note the CPR column refers to the number of periods violating the null hypothesis of the CPR metric, while the PRW  








Table 4.8 Non-Parametric Performance Persistence for the Universe HFs 
Panel A Monthly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 110.24 111.35 95.81 96.12 2.91 2.55 16.89 14.55 
STD 109.42 110.46 97.78 97.84 2.05 1.97 89.22 81.84 
Female 
AVG 6.52 7.79 6.51 6.53 7.75 9.67 1.03 1.04 
STD 5.46 5.20 4.64 4.61 11.69 12.26 0.18 0.19 
Panel B Bi-Monthly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 110.92 112.87 93.37 94.62 4.39 4.37 23.19 21.27 
STD 113.04 114.07 96.40 96.61 3.42 3.75 103.78 98.44 
Female 
AVG 6.50 7.68 6.48 6.51 7.75 9.67 1.12 1.11 
STD 5.54 5.33 4.63 4.61 11.69 12.26 0.32 0.31 
Panel C Quarterly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 109.91 110.49 93.03 92.61 6.32 6.05 30.95 30.71 
STD 111.71 111.81 94.18 94.52 4.75 5.23 124.14 120.85 
Female 
AVG 6.26 7.51 6.62 6.54 1.29 1.12 6.40 28.00 
STD 5.62 5.29 4.62 4.66 0.54 0.32 10.80 0.00 
Panel D  6-Monthly WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 111.79 112.62 92.53 91.36 11.60 10.63 52.08 53.08 
STD 113.70 113.63 90.57 89.72 9.58 9.73 156.80 156.26 
Female 
AVG 6.66 8.13 6.23 6.00 6.40 28.00 1.60 1.23 
STD 5.62 5.35 4.18 4.19 10.80 0.00 0.86 0.52 
 Panel E Annually WW LL WL LW WG LG NEW NEL 
Male 
AVG 114.03 111.57 88.72 87.40 21.72 21.59 89.86 79.13 
STD 108.60 108.50 88.00 89.46 16.10 20.48 196.93 186.04 
Female 
AVG 6.31 7.54 6.14 6.27 6.40 28.00 1.82 1.75 
STD 5.47 5.34 4.05 4.04 10.80 0.00 0.86 0.97 
Note: This table presents the mean [AVG] and standard deviation [STD] number of winning [WW] and  
losing [LL] periods for the Universe HFs. Furthermore, it also provides the number of winners-gone [WG]  







Table 4.9 Non-Parametric Performance Persistence for the Universe HFs 
Panel A 
Monthly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 2.28/3.22 225 1.52/3.61 25 [121] 15.54/27.85 163 [38] 246 [.55] 
Female 3.91/13.95 199 .53/1.39 22 [15] 2.54/3.08 24 [41] 247 [.67] 
Panel B 
Bi-Monthly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 2./1.8 112 1.6/4.09 14 [60] 19.92/35.39 76 [23] 127 [.55] 
Female 3.01/4.14 98 .52/1.45 12 [5] 2.78/3.55 13 [19] 123 [.67] 
Panel C 
Quarterly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 1.93/1.54 78 1.61/3.72 9 [42] 17.61/27.14 57 [12] 86 [.55] 
Female 2.27/2.87 58 .38/1.47 5 [4] 2.58/3.75 8 [9] 78 [.66] 
Panel D 
6-Monthly AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 2.03/1.54 36 2.03/3.64 2 [20] 20.16/32.2 29 [11] 45 [.57] 
Female 3.13/3.27 33 .85/1.28 3 [2] 2.64/2.71 3 [9] 42 [.7] 
Panel E 
Annually AVG/STD CPR CPR AVG/STD Z-s Z@5% [1%] AVG/STD X2 X2@5% [@1%] PRW [PRW%] 
Male 1.89/1.07 18 2.25/2.69 0 [13] 20.24/18.53 22 [4] 21 [.57] 
Female 3./4.12 15 .71/1.13 0 [1] 2.78/2.59 2 [4] 24 [.69] 
Note: This table presents the results for the Cross-Product Ratio (CPR), Z-statistic (Z-s), Chi-square (X2) calculation and  
the percentage of repeating winners (PRW) for the Universe HFs. Furthermore, each panel representing a time horizon  
consists of data for both male and female HF managers. Additional abbreviations: AVG - mean, STD - standard deviation.  
Please note the CPR column refers to the number of periods violating the null hypothesis of the CPR metric, while the PRW  








Table 4.10 The Non-Risk-Adjusted Parametric Performance Persistence for the Equity HFs 
Panel A 
XR m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -2.456 -2.480 3.440 3.617 0.169 0.136 0.082 0.157 0.550 0.575 
Sigma 1.726 1.790 1.870 1.999 0.250 0.321 0.287 0.294 0.120 0.113 
Max 0.106 0.374 9.478 16.739 0.838 3.541 0.584 2.165 0.713 1.000 
Min -9.152 -15.673 -0.236 -0.803 -0.225 -0.993 -1.108 -0.752 0.170 0.116 
Pos 1 23 34 772 25 519 23 544 
 
Sig 0.05 0 5 33 748 3 76 4 103 
Neg 34 751 1 3 10 256 11 232 
Sig 0.05 31 666 0 0 0 8 0 4 
Panel B 
XR bi-m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -1.766 -1.722 2.763 2.871 0.079 0.180 0.159 0.159 0.513 0.532 
Sigma 1.337 3.355 1.644 1.709 0.353 0.463 0.363 0.467 0.163 0.152 
Max 0.233 78.459 8.801 13.613 1.441 6.867 1.248 4.247 0.809 0.987 
Min -6.907 -17.368 -0.393 -3.744 -0.665 -2.778 -0.460 -3.532 0.002 -0.152 
Pos 3 33 34 738 21 512 23 513 
 
Sig 0.05 0 10 31 681 2 66 2 63 
Neg 32 712 1 9 14 236 12 236 
Sig 0.05 27 523 0 0 2 4 0 9 
Panel C 
XR q Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -0.584 -1.237 2.470 2.471 0.148 0.082 0.088 0.126 0.489 0.541 
Sigma 2.097 1.544 1.422 1.524 0.555 0.790 0.281 0.502 0.313 0.171 
Max 10.031 19.634 7.276 11.295 2.767 6.150 1.229 2.609 0.846 1.000 
Min -3.173 -11.240 0.103 -4.909 -0.579 -16.886 -0.435 -3.534 -0.828 -0.500 
Pos 3 58 34 704 20 460 24 456 
 
Sig 0.05 1 21 30 617 1 48 1 70 
Neg 32 653 0 12 15 259 11 263 
Sig 0.05 16 375 0 0 0 12 0 13 
Panel D 
XR 6m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -0.916 -1.012 1.751 1.564 0.191 0.350 0.230 0.239 0.472 0.475 
92 
 
Sigma 0.773 2.391 0.787 1.937 0.362 2.567 0.290 0.683 0.233 0.361 
Max 0.350 19.537 3.179 8.554 0.932 59.799 0.971 7.550 0.850 1.000 
Min -3.319 -43.964 0.415 -31.405 -0.405 -2.821 -0.301 -2.775 -0.191 -3.204 
Pos 4 120 27 575 23 443 23 435 
 
Sig 0.05 1 29 21 387 2 87 0 69 
Neg 24 482 0 31 5 169 5 170 
Sig 0.05 8 189 0 2 0 10 0 11 
Panel E 
XR a Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -1.278 -1.028 1.197 1.251 0.927 0.616 0.409 0.198 0.532 0.483 
Sigma 0.770 1.909 0.539 1.424 0.954 1.636 0.338 2.335 0.230 0.276 
Max 0.415 1.766 1.974 15.225 2.397 9.751 1.293 17.759 0.919 0.973 
Min -2.548 -25.939 0.409 -14.648 -2.057 -19.131 -0.403 -36.527 0.089 -0.283 
Pos 1 87 18 329 17 296 18 256 
 
Sig 0.05 0 4 9 124 8 55 1 58 
Neg 18 252 0 9 2 40 1 78 
Sig 0.05 9 72 0 2 0 3 0 0 
Note: This table presents the non-risk-adjusted parametric performance persistence test results for the Equity (EQU) HFs. The data has  
been divided into five different time intervals, monthly (m), bi-monthly (bi-m), quarterly (q), six-monthly (six-m) and annually (a). The first two  
main columns refer to the dummy variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) relates to  
the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the fourth column (Beta p) implies the auto-correlation  
or persistence amongst positive (winning) cases, the last column provides the adjusted r-squared figures. Abbreviations: FEM denotes female  










Table 4.11 The Non-Risk-Adjusted Parametric Performance Persistence for the Universe HFs 
Panel A 
XR m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean -1.752 -1.948 2.616 2.973 0.245 0.188 0.227 0.225 0.520 0.547 
Sigma 1.799 1.918 2.009 2.174 0.346 0.401 0.409 0.402 0.174 0.150 
Max 0.569 2.832 9.478 19.444 1.344 3.541 1.730 2.816 0.984 1.000 
Min -9.152 -23.164 -0.571 -1.802 -0.225 -2.516 -1.108 -1.615 0.100 0.073 
Pos 9 137 55 1221 45 859 41 895 
 
Sig 0.05 3 39 51 1111 8 152 11 209 
Neg 49 1108 4 30 13 386 17 357 
Sig 0.05 39 912 1 9 0 10 0 10 
Panel B 
XR bi-m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean -1.266 -1.342 2.174 2.306 0.190 0.246 0.278 0.235 0.484 0.508 
Sigma 1.440 2.794 1.715 2.200 0.500 0.589 0.538 0.581 0.196 0.186 
Max 1.316 78.459 8.801 33.285 2.172 9.826 2.184 5.508 0.990 0.998 
Min -6.907 -17.368 -0.682 -18.744 -0.961 -2.778 -0.640 -3.532 0.002 -0.283 
Pos 13 170 53 1157 37 869 40 847 
 
Sig 0.05 3 35 45 982 4 131 5 141 
Neg 44 1043 5 63 20 347 18 374 
Sig 0.05 33 690 0 11 2 7 1 14 
Panel C 
XR q Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean -0.206 -0.890 1.934 2.040 -0.040 0.092 0.145 0.161 0.467 0.519 
Sigma 2.407 1.582 1.445 1.589 1.305 0.986 0.384 0.626 0.280 0.213 
Max 12.245 19.634 7.276 18.466 2.767 6.150 1.430 3.324 0.988 1.000 
Min -3.173 -11.240 -0.567 -4.909 -9.042 -22.354 -0.462 -9.956 -0.828 -1.843 
Pos 13 217 53 1121 31 727 38 755 
 
Sig 0.05 5 76 43 920 1 97 4 113 
Neg 43 933 2 40 25 436 18 414 
Sig 0.05 20 479 1 5 0 19 0 22 
Panel D 
XR 6m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean -0.664 -0.695 1.486 1.345 0.457 0.313 0.317 0.257 0.477 0.477 
94 
 
Sigma 1.091 2.661 0.908 1.782 1.356 2.055 0.932 1.128 0.245 0.377 
Max 1.734 53.320 3.179 13.662 9.351 59.799 4.977 7.550 0.999 1.000 
Min -5.102 -43.964 -0.162 -31.405 -0.405 -3.276 -3.357 -16.675 -0.191 -3.204 
Pos 13 288 45 899 40 722 39 730 
 
Sig 0.05 3 76 29 555 7 141 2 143 
Neg 36 680 2 89 8 266 10 258 
Sig 0.05 10 242 0 8 0 15 m 18 
Panel E 
XR a Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean -0.750 -0.780 0.808 0.974 0.736 0.396 0.540 0.350 0.574 0.501 
Sigma 0.917 2.214 0.670 2.347 0.918 2.061 0.411 2.944 0.236 0.288 
Max 0.415 6.675 1.974 15.225 3.188 9.751 1.630 55.323 0.919 0.989 
Min -2.548 -28.186 -0.798 -46.625 -2.057 -21.119 -0.403 -36.527 0.089 -0.398 
Pos 11 218 28 539 31 493 32 450 
 
Sig 0.05 3 25 11 212 13 101 9 146 
Neg 22 362 4 37 2 79 1 115 
Sig 0.05 9 100 1 8 0 7 0 1 
Note: This table presents the non-risk-adjusted parametric performance persistence test results for the Universe (ALL) HFs. The data has  
been divided into five different time intervals, monthly (m), bi-monthly (bi-m), quarterly (q), six-monthly (six-m) and annually (a). The first two  
main columns refer to the dummy variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) relates to  
the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the fourth column (Beta p) implies the auto-correlation  
or persistence amongst positive (winning) cases, the last column provides the adjusted r-squared figures. Abbreviations: FEM denotes female  










Table 4.12 The Risk-Adjusted Parametric Performance Persistence for the Equity HFs 
Panel A 
AXR m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -0.0004 -0.001 0.511 0.655 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.019 0.112 0.094 
Sigma 0.400 0.632 0.537 0.559 0.033 0.200 0.098 0.781 0.168 0.146 
Max 1.332 13.537 1.330 5.161 0.076 5.036 0.237 1.755 0.988 0.994 
Min -0.588 -3.511 -1.669 -0.782 -0.092 -0.915 -0.371 -21.387 -0.017 -0.464 
Pos 13 281 33 739 18 388 17 427     
Sig 0.05 3 36 25 506 2 19 1 39     
Neg 22 493 1 37 17 387 18 348     
Sig 0.05 2 42 0 2 3 16 2 30     
Panel B 
AXR bi-m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -0.081 0.089 0.673 0.642 0.006 -0.036 -0.022 -0.005 0.070 0.101 
Sigma 0.449 1.798 0.629 0.672 0.060 1.252 0.139 0.265 0.137 0.203 
Max 1.095 42.288 2.217 5.351 0.204 9.757 0.108 5.384 0.333 0.976 
Min -1.328 -5.820 -0.091 -3.511 -0.216 -29.525 -0.775 -1.658 -0.466 -1.197 
Pos 11 316 34 680 16 395 19 381     
Sig 0.05 1 42 18 376 0 16 2 25     
Neg 24 431 1 69 19 353 16 368     
Sig 0.05 5 29 0 4 0 14 0 19     
Panel C 
AXR q Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean -0.060 -0.019 0.537 0.489 0.003 0.038 0.000 -0.035 0.097 0.122 
Sigma 0.435 0.647 0.494 1.926 0.100 0.723 0.166 0.656 0.284 0.247 
Max 0.894 2.845 1.793 3.767 0.358 17.629 0.422 4.890 0.826 0.997 
Min -1.405 -7.440 -0.323 -43.853 -0.218 -3.866 -0.712 -11.703 -1.059 -1.075 
Pos 14 323 30 651 16 357 20 366     
Sig 0.05 1 42 19 283 1 20 1 32     
Neg 21 389 4 65 19 361 15 353     
Sig 0.05 0 11 0 3 1 7 1 20     
Panel D 
AXR 6m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean 0.196 0.203 0.364 0.531 0.034 0.019 -0.124 -0.038 0.069 0.155 
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Sigma 0.404 1.022 0.727 1.255 0.148 0.868 0.534 1.171 0.292 0.426 
Max 1.452 14.699 1.536 18.217 0.664 12.325 0.629 14.840 0.918 0.999 
Min -0.279 -8.250 -2.749 -4.104 -0.272 -7.294 -2.082 -16.092 -0.640 -3.204 
Pos 18 402 25 496 19 325 13 302     
Sig 0.05 1 72 9 187 1 25 1 30     
Neg 10 200 3 108 9 287 14 305     
Sig 0.05 0 10 0 10 0 11 1 26     
Panel E 
AXR a Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU FEM-EQU MAL-EQU 
Mean 0.385 0.843 0.783 0.775 0.809 -0.020 -0.060 0.091 0.172 0.151 
Sigma 1.916 2.109 0.621 1.910 3.894 0.850 0.194 2.679 0.289 0.336 
Max 3.322 17.325 2.722 13.446 17.265 4.157 0.463 37.870 0.805 0.862 
Min -6.429 -9.862 -0.128 -15.413 -0.714 -10.263 -0.512 -9.071 -0.321 -0.734 
Pos 13 270 17 298 9 169 9 169     
Sig 0.05 1 41 2 56 1 15 1 6     
Neg 6 64 1 37 10 170 9 168     
Sig 0.05 1 1 0 1 2 11 0 12     
Note: This table presents the results for the risk-adjusted parametric performance persistence test for the Equity (EQU) HFs. The data has  
been divided into five different time intervals, monthly (m), bi-monthly (bi-m), quarterly (q), six-monthly (six-m) and annually (a). The first two  
main columns refer to the dummy variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) relates to  
the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the fourth column (Beta p) implies the auto-correlation  
or persistence amongst positive (winning) cases, the last column provides the adjusted r-squared figures. Abbreviations: FEM denotes female  










Table 4.13 The Risk-Adjusted Parametric Performance Persistence for the Universe HFs 
Panel A 
AXR m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean 0.107 0.077 0.646 0.702 0.016 0.001 -0.011 -0.009 0.146 0.136 
Sigma 0.426 0.596 0.526 0.586 0.144 0.179 0.084 0.625 0.218 0.193 
Max 1.332 13.537 1.398 5.161 1.074 5.036 0.237 1.755 0.988 0.999 
Min -0.588 -3.511 -1.669 -2.326 -0.092 -0.915 -0.371 -21.387 -0.254 -0.464 
Pos 29 544 56 1185 32 611 31 692 
  
Sig 0.05 10 170 42 838 3 38 1 59 
  
Neg 29 700 2 67 26 635 28 559 
  
Sig 0.05 3 56 0 4 4 26 3 40 
  
Panel B 
AXR bi-m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean 0.081 0.129 0.753 0.696 0.003 -0.024 -0.0002 -0.003 0.124 0.147 
Sigma 0.480 1.556 0.592 0.669 0.133 1.011 0.121 0.244 0.218 0.239 
Max 1.151 42.288 2.217 5.351 0.773 9.757 0.232 5.384 0.988 0.997 
Min -1.328 -18.751 -0.091 -3.511 -0.343 -29.525 -0.775 -2.384 -0.544 -1.197 
Pos 27 618 56 1115 24 637 35 651 
  
Sig 0.05 9 157 33 680 1 28 5 46 
  
Neg 30 596 2 107 33 580 23 570 
  
Sig 0.05 5 38 0 5 1 19 0 29 
  
Panel C 
AXR q Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean 0.088 0.061 0.633 0.561 0.091 0.023 0.016 -0.030 0.152 0.159 
Sigma 0.531 0.649 0.553 1.564 0.687 0.584 0.164 0.648 0.281 0.270 
Max 2.085 4.916 2.741 4.236 5.142 17.629 0.682 4.890 0.894 0.997 
Min -1.405 -7.440 -0.323 -43.853 -0.218 -3.866 -0.712 -11.703 -1.059 -1.075 
Pos 30 592 50 1062 23 581 34 605 
  
Sig 0.05 8 136 33 514 2 35 2 51 
  
Neg 26 560 5 102 33 582 22 563 
  
Sig 0.05 1 22 0 8 1 11 0 41 
  
Panel D 
AXR 6m Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean 0.278 0.259 0.599 0.806 0.461 0.045 -0.156 0.182 0.136 0.195 
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Sigma 0.481 1.442 1.097 4.980 3.168 1.071 0.684 5.954 0.365 0.441 
Max 1.659 34.701 6.294 120.744 22.375 25.767 0.656 181.036 0.996 1.000 
Min -0.504 -8.250 -2.749 -7.047 -0.720 -7.294 -3.832 -16.092 -0.978 -3.204 
Pos 33 671 42 820 31 532 24 497 
  
Sig 0.05 7 177 18 338 1 46 1 54 
  
Neg 15 293 6 169 18 460 24 490 
  
Sig 0.05 1 14 0 18 1 17 0 43 
  
Panel E 
AXR a Alpha n Alpha p Beta n Beta p Adj R2 
FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL FEM-ALL MAL-ALL 
Mean 0.433 0.688 0.795 0.729 0.559 -0.035 0.155 0.080 0.335 0.198 
Sigma 1.571 1.813 0.698 1.558 2.991 0.703 0.779 2.097 0.374 0.351 
Max 3.322 17.325 2.936 13.446 17.265 4.157 3.662 37.870 0.856 0.938 
Min -6.429 -9.862 -0.424 -15.413 -0.714 -10.263 -0.512 -9.071 -0.422 -0.734 
Pos 26 476 29 501 16 283 17 295 
  
Sig 0.05 6 77 10 145 1 19 5 21 
  
Neg 7 94 3 66 17 296 15 279 
  
Sig 0.05 1 2 0 2 2 20 0 30 
  
Note: This table presents the risk-adjusted parametric performance persistence test results for the Universe (ALL) HFs. The data has 
been divided into five different time intervals, monthly (m), bi-monthly (bi-m), quarterly (q), six-monthly (six-m) and annually (a). The first two 
main columns refer to the dummy variables which separate negative (Alpha n) and positive (Alpha p) cases, the third column (Beta n) relates to 
the existence of the auto-correlation or persistence of the negative (losing) cases, while the fourth column (Beta p) implies the auto-correlation 
or persistence amongst positive (winning) cases, the last column provides the adjusted r-squared figures. Abbreviations: FEM denotes female 





Chapter 5. Hedge Fund Flows: Managers’ Ethnicity. 
5.1 Introduction 
Ethnic/racial identification is often considered an early dimension of self-identification, although not as 
early as gender. The learning process during which the individuals ascertain frameworks for classifying 
their (and others) ethnic/racial association usually occurs during childhood. Such classification, if 
associated with emotion and affect, may become significantly embedded in selfhood and lead to various 
outcomes (Epstein, 1978). Moreover, as Jenkins (2008) points out, the debate considering whether 
ethnicity is primordial or situational is still ongoing. The most recent events of the last decade show us 
the struggles in combatting significant inequalities within our societies. As Politico (2019) reports, 
between 2014 and 2019, the European Parliament (EP) has employed only 17 out of 751 (or 2.3%) 
MEPs representing minority non-white backgrounds. Furthermore, this number is expected to decrease 
in post-Brexit Europe as all MEPs (in the EP) of South Asian origin come from the United Kingdom. 
The other common inequality arena is religion, where the most recent data shows us the exponential 
increase in the discriminatory, antisemitic incidents between 2009 and 2019 across Europe (EU Agency 
for Fundamental Rights, 2020) (especially evident in Germany, the United Kingdom and France). 
Lastly, we cannot forget about gender inequality. The European Commission (EC) estimates the gender 
pay gap has remained almost unchanged in the last decade and revolves around 14% (European 
Commission, 2018).  
We could provide countless examples of lesser/greater injustices at every level, regardless of granularity 
(global, continental, national, regional). Although what we find particularly interesting is the fact that 
these inequalities extend as far as the fund/asset management environment. Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi and 
Spalt (2015) observe that “the foreignness”, derived from or associated with the name of the fund 
manager, generates a bias in decision-making amongst the investors, which subsequently affects the 
capital allocation. As much as the gender pay gap is debatable and highly dependent on many factors, 
Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) find that female mutual fund managers attract substantially lower 
capital inflows despite the adaptation of more reliable strategies and generation of the same returns as 
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their male counterparts. These kinds of biases do not support rational statistical discrimination and 
instead ‘irrational prejudice’ towards a specific group (Becker, 1971; Phelps, 1972). As we show in the 
literature review (Chapter 2, sub-section 2.3), investor behaviour is highly dependent on a multitude of 
factors. In many cases, these behaviours are formed and influenced during childhood or in association 
with a particular group. As far as the in-group environment is concerned, the fear of rejection and even 
expulsion/punishment plays an important role. This in effect generates a singularly directed behaviour, 
which would not occur on an individual basis with the same intensity (Zdaniuk and Levine, 2001; Fehr 
and Gachter, 2002). The inequalities are very much a part of our daily lives; in many cases, they prevail 
undetected for decades and can crystallise in almost any dimension, most commonly from politics, 
through religion, to finance. We further discuss the above-mentioned aspects in the literature review in 
Chapter 2, sub-section 2.3.  
Thus, in this chapter, we envisage answering the following research questions. Can the ethnicity 
(derived from the first name) of a hedge fund manager affect the level of capital inflows in a hedge 
fund? This is the first research of its kind to examine hedge funds and potential inflow bias associated 
with managers' ethnicity. Our study's initial focus is to examine the capital inflows considering the 
ethnic profile of each manager in our dataset. Subsequently, after determining the capital inflows, this 
chapter poses another research question. Do the hedge fund returns justify the capital inflows? This 
time, this research question identifies whether the investors’ decision-making, results from rational 
statistical discrimination or a potential ‘irrational prejudice’ towards the specific group of hedge fund 
managers. We believe that the revival of this type of research (especially in the areas such as hedge 
funds, which were not previously explored in the literature under this perspective) can provide a direct 
benefit and support to the spread of diversity in the corporate investment world. Regarding our 
methodology, in the first instance, we determine the most appropriate regression based on the type of 
data we have. In effect, we employ the Random-Effects Generalised Least Squares regression (we also 
provide the Ordinary Least Squares regression merely for comparison purposes). The determination as 
to which models we should employ was based on the application of the Hausman and Breusch-Pagan 
Lagrangian Multiplier tests.  
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To further explore the performance dimension, we examine both clusters' performance focusing on the 
metrics incorporating higher-order statistics (3rd order being skewness and 4th kurtosis). The HFs are 
commonly known to exhibit negative skewness and positive kurtosis, which from the perspective of the 
risk-averse investor is undesirable as it increases the probability of significant losses in cases where the 
returns’ distribution is normal (Favre and Signer, 2002; Kat, 2003; Eling, 2006). The analysis we have 
adopted has been divided into the classic metrics (direct derivatives of the Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio 
selection theory) including Sharpe ratio and Jensen Alpha; Lower Partial Moments Ratios (LPM) 
including Omega, Sortino, Kappa 3 and Upside Potential; Drawdown Ratios including Calmar, Sterling 
and Burke; Value at Risk (VaR) based ratios including Excess Value at Risk, Conditional Sharpe Ratio 
and Modified Sharpe Ratio18.  
Our research reveals a peculiar picture as soon as we look into the descriptive statistics. We quickly 
learn that most HF managers (91% to be specific) represent a solely White19 background. At the same 
time, the rest is a result of a combination of Asian and Latino managers. Our attention increases as we 
look into the average monthly flows into Pctother funds, which represent 2.9% of all average monthly 
inflows into the Pctwhite funds. Surprisingly, the average monthly returns for Pctother are higher than 
for Pctwhite HFs across the entire time-series of 252 months (1999-2019). Interestingly, both clusters' 
average monthly returns converge during and after the severe market distress period, such as the most 
recent global recession of 2007-2009. A final yet equally important observation we can derive from the 
initial descriptive statistics is the fact that in almost all cases (except the high watermark), the fees 
(management, performance, redemption) and thresholds (hurdle rate, lock-ups, advanced notice) are 
higher for the Pctother HFs. Thus, making them more expensive to maintain and therefore less 
appealing to the average investor.  
Stepping up to the regression, we can confidently report that our results are in line with similar literature, 
where the minority (e.g., managers with the name that is perceived as foreign or the gender of the 
manager being female) asset managers experience significantly lower flows into their funds despite 
 
18 Please refer to section 5.3 for details. 
19 Denoted as Pctwhite, while the combination of Asian and Latino managers as Pctother. 
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providing better returns/performance. However, in our case, the magnitude of the results is much higher. 
We observe 57 percentage points fewer capital inflows into the HFs managed by the representatives of 
the racial/ethnic minority (as opposed to White/Caucasian HF managers). Furthermore, the results do 
not support rational statistical discrimination as the minority HF managers generate higher raw returns.  
The results of the risk-adjusted analysis also uncover interesting findings. Under Markowitz’s (1952) 
classical approach, we observe a notable difference between the average Sharpe ratios, with the Pctother 
being higher by approximately 44%. Although, as soon as we look into the LPM based metrics, we 
learn that the Pctwhite HFs are minimally better managing the negative deviations of the returns’ 
distribution. Thus, they are slightly better at minimising the probability of the extreme loss occurrence 
and operating their portfolios at a higher efficiency as compared with the Pctother. Furthermore, the 
risk involved in the generation of the returns in the Pctwhite HFs is lower according to the Upside 
Potential Ratio (the prelude of this could have been observed in the basic assessment of our descriptive 
statistics). When it comes to metrics employing the average annual compounded rate of return, both 
clusters operate at the same level. However, under the assumptions of the compounded annualised 
return, Pctother funds carry a slight advantage. Lastly, the Excess VaR stands at the same level for both 
Pctwhite and Pctother managers. Although, the accountability for higher-order statistics through the 
Modified and Conditional Sharpe Ratio aligns with the earlier findings, providing the Pctother with a 
further, yet statistically insignificant, advantage.  
Like many other researchers, we strongly believe that the future exploration of topics concerning 
ethnic/racial imbalances in fund management is very important. We are delighted to provide the first 
research of this kind, which addresses ethnic/racial imbalances within the HFs industry, where the 
collective assets under management of US$ 3.61tn (Prequin, 2020) exhibit a significant influence on 
global economic stability.  
The remaining sections of this chapter are organised in the following way: Section 5.2 describes the 
data and data cleaning process; Section 5.3 focuses on methods and is divided into three sub-categories 
(Variables, Regression and Risk-Adjusted Metrics); while section 5.4 provides the description of the 
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results and Section 5.5 concludes findings. Lastly, the literature review has been explored in Chapter 2 





















5.2.1 General Data Overview 
This research employs the data from the Morningstar Direct database, which in the current form as of 
December 2020 consists of 6649 HFs. According to Massa, Reuter and Zitzewitz (2010), Morningstar 
Direct is one of the most precise databases when it comes to managers’ identity information. The 
timeframe of our research spans between January 1999 and December 201920. The data cleaning process 
begins with the removal of all HFs with less than 12 months of historical net returns and missing 
manager details (which downsizes the population to 2229 HFs) - the same process is applied to the 
separate extract of the net flows (where the number of HFs downsizes to 1127). We also remove HFs, 
which do not report their net flows; the same applies to the corresponding HFs in the net return’s dataset. 
After aligning two datasets (net returns and net flows), we end up with 1076 HFs. In the last step, we 
remove the duplicate funds, where the correlation between the funds is higher than or equal to 0.85 (our 
approach is slightly more aggressive than the one employed by Aggarwal and Jorion (2010), which was 
set at 0.99 correlation, as we eliminate not only highly correlated share class duplicates but also the 
fund listings in various currencies), simultaneously downsizing our dataset to 770 unique HFs. Both 
flows and the returns are then subjected to the winsorisation process, where the bounds are set to 0.05.  
Our cleaned dataset is then categorised based on the race and ethnicity of the HF managers. In our 
classification, we employ the demographic dataset created by Tzioumis (2018)21. In brief, his approach 
was to create a unique list of first names based on the three proprietary mortgage datasets. The 
combined, voluminous dataset was then used to classify the applicants' ethnicity into six categories, 
which were previously present in two Censuses (2000 and 2010).  
Since our analysis relies on the ability to extract names of HF managers’, we additionally exploit the 
2004 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 33-8458 rule (SEC, 2004), which required all mutual 
funds and closed-ended funds (some hedge funds) (Hastings, 2004) to disclose managers (management 
team) names. As we learn from Kumar et al.  (2015), before October 2004, approx. 34% of funds did 
 
20 Due to the number of non-Pctwhite HF managers making appearance only around 1999. 
21 Please see Tziomis (2018) for details. 
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not disclose the manager/management team member names (instead of labelling them as “anonymous” 
or “team managed” - a practice that still happens in some of the funds).  
Using Tzioumis’s (2018) list of the 4250 unique first names and their probabilities of occurring under 
a specific race/ethnicity, we manage to easily classify 686 of 770 HF managers (Table 5.1). The 
remaining 84 HF manager names were found manually, through an online search (based on the HF or 
the umbrella-fund name), and then their names were classified using Tzioumis’s (2018) race/ethnicity 
name association list. In addition, given the relatively small sample of hedge funds in our analysis, we 
manually verify the accuracy of Tzioumis’s (2018) method (through a search on Bloomberg and the 
individual hedge fund websites).  
We have also adopted the same naming conventions where the non-Hispanic White is labelled Pctwhite, 
non-Hispanic Asian is Pctapi and Hispanic, or Latino is Pcthispanic. Although, due to the low number 
of HF managers representing the Asian and Hispanic ethnicities, we have decided to combine them to 
form one category, denoted as Pctother. Sadly, the application of Tzioumis’s (2018) framework does 
not indicate the existence of Black HF managers in our dataset, which does not mean they are not 
present in the overall Morningstar Direct dataset.  
 
*** Insert Table 5.1 *** 
 
In a further attempt to visualise the annual fluctuations of the racial/ethnic disparities between the 
number of HF managers, we have plotted our cleaned data on a graph (Figure 1). Figure 1 indicates that 
the number of Pctother HF managers begins to appear in 1999, initially with a 3% share, which then 
increases to 10% a decade later and stabilises at 11% from 2014 onwards. In addition, we have also 
provided the list of the top 20 most common HF manager names (Figure 2).  
 
*** Insert Figure 1 *** 
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*** Insert Figure 2 *** 
 
As an additional insight, Table 5.2 provides the HF managers' descriptive statistics with the most 
common first names. For example, HF managers named Robert, Adam and Jeffrey attract the most 
capital (flows) overall. Whereas, when it comes to the average returns, it is Adam, Michael, and Eric - 
despite some of the highest average capital flows, Robert and Jeffrey rank 5th and 12th, respectively. 
Also, in the rec period, Christophers generate the highest average returns, while the flows belong to 
Kevins. Overall, considering all rankings, John and Paul were most likely to provide the optimal balance 
between the capital inflows and generation of returns.  
 
*** Insert Table 5.2 *** 
 
5.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.3 reports the descriptive statistics of our final sample of 770 HFs (Jan 99-Dec 19) 
classified based on the ethnic association of the HF manager. In the first instance, we observe that the 
average HF size for the Pctwhite cluster dwarfs the combination of the other two (Pctother). 
Furthermore, not surprisingly, the net average (as well as the median) flows of the Pctwhite are also 
significantly above the Pctother. An interesting observation can be also attributed to the results of the 
t-test, which regarding the difference between the inflows of the two clusters remains statistically 
insignificant. Thus, indicating there is no difference between the level of flows in Pctwhite and Pctother. 
The logical implication is that the significant and positive average inflows into the Pctwhite HFs would, 
in effect, be a result of superior returns (Huang, Wei and Yan, 2007). Thus, given these observations, 
we have also decided to investigate the net returns to see whether or not they justify the substantial 
differences in the average/median net flows between the ethnically classified funds. Interestingly, the 
Pctother cluster dominates the returns despite its average monthly inflows representing approx. 69.5% 
of all average monthly inflows in Pctwhite funds. Not surprisingly, the skewness of the returns is also 
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negative amongst Pctwhite HFs what correlates with their lower (in contrast to Pctother) average returns 
(the t-test also indicates the significance at 0.05).  
As much as it seems a paradox (Pctwhite attracting significant net inflows, as compared to the 
Pctother generating the higher average returns), a similar situation has been observed in gender-related 
studies (see literature review) and documented by Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015). At the time, it 
was identified as ‘irrational prejudice towards’ female mutual fund managers as opposed to rational 
statistical discrimination. To further examine both flows and the returns and thus provide even deeper 
insight, we have dissected our sample into three different periods around the most recent economic 
depression of 2007-2009. The whole purpose of it is to learn how our ethnically classified HF managers 
dealt with the most recent period of significant economic/market distress and how it affected the flows. 
In all three periods, the Pctother HFs minimally dominate Pctwhite in terms of the average returns. 
During the recession (rec) period, we can see a significant drop in the average returns in both clusters, 
which then emerge in the post-rec. As we can observe, the flows in the pre-recession period in Pctwhite 
HFs attract approx. $2.31M per month (on average), while the Pctother attracts less than a quarter of 
this figure ($0.55M) - also, the t-test indicates statistical significance at 0.05.  
Furthermore, the rec period shows that the flows for both Pctwhite and Pctother are negative 
(in fact converting into outflows). While the flows for both clusters in the post-rec period are positive, 
it is the Pctother that takes the greater share of the average monthly flows. Regarding the fees 
(management, performance, and redemption), by far, the highest on average can be found amongst the 
Pctother HFs with Pctwhite funds charging the least. Furthermore, the Pctother HFs’ hurdle rate is 
minimally lower, meaning these funds will apply performance fees charges sooner than those in the 
other cluster (when the fund generates on average >=1.43% profit). However, from the perspective of 
the high watermarks, the Pctother HFs are the most attractive investment. The new investors’ inability 
to redeem the assets is expressed by a lock-up period, which is on average the shortest for the Pctwhite 
HFs. While the advanced notice required for the redemptions is similar across both clusters, although 
minimally higher for the Pctother funds. Lastly, despite the aforementioned differences, the manager’s 




*** Insert Table 5.3 *** 
 
5.3 Methods 
This section consists of two parts. In the first instance, we outline the regression model we have adopted, 
while the second part focuses on several risk-adjusted metrics. 
5.3.1 Regression 
Prior to the regression analysis, we first define all variables in Table 5.4. Furthermore, Table 5.4 also 
explains the source and a combination of the variables used in calculations.  
 
*** Insert Table 5.4 *** 
 
To decide whether we should employ fixed or random effects, we first use the Hausman specification 
test (1) (Hausman, 1978; Green, 2008). The null hypothesis of this test indicates the preferred model 
(either fixed or random effects). Since the results of the chi-square are not statistically significant (@ 
0.05) at 0.995 level, we focus on the Random-Effects model (5.1) in the first place (Table 5.6 and 5.8, 
Panel B). 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑏 − ?̂?] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑏] + 𝑉𝑎𝑟[?̂?] − 𝐶𝑜𝑣[𝑏, ?̂?] − 𝐶𝑜𝑣[?̂?, 𝑏]    (5.1) 
 




2], 1 = [1 1 … 1]𝑇. The statistical test is the chi-square, where the number of d.f. equals to 
the number of regressors in the 𝑍 matrix (Breusch and Pagan, 1979). The test helps to decide between 
109 
 
the Random-Effects Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regression and the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression. As seen in Tables 5.6 and 5.8 (Panel B), the result is statistically significant with a chi-
square of less than 0.01. Thus, we fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the Random-
Effects test is appropriate. Nevertheless, for the sake of contrast, we also include the results of the OLS 
approach. The regression model we use can be seen in equation (5.3), where the 𝜇𝑖 corresponds to the 
individual-specific effect and 𝜀𝑖 is an error term. The variables employed in this regression (5.3) are as 
follows. The dependent variable, in this case, is denoted as Flow and refers to the inflows of capital 
Flow=(〖TNA〗_(i,t)-〖TNA〗_(i,t-1))/〖TNA〗_(i,t-1) -r_(i,t), where the TNA stands for Total Net 
Assets (Ammann et al. 2018). Regarding the independent variables, Eth_w refers to Ethnicity and takes 
the form of the dummy variable, where number 1 corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite; Returnp 
refers to the monthly net returns as a percentage;  Inter_eth_r is an interactive variable created out of 
the Eth_w and Returnp; Mfee stands for management fees; Pfee stands for performance fees; Rfee 
stands for redemption fees; Hrate stands for hurdle rate; Hwmark stands for high watermark; Lock_u 
stands for lock up (expressed in months); Adv_n stands for advanced notice (in months); Man_t stands 
for managers’ tenure (in years). 
 






     (5.2) 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤(?̂?) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑒𝑡ℎ_𝑤1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑝2 + (𝛽1𝑒𝑡ℎ_𝑤1 ∗ 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑝2) + 𝛽3𝑚𝑓𝑒𝑒3 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑓𝑒𝑒4 +
𝛽5𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑒5 + 𝛽6ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒6 + 𝛽7ℎ𝑤𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘7 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑢7 + 𝛽7𝑎𝑑𝑣_𝑛7 + 𝛽7𝑚𝑎𝑛_𝑡7 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  




5.3.2 Risk-Adjusted Metrics 
Further to our earlier analysis, we have also computed the risk-adjusted metrics for both clusters. Table 
5.10 presents the results, which are divided into four tiers: classic, lower partial moment, drawdown, 
and the value at risk-based ratios.  
In our analysis, the classic ratios comprise the Sharpe ratio and Jensen Alpha. Both of these ratios are 
directly related to Markowitz’s portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952). The Sharpe ratio, in particular, is 
the most widely used metric in the finance-related literature (Sharpe, 1966; Dhrymes, 2017). While the 
classic ratios consider both positive and negative deviations of the returns, the same cannot be said 
about the lower partial moments (LPM), which measure the risk considering only negative deviations 
with respect to the minimum acceptable return (MAR) (Fishburn, 1977). Therefore, the LPM metrics 
provide an improved measure of risk as compared to the classical approach. The next risk-adjusted 
metric class, the Upside Potential ratios, combines the lower and higher partial moments to assess the 
investment appeal (the application of the increased weighting to the returns below the MAR) (Sortino, 
van der Meer, and Plantinga, 1999). The drawdown-based ratios are particularly relevant to HFs. These 
metrics combine the returns with the average of all the most unfavourable drawdowns in each year. 
Furthermore, they are also thought to be easy to interpret, while their operational properties are difficult 
to analyse (Schuhmacher and Eling, 2011). Lastly, the metrics based on the Value at Risk (VaR) 
measure the worst expected loss over the given period at a predefined confidence interval (Jorion, 2001). 
In order to incorporate the effects of the higher orders of return distribution (skewness and kurtosis), 
we follow Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004), Malkiel and Saha (2005) and Eling (2006) and compute 
VaR and M(Modified)VaR to be able to calculate M(Modified)Sharpe Ratio. 
5.3.2.1 Classic Ratios 
Sharpe Ratio 










The Jensen Alpha (5.5) indicates the over/underperformance as compared with the market.  
𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛 = (𝑟𝑖
𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓) − (𝑟𝑟𝑝
𝑑 − 𝑟𝑓)𝛽      (5.5) 
5.3.2.2 Lower Partial Moment Ratios (LPM) 
Omega 
The Omega ratio (5.6) measures the excess return over MAR and the first-order LPM1. Due to the 






+ 1         (5.6) 
Sortino 
The Sortino ratio (5.7) measures the excess return over the minimum target return and the second-order 





2         (5.7) 
Kappa 3 
The Kappa 3 ratio (5.8) measures the excess return over MAR and the third-order LPM3. Similarly, to 





3         (5.8) 
Upside Potential 








5.3.2.3 Drawdown Ratios 
Calmar 
The Calmar ratio (5.10) measures the performance through the (smoothed) returns versus drawdown 





        (5.10) 
Sterling 
The Sterling ratio (5.11) measures risks through the application of the average drawdown (Lhabitant, 









        (5.11) 
Burke 
The Burke ratio (5.12) measures the adjusted risk. As opposed to the Sharpe ratio, Burke’s denominator 







        (5.12) 
5.3.2.4 Ratios Based on the Value at Risk (VaR) 
Excess Return on Value at Risk 





         (5.13) 
Conditional Sharpe Ratio 
Conditional SR (5.14) measures the expected loss considering the values, which exceed VaR (Albrecht 







          (5.14)   
Modified Sharpe Ratio 
The return to variability ratio, which includes the effects of the skewness and kurtosis (5.15). In order 
to obtain this metric, we have computed VaR (5.16) 𝑍𝑎 = −2.33 (0.99 𝐶𝐼) (Jorion, 2001, p. xxii) and 
then to integrate deviations of higher moments of return distributions MVaR (5.17) with quintile Alpha 






          (5.15) 
𝑉𝑎𝑅 = −(𝑍𝑎𝜎𝐴𝑚 + 𝑟𝑖
𝑝
)𝑤        (5.16) 
𝑀𝑉𝑎𝑅 = −(𝑍𝐶𝐹𝜎𝐴𝑚 + 𝑟𝑖
𝑑)𝑤        (5.17) 
























5.4 Empirical Results 
5.4.1 Regression Results 
Table 5.6 shows the Random-Effects (RE) GLS model result, while table 5.7 provides the OLS model 
for comparison. It is worth noting that the OLS calculations in Table 5.7 include year fixed-effects. We 
have also undertaken the OLS regression excluding year fixed-effects and noted that the only significant 
difference occurs in the Ethnicity coefficient (column 1), where the value of -0.691 is replaced with -
0.634. The results in both tables (5.6 and 5.7), regardless of the model, show that the flows in HFs 
managed by the Pctother are much lower than in Pctwhite. Nevertheless, despite a substantial difference 
in the number of HFs in both clusters (Table 5.1), the results are not statistically significant. While the 
economic perspective implies that the HFs managed by the Pctother grow by around 69 to 76 percentage 
points less than similar funds managed by the Pctwhite (depending on the model). The other control 
variables exhibiting statistical significance (@ 0.05) are marked with the asterisk (* at 0.01/** at 
0.05/*** at 0.10). Interestingly, the ‘Returns’ coefficient for the Pctother funds is highly positive and 
also statistically significant under the GLS (some cases) OLS (all cases) assumption. Furthermore, the 
other variables exhibiting statistical sig. are ‘High Watermark’, ‘Lock-ups’ and ‘Managers' Tenure’. In 
addition to the regression results, we also provide a correlation table of the variables used in the analysis 
(Table 5.5). Table 5.5 shows, that the correlations between the variables range between -0.09 (for 
Flow/Man_t) and 0.47 (for Pfee/Hwmark). 
 
*** Insert Table 5.5*** 
*** Insert Table 5.6 *** 
*** Insert Table 5.7 *** 
 
We further focus on the analysed timeframe and isolate the period between 2013 and 2019, where the 
number of Pctother hedge fund managers exceeds 10 per cent saturation (in each year). Once again, we 
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provide regression analysis for both models as shown in tables 5.8 (GLS) and 5.9 (OLS). The statistical 
significance of the results is less prevalent than in the period between 1999 and 2019 for both GLS and 
OLS regressions. However, what draws particular attention, is the emergence of the Ethnicity variable 
as statistically significant at 0.10 for all coefficient combinations (columns 1,2 and 4) in table 5.9 (OLS).  
 
*** Insert Table 5.8 *** 
*** Insert Table 5.9 *** 
 
The overall results of our regression analysis indicate that the investors' preference lies in the HFs 
managed by the Pctwhite managers. The investor bias we observe, where the HFs generating better 
performance/returns attract much fewer capital inflows, should not come as a surprise. The earlier 
studies into the investor bias in mutual funds exposed similar behaviour. Kumar et al. (2015) show that 
the fund managers with a foreign name22 attract much less capital (-9.8 percentage points) yet exhibit 
better performance. The same goes for other ‘minority’ managers, this time gender-related. As Niessen-
Ruenzi and Ruenzi (2015) find, female mutual fund managers, attract around 11.2 percentage points 
less capital than their male counterparts (they also generate higher returns than male managers). 
Interestingly, the 11.2 percentage points difference seems economically trivial compared to our findings 
where the Ethnicity factor creates a gap in excess of 58.5 and 57.6 percentage points for GLS and OLS, 
respectively (within the 1999-2019 timeframe). Interestingly, for the period spanning 2013 to 2019, we 
report that the Ethnicity factor exceeds 94.9 for the GLS regression and 96.1 for the OLS (with OLS 
observations being statistically significant at 0.10).  
 
 
22 The individuals based in the USA were asked to classify the names of the mutual fund managers – regarding 
their potentially ‘foreign’ origin.  
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5.4.2 Risk-Adjusted Metrics 
Table 5.10 presents the results of the risk-adjusted metrics analysis for both clusters (Pctwhite and 
Pctother). We can observe a notable difference between the average Sharpe ratios in a classic approach, 
with the Pctother being significantly higher (by approx. 44%). The Jensen Alpha for both remains 
almost the same (approx. 1 BPS above the market), although the T-Test indicates significance at 0.05. 
Regarding the LPM ratios (Table 5.10, Panel B), we can see that the Pctwhite HFs minimally dominate 
Pctother in three out of four metrics. Both HF clusters exhibit a high Omega ratio, which is quite 
favourable from the investor’s perspective, as it minimises the probability of extreme loss occurrence. 
The Sortino ratio indicates that the Pctwhite portfolios operate at a slightly higher efficiency as 
compared with the Pctother. Interestingly, the Kappa ratio, otherwise known as ‘the attractiveness 
rank’, is the same for both clusters.  
As we also observe, the Upside Potential ratio is higher for the Pctwhite HFs, which means the risk 
involved in the generation of the returns is lower – it also correlates with Pctwhite’s lower average 
(returns) standard deviations (Table 5.5). Regarding drawdown-based ratios, both types of HFs exhibit 
the same Calmar ratio, implying that their performance is similar on a performance adjusted basis. 
Under the Sterling ratio's assumptions, which, unlike the Calmar ratio, do not employ the average annual 
compounded rate of return but instead compounded annualised return, Pctother funds carry a slight 
advantage (significant at 0.05). Furthermore, Pctother’s advantage also extends to the Burke ratio 
(significant at 0.05). Lastly, the VaR metrics are almost in all cases dominated by Pctother HFs (except 
ErVaR, where they are the same). Not surprisingly, both CSR and MSR, amongst Pctother, are 
dominant (as was the case earlier with the classical ratios). 
 





This chapter has explored a conjecture that the investors are biased against the ethnic minority (Pctother) 
HF managers. Given the gravity of this topic (where the ethnic/racial associations are discussed), it is 
essential to understand previous multidisciplinary literature. The exploration of the ethnic/racial 
literature review (Chapter 2 [2.3]) has shown that investment decisions do not merely stay within the 
risk/return framework. As many cross-referenced multidisciplinary studies show, human behaviours are 
driven by self-identification (on ethnic/racial grounds), the in/out-group associations and fear of group 
expulsion/rejection. These combined (or even isolated factors) force certain behaviours and choices, 
which to many may appear to be deprived of logic, yet in fact, they are a result of complex psycho-
social connections. It is pivotal to acknowledge these human dependencies while evaluating the results 
presented in this chapter. The findings we have presented provide a unique contribution to the literature 
concerning hedge funds, social biases, and discrimination. Our major contribution to the literature is 
the exploration of the previously uncharted territory of race/ethnicity within the context of hedge funds. 
Secondly, we have discovered that the ethnic/racial minorities receive much lower capital inflows 
despite generating higher returns, what according to other researchers (Kumar et al., 2015; Niessen-
Ruenzi and Ruenzi, 2015) investigating mutual fund’s gender performance and the foreignness of a 
manager's name (relative to the flows of capital into the mutual funds) accounts to irrational prejudice 
and not rational statistical discrimination (Phelps, 1972). The results of our analysis unequivocally 
indicate that the Pctother HFs receive significantly fewer capital inflows than their Pctwhite 
counterparts. In fact, the effect is approximately six (nine) times higher for the period 1999-2019 (2013-
2019) than has been discovered in similar literature concerning the ‘foreignness’ of the manager’s name 
or the manager’s gender in mutual funds. Furthermore, the returns (and performance from the 
perspective of the majority of risk-adjusted metrics) generated by the Pctother HF managers are higher 
than Pctwhite. These results alone lead us to an inevitable conclusion that has also been reached by our 
academic counterparts in earlier cases of similar research, namely, to reject the notion of statistical 
discrimination. Our research shows that the potential investor bias towards the ethnic minority HF 
managers can exhibit significant implications within the HF environment itself. Furthermore, as we 
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have presented in the literature review, ethnically associated biases can thrive across the ether for 
decades and when and if they crystallise in HFs (given the collective AuM), they can contribute to 
bending the rules of global economics. Moreover, this is the first research of its kind not only concerning 
hedge fund focused environments but the entire fund-related world. Furthermore, the results of this 
study directly contribute to the revival of the debate concerning ethnic and racial inequalities in 
corporate finance. This study’s results prove that despite years of advancement in socio-cultural 




















Table 5.1 The Ethnicity of HF Managers’ 
Ethnicity All HFs % of Total 
Pctwhite 703 91% 
Pctother* 67 9% 
Total 770 100% 
Note: This table provides an overview of  
the managers' ethnicity in 770 HFs.  

















































































































































David 35 19 -2258168.70 16 0.607 8 0.871 17 -0.021 14 0.308 2 5687963.82 20 -2539010.06 15 -667185.60 
John 25 9 739233.12 6 0.880 6 0.935 7 0.458 8 0.414 7 1153981.21 2 835293.45 12 -132908.32 
Michael 18 12 209576.87 2 1.098 14 0.525 4 0.645 5 0.458 15 288152.91 5 564626.22 3 194399.25 
Mark 11 16 -504626.49 13 0.684 11 0.697 12 0.236 12 0.354 19 -307615.85 13 -449610.98 14 -448117.13 
Robert 11 1 21281054.33 5 0.894 12 0.694 5 0.544 2 0.532 6 2342704.59 7 166408.13 17 -811144.48 
Jeffrey 10 3 1895629.20 12 0.690 9 0.765 9 0.301 4 0.487 4 3178568.04 17 -1171500.70 6 28155.04 
Kevin 9 8 772306.54 8 0.780 2 1.291 20 -0.366 7 0.415 18 84615.90 11 -437178.04 10 -117383.29 
Martin 8 11 454014.65 9 0.775 15 0.515 18 -0.180 10 0.376 8 720376.62 10 -363588.37 2 450207.13 
Stephen 8 4 1676763.50 14 0.634 19 0.210 15 0.062 20 0.128 16 250000.00 9 36594.43 5 75226.23 
Christopher 8 13 176796.63 4 0.899 13 0.625 1 1.331 6 0.438 14 294256.22 4 658754.42 9 -59312.78 
Charles 8 15 -159469.39 10 0.742 3 1.038 16 0.037 3 0.505 3 3984374.10 18 -1451071.01 18 -1871411.38 
Peter 8 5 1313911.27 15 0.622 1 1.356 19 -0.336 9 0.377 5 2788180.54 12 -445537.58 20 -3536281.88 
George 8 14 127538.16 18 0.580 16 0.420 10 0.296 15 0.297 11 526480.67 14 -667510.12 13 -327877.24 
Eric 7 7 937586.82 3 0.903 20 0.187 11 0.282 13 0.318 1 7338751.67 3 829748.94 11 -122348.80 
Marc 7 20 -3140549.21 20 0.361 7 0.913 13 0.187 19 0.146 12 356488.39 19 -2174187.49 19 -2106062.83 
Paul 7 6 987309.62 17 0.588 4 0.962 3 0.720 17 0.261 9 658655.15 1 1042527.90 1 1982689.38 
Andrew 7 18 -653494.53 11 0.694 10 0.760 2 0.728 11 0.367 13 301825.99 15 -768192.60 16 -673633.15 
Richard 6 17 -581237.38 7 0.842 5 0.946 8 0.388 1 0.611 17 90343.38 8 80697.21 8 -49092.16 
Adam 6 2 3019234.68 1 1.258 17 0.378 6 0.476 16 0.275 20 -1537830.99 16 -980776.19 4 157642.50 
Matthew 6 10 660457.28 19 0.503 18 0.371 14 0.114 18 0.202 10 631048.35 6 297605.16 7 6325.48 
Note: This table shows the top 20 most popular HF manager names*, which are sorted based on the frequency of occurrence (Count). The following columns  
consist of overall average ‘Flows’/’Returns’ and returns/flows pre/during/post the great recession of 2007-2009. Every column is accompanied  







Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 




Flows ($M) 1.20 (0.029)TNA 0.72 (-0.785)TNA 0.33 1.15 
Flows (median) ($M) 0.57 0.24 0.21 0.54 
Fund Size ($M) 6331.01 181.76 0.23 5795.95 
Returns 0.67 0.83 0.04 0.68 
Returns (median) 0.68 0.82 0.11 0.70 
Returns σ 3.19 3.91 0.06 3.25 
Returns Skew -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.04 
Flows Skew 0.20 0.24 0.89 0.20 
Returns Kurt -0.32 -0.28 0.54 -0.32 
Flows Kurt 4.40 7.72 0.08 4.68 
Returns (pre-rec) 0.74 0.89 0.45 0.75 
Returns (rec) 0.30 0.31 0.95 0.30 
Returns (post-rec) * 0.36 0.41 0.54 0.37 
Returns (pre-rec) σ 1.77 1.81 0.91 1.77 
Returns (rec) σ 2.65 2.77 0.81 2.66 
Returns (post-rec)* σ 3.06 3.74 0.07 3.12 
Flows (pre-rec) ($M) 2.31 0.55 0.01 2.16 
Flows (rec) ($M) -0.09 -0.42 0.69 -0.12 
Flows (post-rec) ($M) * 0.39 0.43 0.88 0.39 
Management Fees 1.32 1.50 0.01 1.34 
Performance Fees 15.36 17.97 0.00 15.59 
Redemption Fees 0.76 1.13 0.04 0.79 
Hurdle Rate 1.47 1.43 0.90 1.46 
High Watermark 0.85 0.91 0.12 0.86 
Lock-ups (months) 4.0 5.2 0.19 4.11 
Advanced Notice (months) 3.0 3.1 0.68 35.74 
Managers' Tenure (years) 11.4 11.0 0.58 11.33 
Note: This table shows the number of HF characteristics based on  
the managers' ethnicity (Pctwhite = White, Pctother = Asian + Hispanic).  
‘Flows ($M)/(median)’ is the average/median of all reported monthly flows**,  
while the component in brackets represents  𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (Ammann et al. 
 2018); ‘Fund Size’ variable is set to Millions of $US ($M);  





/median of all  













)4𝑁𝑖=1  describe skewness  
and the excess kurtosis of both flows and returns**;  
‘Returns/Flows (pre-rec-post)’ focus on specific time-intervals of our entire sample;  
‘Management’, ‘Performance’, ‘Redemption’ fees and ‘Hurdle Rate’ are denoted  
as percentages varying between 0.02-4%, 1-50%, 0.1-10% and 1.5-20% respectively;  
the ‘High Watermark’ is a binary variable with 1 = Yes and No = 0; ‘Lock-ups’,  
‘Advanced Notice’ periods are presented in months (where applicable), while the  
‘Managers' Tenure’ in years. Furthermore, all average/median calculations  
exclude 0 values. Additionally, we provide a two-sample t-test between the means  
of Pctwhite and Pctother.  
 
Abbreviations: great recession period pre/post is denoted as *rec.  
*The HFs established after the (rec) period is not taken into consideration in this instance. 







Table 5.4 Variables 




− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡  (Ammann et al. 2018) 
Eth_w 
The dummy variable created out of this 
division is Ethnicity, where number 1 
corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite 
Coding based on an extract from 
Morningstar Direct and methodology 
proposed by Tzioumis (2018) - see 
section 3 Data. 
Returnp Monthly net percentage 
Morningstar Direct 
Inter_eth_r 
Eth_w * Returnp to form an interactive 
variable 
Mfee Management fees 
Pfee Performance fees 
Rfee Redemption fees 
Hrate Hurdle Rate 
Hwmark High Watermark 
Lock_u Lock-ups (months) 
Adv_n Advanced Notice (months) 
Man_t Managers' Tenure (years) 








Table 5.5 Variable Correlations 
  Flow Eth_w Returnp Inter_eth_r Mfee Pfee Rfee Hrate Hwmark Lock_u Adv_n Man_t 
Flow 1 
           
Eth_w -0.0068 1 
          
Returnp 0.0054 0.0123 1 
         
Inter_eth_r -0.0024 0.1484 0.309 1 
        
Mfee 0.0048 0.0809 -0.0031 0.0128 1 
       
Pfee 0.0034 0.0894 0.0173 0.0181 0.1267 1 
      
Rfee 0.0018 0.104 0.0069 0.0325 0.0706 0.0523 1 
     
Hrate -0.0016 -0.0272 -0.0043 -0.0084 0.0581 -0.0036 0.0522 1 
    
Hwmark 0.0049 0.0457 0.0094 0.0157 0.015 0.4662 0.0584 0.0111 1 
   
Lock_u -0.0077 0.0384 0.0252 0.0121 0.0355 0.0548 0.0546 0.1206 0.0763 1 
  
Adv_n -0.0061 0.0148 0.0042 0.0007 0.053 -0.0813 -0.0539 0.0709 0.004 0.2724 1 
 
Man_t -0.0099 0.0012 -0.0013 0.0003 0.0269 0.1215 -0.0252 -0.0944 0.0661 0.0539 0.0334 1 
Note: This table provides the correlation between the variables used in the regression analysis. The variables are  
defined in the following way: Flow: 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (Ammann et al. 2018); Eth_w: this dummy variable  
refers to the ethnicity/race of a hedge fund manager, where number 1 corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite;  
Returnp: refer to the monthly net percentage returns; Inter_eth_r: refer to the multiplication of Eth_w * Returnp to form  
an interactive variable; Mfee, Pfee, Rfee: refer to management, performance and redemption fees respectively (stored as percentages); 
Hrate: refer to hurdle rates (stored as percentages); Hwmark: refer to high watermark fees (stored as the binary 1/0); Lock_u: refer to  
lock-up period (stored as the number of months); Adv_n: refer to advanced notice (stored as the number of months);  
Man_t: refer to the length of managers’ tenure (stored in years). All variables are extracted/built on the basis of data  





Table 5.6 Fund Flow Regression GLS 1999-2019 
  RE GLS (SE) 1  RE GLS (SE) 2 RE GLS (SE) 3 RE GLS (SE) 4 RE GLS (SE) 5 RE GLS (SE) 6 
Panel A 
Ethnicity (Pctother)     -0.585 (0.602) -0.64 (0.611)   -0.76 (0.617) 
Returns 5.218 (2.743)*** 4.177 (2.881) 5.246 (2.743)** 5.33 (2.744)** 4.074 (2.88) 4.056 (2.882) 
Inter_eth_r    11.978 (9.308)     12.099 (9.304) 13.534 (9.393) 
Management Fees   0.305 (0.281)   0.329 (0.282)   0.329 (0.282) 
Performance Fees   -0.015 (0.023)   -0.013 (0.023)   -0.013 (0.023) 
Redemption Fees   0.033 (0.146)   0.055 (0.147)   0.053 (0.147) 
Hurdle Rate   -0.014 (0.069)   -0.018 (0.069)   -0.017 (0.069) 
High Watermark   0.724 (0.51)   0.724 (0.51)   0.723 (0.51) 
Lock-ups (months)   -0.031 (0.022)   -0.03 (0.022)   -0.03 (0.022) 
Advanced Notice (months)   -0.002 (0.004)   -0.002 (0.004)   -0.002 (0.004) 
Managers' Tenure (years)   -0.03 (0.019)***   -0.03 (0.019)***   -0.031 (0.019)*** 
Adj. R2 0.0035 0.0088 0.0002 0.0099 0.0028 0.01 
Observations 120,785 
Panel B 
Hausman FE chi2 n/a 0.132 0.9301 0.701 0.99 0.735 
Breusch-Pagan LM chi2 0* 
Note: Panel A of this table presents the GLS model results (with Standard Errors in brackets) – including fixed year effects. The table is divided into  
six columns depending on the number of coefficients employed in each regression. In Panel B, we see the results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM  
chi2 results. The variables presented in this table are defined in the following way: Flow: 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (Ammann et al. 2018);  
Eth_w: this dummy variable refers to the ethnicity/race of a hedge fund manager, where number 1 corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite;  
Returnp: refer to the monthly net percentage returns; Inter_eth_r: refer to the multiplication of Eth_w * Returnp to form an interactive variable;  
Mfee, Pfee, Rfee: refer to management, performance and redemption fees respectively (stored as percentages); Hrate: refer to hurdle rates (stored as  
percentages); Hwmark: refer to high watermark fees (stored as the binary 1/0); Lock_u: refer to the lock-up period (stored as the number of months);  
Adv_n: refer to advanced notice (stored as the number of months); Man_t: refer to the length of managers’ tenure (stored in years). All variables are  







Table 5.7 Fund Flow Regression OLS 1999-2019 
  RE OLS (SE) 1  RE OLS (SE) 2 RE OLS (SE) 3 RE OLS (SE) 4 RE OLS (SE) 5 RE OLS (SE) 6 
Ethnicity (Pctother)     -0.576 (0.447) -0.572 (0.454)   -0.691 (0.462) 
Returns 5.839 (2.782)** 4.976 (2.919)*** 5.916 (2.783)** 6.018 (2.784)** 4.858 (2.918)*** 4.802 (2.921)*** 
Inter_eth_r    10.322 (9.23)     10.301 (9.222) 12.934 (9.394) 
Management Fees   0.232 (0.2)   0.254 (0.2)   0.253 (0.2) 
Performance Fees   -0.019 (0.017)   -0.018 (0.017)   -0.018 (0.017) 
Redemption Fees   0.011 (0.106)   0.03 (0.107)   0.029 (0.107) 
Hurdle Rate   -0.005 (0.048)   -0.009 (0.048)   -0.008 (0.048) 
High Watermark   0.808 (0.357)**   0.804 (0.357)**   0.802 (0.357)** 
Lock-ups (months)   -0.03 (0.016)***   -0.029 (0.016)***   -0.029 (0.016)*** 
Advanced Notice (months)   -0.002 (0.003)   -0.002 (0.003)   -0.002 (0.003) 
Managers' Tenure (years)   -0.032 (0.013)*   -0.032 (0.013)*   -0.032 (0.013)* 
Adj. R2 0.0097 0.0011 0.0098 0.0035 0.0088 0.01 
Observations 120,785 
Note: This table presents the OLS model results (with Standard Errors in brackets) – including fixed year effects.  
The table is divided into six columns depending on the number of coefficients employed in each regression. The variables presented in this table are  
defined in the following way: Flow: 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (Ammann et al. 2018); Eth_w: this dummy variable refers to the ethnicity/race of a hedge fund manager, 
where number 1 corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite; Returnp: refer to the monthly net percentage returns; Inter_eth_r:  
refer to the multiplication of Eth_w * Returnp to form an interactive variable; Mfee, Pfee, Rfee: refer to management, performance and redemption  
fees respectively (stored as percentages); Hrate: refer to hurdle rates (stored as percentages); Hwmark: refer to high watermark fees (stored as the  
binary 1/0); Lock_u: refer to the lock-up period (stored as the number of months); Adv_n: refer to advanced notice (stored as the number of months);  
Man_t: refer to the length of managers’ tenure (stored in years). All variables are extracted/built on the basis of data extracted from the Morningstar  







Table 5.8. GLS Fund Flow Regression 2013-2019 
  GLS (SE) 1  GLS (SE) 2 GLS (SE) 3 GLS (SE) 4 GLS (SE) 5 GLS (SE) 6 
Panel A 
Ethnicity (Pctother)     -0.949 (0.706) -0.963 (0.714)   -0.981 (0.72) 
Returns 5.638 (4.185) 7.066 (4.402)* 5.695 (4.185) 5.762 (4.187) 6.951 (4.401) 6.879 (4.405) 
Inter_eth_r    -13.969 (14.06)     -13.535 (14.054) -11.559 (14.168) 
Management Fees   0.355 (0.339)   0.385 (0.339)   0.385 (0.34) 
Performance Fees   0.005 (0.028)   0.008 (0.773)   0.008 (0.028) 
Redemption Fees   0.045 (0.174)   0.065 (0.71)   0.067 (0.175) 
Hurdle Rate   -0.036 (0.084)   -0.04 (0.635)   -0.04 (0.084) 
High Watermark   0.554 (0.626)   0.554 (0.376)   0.556 (0.626) 
Lock-ups (months)   -0.034 (0.027)   -0.033 (0.215)   -0.033 (0.027) 
Advanced Notice (months)   -0.004 (0.005)   -0.004 (0.455)   -0.004 (0.005) 
Managers' Tenure (years)   -0.05 (0.024)**   -0.05 (0.034)**   -0.05 (0.024)** 
Adj. R2 0.0002 0.0118 0.0009 0.0129 0.0002 0.0129 
Observations 59,664 
Panel B 
Hausman FE chi2 n/a 0.112 0.866 0.632 0.993 0.699 
Breusch-Pagan LM chi2 0* 
Note: Panel A of this table presents the GLS model results (with Standard Errors in brackets) – including fixed year effects.  
The table is divided into six columns depending on the number of coefficients employed in each regression.  
In Panel B, we see the results of Hausman and Breusch-Pagan LM chi2 results. The variables presented in this table are defined in the following  
way: Flow: 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 =
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (Ammann et al. 2018); Eth_w: this dummy variable refers to the ethnicity/race of a hedge fund manager,  
where number 1 corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite; Returnp: refer to the monthly net percentage returns; Inter_eth_r: refer to the  
multiplication of Eth_w * Returnp to form an interactive variable; Mfee, Pfee, Rfee: refer to management, performance and redemption fees  
respectively (stored as percentages); Hrate: refer to hurdle rates (stored as percentages); Hwmark: refer to high watermark fees (stored as the  
binary 1/0); Lock_u: refer to the lock-up period (stored as the number of months); Adv_n: refer to advanced notice (stored as the number of months);  
Man_t: refer to the length of managers’ tenure (stored in years). All variables are extracted/built on the basis of data extracted from the Morningstar  





Table 5.9 OLS Fund Flow Regression 2013-2019 
  OLS (SE) 1 OLS (SE) 2 OLS (SE) 3 OLS (SE) 4 OLS (SE) 5 OLS (SE) 6 
Ethnicity (Pctother)     -0.961 (0.585)*** -0.975 (0.592)***   -0.97 (0.599)*** 
Returns 5.195 (4.221) 6.789 (4.437) 5.284 (4.222) 5.368 (4.223) 6.638 (4.435) 6.522 (4.439) 
Inter_eth_r    -15.467 (14.018)     -14.855 (14.009) -11.957 (14.175) 
Management Fees   0.356 (0.279)   0.386 (0.28)   0.386 (0.28) 
Performance Fees   0.007 (0.023)   0.01 (0.023)   0.01 (0.023) 
Redemption Fees   0.039 (0.144)   0.059 (0.144)   0.061 (0.144) 
Hurdle Rate   -0.032 (0.069)   -0.037 (0.069)   -0.037 (0.069) 
High Watermark   0.585 (0.518)   0.583 (0.518)   0.586 (0.518) 
Lock-ups (months)   -0.034 (0.022)   -0.033 (0.022)   -0.033 (0.022) 
Advanced Notice (months)   -0.004 (0.004)   -0.004 (0.004)   -0.004 (0.004) 
Managers' Tenure (years)   -0.05 (0.02)***   -0.05 (0.02)***   -0.05 (0.02)*** 
Adj. R2 0.0002 0.012 0.001 0.013 0.0002 0.013 
Observations 59,664 
Note: This table presents the OLS model results (with Standard Errors in brackets) – including fixed year effects. The table is divided into six columns  




− 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 (Ammann et al. 2018); Eth_w: this dummy variable refers to the ethnicity/race of a hedge fund manager,  
where number 1 corresponds to Pctother and 0 to Pctwhite; Returnp: refer to the monthly net percentage returns; Inter_eth_r: refer to the  
multiplication of Eth_w * Returnp to form an interactive variable; Mfee, Pfee, Rfee: refer to management, performance and redemption fees  
respectively (stored as percentages); Hrate: refer to hurdle rates (stored as percentages); Hwmark: refer to high watermark fees (stored as the  
binary 1/0); Lock_u: refer to the lock-up period (stored as the number of months); Adv_n: refer to advanced notice (stored as the number of months);  
Man_t: refer to the length of managers’ tenure (stored in years). All variables are extracted/built on the basis of data extracted from the Morningstar  






Table 5.10 Risk-Adjusted Metrics 
Metric 




Panel A: Classic Ratios 
Sharpe Ratio 0.18 0.26 0.11 
Jensen Alpha 0.07 0.08 0.03 
Panel B: Lower Partial Moment Ratios 
Omega Ratio 0.92 0.89 0.87 
Sortino Ratio 0.56 0.39 0.18 
Kappa 3 0.27 0.28 0.83 
Upside Potential Ratio 1.30 1.05 0.16 
Panel C: Drawdown Ratios 
Calmar Ratio 0.03 0.03 0.10 
Sterling Ratio 0.55 0.63 0.05 
Burke Ratio 0.46 0.52 0.05 
Panel D: Ratios Based on the Value at Risk 
ErVaR 0.20 0.20 0.10 
CSR 0.44 0.53 0.13 
MSR 0.21 0.30 0.32 
Note: This table presents the risk-adjusted metrics  
categorised into four panels: classic, lower partial moment,  
drawdowns and value at risk. Furthermore, the columns  
corresponding to Pctwhite and Pctother denote the racial/ethnic  
associations of the hedge fund managers. The difference between  














Figure 1. The Annual Ethnic Fluctuations of the HF Managers (1999-2019) 
 
Note: This figure shows the percentage fluctuation in the number of HFs managed by Pctwhite and Pctother 
managers between January 1999 and December 2019. The data has been extracted from the Morningstar Direct 













































































































Figure 2. Top 20 Most Popular HF Manager Names (1999-2019) 
 








































































































Most Popular HF Manager Names
131 
 
Chapter 6. Conclusion of the Thesis 
The importance of hedge funds has been highlighted in this thesis several times. Most importantly, 
hedge funds with their US$ 3.61tn (Prequin, 2020) in assets under management exhibit a significant 
influence over global financial stability. Despite the wealth of research conducted in the area of hedge 
fund performance, risk and corporate governance, the literature remains silent on the combined effects 
of geolocation and strategy, gender differences in performance and risk, and the flow-performance 
relationship amongst ethnic minority hedge fund managers. Therefore, the main aim of this doctoral 
research is to address the gaps mentioned above. More specifically, Chapter 3 answers the question 
“Does the geolocation and investment strategy effects impact the estimation of risk in performance 
persistence measurement dynamics?”; Chapter 4 investigates “Is there a difference in the risk-adjusted 
performance and performance persistence between male and female hedge fund managers?”; while 
Chapter 5 answers, “Does the racial association of the hedge fund manager affect the investment choice 
of the investor?”. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis documents the difference in performance persistence from the 
perspective of domicile, strategy and the combination of both. The area of coverage spans the four most 
hedge fund saturated domiciles and the four most commonly employed investment strategies. We use 
the dataset of 5619 for the period between 1995 and 2016. The results indicate short-term performance 
persistence individually across all combinations (the domicile, the investment strategy and the 
combination of both). Furthermore, the combination of the two aforementioned clusters exhibits 
diminished persistence as well as its loss and occasional reversal. The parametric (non-risk-adjusted) 
analysis reveals dominant and statistically significant negative performance persistence in portfolios 
combined with IRL and the USA domiciled hedge funds. Similar occurrence takes place in the geo-
strategic combinations and domiciles employing LSE or MLTI strategies. Whereas the parametric yet 
risk-adjusted approach shows changes in the outcomes for several domiciles and the investment 
strategies, where previously founded negative performance is elevated into the positive and statistically 
significant levels. Overall, the result of the study shows that the dependence on either domicile or 
strategy for the analysis of the performance persistence can be misleading. The frequent omission or 
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underestimation of the domicile factor has not provided a complete risk-accountability, much needed 
in the hedge fund environment. This chapter primarily provides a significant contribution to hedge fund 
investors. The results indicate the potential of capita loss where there is no accountability for the 
combined effects of domicile and strategy.  
Furthermore, Chapter 4 has taken another step into the area of risk-adjusted performance and 
performance persistence. Although, this time through a prism of a hedge fund managers’ gender. 
Employing the dataset with 1321 hedge funds and a timeframe between 1978 and 2018, I have identified 
that the comparison of male and female managers under the assumptions of metrics based on the lower-
order statistics provides similar/same results. Whereas the application of metrics beyond lower-partial 
statistics reveals that female managers marginally underperform in relation to generation of returns and 
risk management as compared with their male counterparts. The returns of female managed hedge funds 
are, on average, negatively skewed, while the performance measures employed in the analysis identify 
negative deviations and penalize these funds relative to the ones managed by males (where the skewness 
of returns is in the positive territory). Regarding the performance persistence analysis, both male and 
female managed hedge funds were found to exhibit varying levels of persistence. Under the non-
parametric assumptions, female managed funds have, on average, dominated their male counterparts in 
the overall number of cases. Nevertheless, it was the male managed funds that exhibited the majority 
of dominance in cases that were statistically significant. In the parametric (non-risk-adjusted) approach, 
I have observed a mix of negative and positive persistence fluctuations between both genders. Although, 
the last approach, with the accountability for risks crystallising in hedge funds, has proven that the male 
managers have exhibited stronger (and almost in all cases of analysed horizons) positive performance 
persistence. The main contribution of this chapter is to reinvigorate the debate around female presence 
within the financial industry. Furthermore, the previous hedge fund related literature has not provided 
any answers regarding gender differences in risk, performance and/or performance persistence. 
The relative minority that female managers represent in the hedge fund industry has led me to 
my next research question, which has been analysed in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 continues the focus on the 
minority representative hedge fund managers, this time, however, from the racial/ethnic perspective. 
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The cleaned dataset consists of 770 hedge funds and a timeframe between 1999-2019. The results have 
proven without a shadow of a doubt that racial/ethnic minority hedge fund managers receive 
significantly lower flows of capital into their hedge funds. The impact is profound as the capital inflows 
are approximately six times higher than those reported in the similar literature on mutual funds 
concerning the ‘foreignness’ of the manager’s name or manager’s gender. The findings are specifically 
interesting as the minority hedge fund managers generate higher raw returns than their non-minority 
counterparts. Thus, inevitably leading to a similar conclusion as expressed in the mutual fund literature 
and the rejection of the notion of rational statistical discrimination. The findings presented in Chapter 
5 contribute to the literature concerning hedge funds, social biases and discrimination. Furthermore, as 
was also the case in a previous chapter, they raise awareness regarding the numbers of race/ethnic 
minority hedge fund managers within one of the most secretive investment industries in the world.  
Despite the contributions mentioned above, this thesis also has several limitations. First, the 
databases employed throughout this thesis do not contain the entire, complete hedge fund universe - 
this limitation could be addressed by a merger of all known, mainstream hedge fund databases (provided 
there is unrestricted access). Thus, potentially leading to changes in the results, especially in areas 
identifying merely marginal differences (be it between geolocations/strategies, genders or ethnic 
associations). Furthermore, a data merger between hedge fund databases could be beneficial and allow 
for insight into other regions/strategies (depending on hedge fund saturation). Second, the literature 
concerning in-depth gender differences including the accountability for crucial statistical properties, 
such as predominantly negative skewness and positive kurtosis, autocorrelation, biases, and fat tails of 
the return’s distribution in hedge funds (e.g., Kat, 2003; Eling, 2006, Fung and Hsieh, 1999) does not 
exist. Thus, not allowing for direct contrast between the results this thesis has generated - other than the 
in-direct contrast with the mean-variance focused work of Argawal and Boyson (2016). The same 
applies to Chapter 5, as the hedge fund managers’ ethnicity has never been considered in the analysis 
of flows. Third, further limitations may concern the mainstream performance and performance 
persistence methods employed in this thesis. Fourth, in all chapters, although with particular emphasis 
on Chapters 4 and 5, there may be cultural and regional biases impacting the investors' decisions 
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(whether or not they should invest in a hedge fund managed by a male/female or an ethnic minority). 
This kind of research would require a more in-depth cross-discipline examination.  
This thesis is directly applicable in practice in several areas. First, through the previously 
unseen contrasts, Chapter 3 of the thesis provides the potential hedge fund investor with a unique view. 
The investor can easily infer that the domicile or a strategy may not provide them with a level of insight 
that the combination of both does. Furthermore, the chapter also signifies the importance of the 
performance persistence methods as their results differ depending on their mechanics (non-parametric 
and/or parametric non/risk-adjusted). Chapter 4 continues to examine the performance persistence with 
the addition of risk-adjusted performance metrics. Similar to the previous chapter, we can also observe 
the significance of metrics employed in the analysis. Furthermore, this time, the chapter divides the data 
into two gender-based clusters and shows that the time horizon of the research plays a pivotal role and 
allows investors to plan more strategically. Lastly, Chapter 5 considers the capital flows into hedge 
funds, which are clustered based on the fund manager's race/ethnicity. This approach yet again looks at 
the minority hedge fund managers (right after the earlier gender-focused chapter) and how the investors 
perceive them. Furthermore, both clusters' performance is assessed in an attempt to identify whether 
the flows are performance or perhaps race/ethnicity related. In this case, the potential future investor 
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